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Abstract
Billions of devices are connected to the Internet nowadays, and the number
will continue to grow in the future thanks to the advances in the electronics
and telecommunication technology developments. Its application in broad as-
pects of human's life brings a lot of benets by improving productivity and
quality of life. This paradigm, which is often called Internet of Things (IoT)
or Machine-to-Machine (M2M), will provide an unprecedented opportunity to
create applications and services that go far beyond the mere purpose of each
participant.
Many studies on the both technical and social aspects of IoT have shown
that the concern about the security and privacy play a huge role for the mass
adoption of the IoT/M2M as cloud services. Among the important topics
within the security and privacy, the access control is an important mechanism,
which essentially manages how the important assets or resource of a system
can be accessed by other parties by means of a set of access policies.
For an IoT system such as Radio Frequency Identication (RFID) that col-
lects huge amounts of RFID events data and may store it in the cloud storage
for tracking purpose, access control to such data becomes a critical point to
the privacy of the enterprises as well as the customers. Certainly, designing
an access control to the RFID events data with high-granularity is desirable
to maintain the privacy while allowing external party to perform tracking and
tracing of RFID tags. In addition, mobility or location management also plays
a big role to perform tracking of RFID tags. Scalability and eciency are two
important requirements in location management when big numbers of tags are
moving from one reading location to the others, i.e. being mobile. Thus, de-
signing a ne-grained access control along with scalable location management
in RFID system is of paramount importance.
A distributed cloud platform approach for the IoT/M2M, which consists of
a set of IoT/M2M gateways, is introduced to cope with some inherent issues
of IoT network which is highly heterogeneous and distributed in nature. As a
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result, access control becomes even more challenging when such approach -also
called as local cloud - which may consist of devices with low computational
capacity, is used. As each of the IoT/M2M gateways may have dierent as-
sets or resources, and thus dierent access policies, combining dierent policies
and to make an access control decision in distributed manner is a very chal-
lenging task. In addition, the access control system should also fulll other
requirements in terms of scalability, context-awareness, exibility, and attack
resilience. These challenges lead us to come up with capability-based access
control that can be easily distributed, i.e. scalable and suitable for distributed
system, and propagated, i.e. allow exible access delegation. On top of that,
contextual information can also be included in the capability data structure so
as to deal with dynamic context in IoT/M2M environment. However, thorough
design of capability-based access control is needed, especially to keep the ac-
cess delegation through capability propagation under control and to maintain
secure access control.
To detect and mitigate various threats, especially the insider threat, within
the IoT/M2M local cloud platform is a dicult task for the access control
system. Thus, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is needed as the integral
part of the access control system. We can imagine a situation where a malicious
node disguises as a good node such that it can join the local cloud, but once
it becomes part of the cloud it would cause a huge damage to the system.
For example it could manipulate access right of an actuator controlled by a
gateway, e.g. to open a gate or turning on or o some switches, stealing
some sensitive data from sensors, and so on. Keeping in mind such threat
and the fact that minimum human interaction is needed in the local cloud
environment, the IDS should be able to learn and update its knowledge based
on the interaction with the other nodes. This leads us to study, model, and
analyze the interactions between malicious node and regular node equipped
with IDS with game theory, in order to suggest the best strategies for both
sides. The study also includes a general fact that each node has a set of assets or
resources with dierent values. Finally, an optimum strategy for both attacker
and defender will be derived by considering their respective costs and benets.
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Dansk Resume
Milliarder af apparater er forbundet til internettet i disse dage og antal af disse
apparater vil stige i fremtiden takket vre udviklingen i elektronik og telekom-
munikation. Dens anvendelse i ere aspekter af menneskeliv har bragt en masse
fordele ved at forbedre produktivitet og livskvalitet. Dette paradigme, som ofte
hedder Internet of Things (IoT) eller Machine-to-Machine (M2M), vil give en
hidtil uset mulighed for at skabe applikationer og tjenester, som strkker langt
over det behov, som hver forbruger har.
En del studier pa bade de tekniske og sociale aspekter af IoT har indikeret,
at bekymringen for sikkerhed og privatliv spiller en stor rolle for anvendelse af
IoT/M2M som cloud services. Udover sikkerhed og privatliv er adgangskontrol
ogsa en vigtig mekanisme, som essentielt styrer vigtigheden af andre partier
til at fa adgang til et systems aktiv eller ressourcer ved hjlp af et st af
adgangspolitikker. For et IoT system sasom Radio Frequency Identication
(RFID), som samler store mngder RFID events data og som kan opbevares
i cloud storage saledes for at kunne bliver sporet, adgangskontrol til dataene
bliver et vigtigt punkt for virksomhedernes og kundernes privatliv. At designe
en adgangskontrol til RFID events data med en hj njagtighed er bestemt
nsket for at kunne opretholde privatlivet og samtidig tillade eksterne partier at
foretage sporingen af RFID tags. Ydermere spiller mobilitets og beliggenhed
styring ogsa en stor rolle i at foretage sporing af RFID tags. Skalerbarhed
og eektivitet er de to vigtige krav i styringen af beliggenheden nar store
mngder af data bevger sig fra en lsebeliggenhed til andre beliggenheder
ved eksempelvis at vre bevgelig. Derfor er det vigtigt at designe en nkornet
adgangskontrol sammen med en skalerbar beliggenhedstyring i RFID systemet.
En distribueret skyplatform tilgang til IoT/M2M, som bestar af et st
IoT/M2M gateways, er blevet introduceret for at kunne handtere nogle iboende
sager vedr. IoT netvrk, som i hj grad er forskellige og distribueret af karak-
ter. Dette medfrer, at adgangskontrollen bliver mere udfordrende nar der
anvendes sadan en tilgang, som ogsa hedder local cloud og som kan besta af
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apparater med en lav beregningsmssig kapacitet. Da hver IoT/M2M gate-
way kunne have forskellige aktiver eller ressourcer og dermed ogsaforskellige
adgangspolitikker, at kombinere diverse politikker og foretage en beslutning om
handteringen af adgangskontrollen er en meget krvende opgave. Desuden skal
adgangskontrolsystemet ogsa opfylde andre krav med henblik pa skalerbarhed,
kontekstbevidsthed, eksibilitet og angrebsmodstandskraft. Disse udfordringer
leder frem til udviklingen af en kapacitetsbaseret adgangskontrol, som let kan
distribueres ved fx at vre skalerbar og egnet til et distribueret og spredt
system. Et distribueret og spredt system angiver hermed en eksibel adgang-
suddelegering. Oven i kbet vil kontekstuelle data ogsa kunne vre inkluderet
i kapacitetsdatastrukturen for at kunne handtere den dynamiske kontekst i
IoT/M2M miljet. Det skal dog bemrkes, at der skal et grundigt design
af en kapacitetsbaseret adgangskontrol til for at styre adgangsuddelegeringen
gennem kapacitetspredningen og for at opretholde en sikker adgangskontrol.
At detektere og afbde forskellige trusler, isr interne trusler i IoT/M2M
lokal skyplatform, er en besvrlig opgave for adgangskontrolsystemet. Derfor
er det ndvendigt at have en Intrusion Detection System (IDS) som en cen-
tral del af adgangskontrolsystemet. Man kan forestille sig en situation, hvor
en farlig node skjuler sin identitet og lader som om, den er en ufarlig node.
Nar truslen trnger ind i den lokale sky kan den faktisk medfre en stor og
alvorlig skade pa systemet. For eksempel kan den manipulere en aktuators
adgangsret, som er styret af en gateway ved at lukke op for indgangen i sys-
temet eller slukke nogle knapper i systemet, at stjle nogle mtalelige data fra
sensorerne, osv. Af hensyn til sadanne trusler og ndvendigheden af minimum
menneskeinteraktionen i det lokale skymiljburde IDS kunne lre og opdatere
dets viden pa baggrund af interaktionen med andre noder. Dette frer frem til
at studere, analysere og modellere interaktioner mellem farlige og almindelige
noder forsynet med IDS med spilteori for at kunne anbefale de bedste strate-
gier for begge parter. Studiet omfatter ogsa faktummet, at hver node har en
rkke aktiver eller ressourcer med forskellige vrdier. Endelig vil en optimal
strategi for bade angriber og forsvarer kunne opnas ved at tage hjde for deres
respektive omkostninger og fordele.
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Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to motivate the necessities in securing, as well as
ensuring the privacy and trust, of the Internet of Things (IoT)/Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) and Cloud, by taking into consideration the huge demands of
such applications nowadays and in the future. The glimpse of the key issues is
taken in this chapter which are identied and addressed in the dissertation. It
includes explanation of contributions of the dissertation and related publica-
tions which are provided. Finally, outline of the thesis is specied that gives
an overview of the individual chapters.
1.1 Motivation
Billions of devices are connected to the internet nowadays, and the number
will continue to grow in the future. As documented in [37] back in 2004, Har-
bor Research, a technology consultancy and analysis rm, predicted that by
2010, at least 1.5 billion devices will be Internet-connected worldwide. Some
advances in the electronics and telecommunication technology developments in
recent years, especially in wireless communication, that result in various kinds
of tiny yet powerful devices with communication and networking capabilities,
have attracted the industries to adopt this technology into their everyday busi-
ness, so as to increase their eciency, i.e. saving time, money or both [14].
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Moreover, there is also a huge demands in other sector other than industrial
sector, such as public service, assisted living, etc, for this Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) developments.
Therefore, this calls the needs to a new paradigm in machine-to-machine
communication which enables object or "things" connectivity to the global
internet network. This paradigm has been "popularized" in the recent years
by the term IoT or M2M. Before going even further, it is important to note
that the term IoT and M2M are often referring to the same thing or used
interchangeably. One of the articles found in the literature that use both of the
term Internet of Things and M2M is [14]. The article was entitled "The Internet
of Things", and the author of this article said that M2M communications
would bring about a new wave of growth in the global economy driven by
billions of electronic and electromechanical devices being connected to the
Internet. In the recent years, the terms M2M/IoT have been used together in
many scientic conferences within the eld of Information and Communication
Technology.
The vision of connecting billions and even trillions of devices to the internet
have come closer to the realization nowadays, driven by many kinds of appli-
cations that not only concern with the industries but also the government as
well as public institution, and even everyday people's life. For instance, smart
grid and smart metering allow the electrical utility companies to monitor the
supply of electrical power by power plants, including those that are owned
by private house, especially the ones with renewable energy sources, and the
energy demands by means of monitoring devices, e.g. wireless sensors. More-
over, the electricity prices that are based on supply and demand can also be
monitored by the users, so as they can utilize their electrical appliances when
the electricity price goes low due to high supply and so on. Another example is
the Intelligent Transport System (ITS) application in which information about
the trac in a city can be monitored by wireless sensors or video surveillance,
and then communicated to the users on their mobile devices with the help
of a Global Positioning System (GPS) transceiver, so that users will get the
information about the best route by avoiding trac jam, or the road accident
can be prevented due to bad road condition, bad weather, natural disaster, e.g.
avalanche, landslide, or ood, and so on. In fact, there are a lot more examples
and applications in dierent areas that can utilize the M2M or IoT, such as
e-Health, smart home and building, environment monitoring, etc. All those
examples show that massive amount of data generated by billions of devices
will be transferred through the network, and eventually the internet. In one
hand, it opens a completely new opportunities and business models, especially
to telecommunication industries due to high amount of generated data trac
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as well as to the ICT players in general, and also growth in the global economy
in general. On the other hand, it leaves some problems and challenges to be
tackled, in particular the security and privacy issues.
Another statement that can support the previous paragraph can be found in
[15], in which US National Intelligence Council (NIC) in its Conference Report
on Disruptive Civil Technologies has included IoT as one of "Six Technologies
with Potential Impacts on US Interests out to 2025". It was foreseen that the
internet nodes will reside in almost all everyday things such as food packages,
furniture, paper documents, and more, and therefore, it could contribute in-
valuably to the economy. Besides the potential opportunities of IoT to the US
economy, [15] also stressed out the potential risk of IoT which is the loss due
to the security issue that could be exploited from IoT. This really shows how
huge the impact of IoT to the economy and people's everyday life is, and also
the risk it might cause to the security, not to mention the loss in privacy due
to security breach of people's personal private information communicated over
those devices.
Smart things or objects connected to the Internet can take advantage of
services that are oered by the cloud [35]. One obvious benet of integrat-
ing IoT/M2M with cloud is to give exibility to the user in accessing services
oered by the M2M application through web interface. Thus, it also gives
exibility to the M2M service provider to oer its services to even more users
or customers. Besides that, utilizing cloud services, thanks to the advances in
the cloud computing technology, could bring more advantages to the actual
deployment of M2M or IoT. First of all, an IoT device could save the energy
consumption, to a certain extent, by ooading its computation to the cloud
infrastructure. That is, if the computational energy required to perform a
certain task locally is higher then sending the data to the cloud through the
internet [36]. Nevertheless, this kind of solution faces another unique chal-
lenges, such as security and privacy, communication reliability, and real-time
data requirement in some IoT/M2M applications [36]. Secondly, centralized
decision making and management of billions of devices within the cloud will
become an essential value of the IoT vision, although decentralized processing
is critical to address the complexity of M2M applications [60].
Cloud computing itself is becoming a popular paradigm in the internet
computing world, that provides a model to support processing large volumet-
ric data using clusters of commodity computers [50]. This computing model
allows on-demand, pay-for-use, and more economical, scalable IT services, over
the Internet. Moreover, it provides many advantages for businesses|including
low initial capital investment, shorter start-up time for new services, lower
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maintenance and operation costs, higher utilization through virtualization, and
easier disaster recovery|that make cloud computing an attractive option [36].
Cloud platforms are dynamically built through virtualization with provisioned
hardware, software, networks, and datasets [24]. Thanks to the virtualiza-
tion technology, the computing at the local devices, such as PC, mobile and
M2M devices, can be migrated to a virtual server clusters at the data cen-
ter. However, the lack of trust on the security and privacy protection of cloud
users information to the cloud providers prevents the wide scale acceptance
of cloud based computing services, which call the needs of designing a secure,
trustworthy, and dependable cloud platform.
1.2 IoT/M2M and Cloud Service: An Intro-
duction
In the eld of ICT, there is no single universally accepted denition of the
term IoT or M2M, although it is used to refer to a vision of connecting multi-
billions of electronics and communication devices, including all everyday things
powered by "smart" objects, to the internet. The vision of IoT is very much
inuenced by the term "Internet of Things" itself, which syntactically is com-
posed of two terms: "Internet" and "Things" [9]. As a result, the visions one
IoT paradigm is divided into two main visions, namely the network oriented
vision of IoT or the "Internet oriented" and the "Things oriented" vision which
focus on generic "objects" to be integrated into a common framework.
The very rst denition of IoT derives from a "Things oriented" perspec-
tive; the considered things were very simple items: Radio Frequency IDenti-
cation (RFID) tags. The terms "Internet of Things" is, in fact, was popularized
by the work of the Auto-ID Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (MIT), when its rst white paper [54] already suggested a vision that ex-
tended beyond RFID [43]. Auto-ID center together with EPCGlobal have been
focusing mainly on the development of the Electronic Product Code (EPC) to
support a widely use of the RFID technology in the modern trading and supply
chain networks worldwide, and to create the industry-driven global standards
for the EPCglobal Network. These standards are primarily designed to im-
prove object traceability and the awareness of its status, current location, etc.
This is without doubt a key component towards the full deployment of the IoT
vision. However, it is not the only one.
An article in [48] stated that RFID still stands at the forefront of the
technologies driving the vision due to the RFID maturity, low cost, and strong
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support from the business community. However, the authors in [48] also stated
a wide portfolio of device, network, and service technologies, together with
RFID, will eventually build up the IoT, such as Near Field Communication
(NFC), WSAN (Wireless Sensor and Actuator Network). An example of a
combined RFID and wireless sensor network is WISP (Wireless Identication
and Sensing Platforms) [49] in which a sensing platform is developed on top of
passive RFID tags based on EPCGlobal standards, in particular EPC Class 1
Generation 1 and 2 standards, which operate in the UHF bands.
On the other hand, the term M2M was initially introduced by carrying the
"Things" oriented vision, driven by the industries to help them in increasing
their eciency in the industrial process. M2M telemetry made a breakthrough
already in the early 2000s, with the use of cellular modems and IP to monitor
and control a wide range of equipment from vending machines to water pumps
[55]. The "hype"towards M2M communication was further elevated along with
the developments of some new standards in wireless communication utilizing
the free-unlicensed ISM band in the early 2000, such as the IEEE 802.11 that
is known as Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) standard; IEEE 802.15.1
or Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) standard that was ratied in the
early version of Bluetooth technology; and IEEE 802.15.4, which is a low rate
WPAN used for short range communication, and is adopted by ZigBee. The
implementation of those wireless standards have been widely used since then
by the industries in dierent sectors, ranging from remote monitoring and mea-
surements, to the industry automation and robotics. Earlier, some companies
that are already deploying M2M system based on those wireless standards or
other technologies, would rather call their applications as either "building au-
tomation", "patient monitoring", "automated meter reading", "automated asset
tracking", and so on, instead of the M2M technology [14]. Nowadays, M2M
applications are becoming broader, touching almost any aspect of people's life
and any communication-capable devices. The authors in [60] envisioned the
future M2M towards the embedded internet. This vision allude to embedding
more intelligence and functionality, such as security-on-chip, system analytic,
embedded augmented sensing, and plug-and-play capability, to the end device.
On the networking oriented category falls the IoT vision of the IPSO (IP for
Smart Objects) Alliance. This forum suggests Internet Protocol (IP) to be the
main networking protocol towards interconnecting billions of communication-
capable smart "things" or objects [16]. The main reasons for pushing IP for
IoT are due to its maturity, interoperability, scalability, manageability, and the
fact that it has been widely accepted network and communication society. Fur-
thermore, in some of IPSO's whitepapers [1, 23], it was shown that through a
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wise IP adaptation and by incorporating IEEE 802.15.4 into the IPv6 architec-
ture, i.e. IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN),
the IP stacks consume a small memory footprint. This development confutes
the belief that IP is such a heavyweight protocol. Hence, the full deployment
of the IoT paradigm will be enabled by using IP as the networking protocol.
Internet-0 or "Internet-Zero" follows a similar approach of reducing the com-
plexity of the IP stack to achieve a protocol designed to interconnect all type
of devices over IP, a concept known as interdevice internetworking [19]. Ac-
cording to both the IPSO and Internet-0 approaches, the IoT will be deployed
by means of a sort of simplication of the current IP to adapt it to any object
and make those objects addressable and reachable from any location [9].
Another work related to the networking oriented of IoT vision was done
in the context of MAGNET and MAGNET Beyond projects [47]. MAG-
NET's primary focus was on the concepts of Personal Network (PN) and its
extension, Personal Network Federation (PN-F), enabling wireless machine-to-
machine communication literally, from within the short range communication,
e.g. WPAN, and even goes across dierent geographical positions. Among
others, its networking protocols, including the PN and PN-F creation as well
as the interoperability with the existing network, such as 3G and beyond 3G;
and a solid security framework which includes identity, trust, and key man-
agement; have been some key contributions towards opening path of the IoT
vision.
1.3 State of the Art: IoT/M2M Cloud Plat-
form and the Enabling Technologies
This section gives an overview of the related theories as well as the state of
the art of technologies and research and development works, which are im-
portant to this PhD work. It will begin with the description of the enabling
technologies within IoT/M2M, including the RFID as an identication, sens-
ing, and communication technology; IoT/M2M middleware that bridges the
physical world with the application layer; and the network architecture, en-
abling the actual machine-to-machine communication through internet. It will
then followed by some brief overview of cloud computing technology and its
taxonomy. Finally the state-of-the-art of the IoT/M2M and cloud platform,
and some research works on the security, privacy, and trust in such platform
will be presented.
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1.3.1 IoT/M2M Physical Sensing: RFID as an Identi-
cation, Sensing, and Communication Technology
RFID is one of the most promising identication, sensing as well as communica-
tion technology to enable the actual deployment of IoT. One of its important
feature that requires no power source, i.e. passive RFID, and moreover its
price that decreases over time, along with the invention of new technologies
and ecient RFID production, have become the main reason for industries to
adapt it into their business process recently. Furthermore, the development
of sensing platform on top of passive RFID tag, such as the WISP project by
Intel [49], ALB-2484 by Alien Technology, TELID 210 by Microsensys, and
[25] that is developed by three Japanese companies [45], is giving more degree
of freedom to the RFID to be used in a remote sensing type of application by
the industries, e.g. the cold supply chain. In addition to that, some research
works and commercial products attempted at integrating the RFID system
with the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), either at the network level [13],
or tag level, i.e. integrated RFID tag and sensor node, [52, 45], enable the
multi-hop communication and wireless ad-hoc network creation within RFID
system, thus extending the potential applications of RFID. With all these
consideration, this PhD work focuses on RFID as the identication, sensing,
and communication technology for IoT.
1.3.1.1 RFID system components
Depending on the type of application as well as the industrial sectors that
deploy it, an RFID system can be very complex. An overall RFID system
components that can cover the very complex type of RFID application, consists
of the following three subsystems [34]:
 Radio Frequency (RF) subsystem: This part performs identication and
related transactions using wireless communication.
 Enterprise subsystem: It consists of specialized software that can store,
process, and analyse data acquired from RF subsystem transactions to
make the data useful to a supported business process.
 Inter-enterprise subsystem: This subsystem connects enterprise subsys-
tems when information needs to be shared across organizational bound-
aries.
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Essentially, the actually RF subsystem consists of readers, which are also
called interrogators, and tags, which are also called transponders. Both the
enterprise and inter-enterprise subsystem together are also commonly called
as an RFID middleware, that consists of several components designed in a
modular fashion. While the RF subsystem and the enterprise subsystem {
to a certain extend, depending on the RFID middleware component used in
the deployment { are the must have ones in every RFID system, an RFID
system with an inter-enterprise subsystem is typically used, for instance in a
supply chain application. Thanks to the inter-enterprise subsystem, a tagged
product in a supply chain application can be tracked throughout its life cycle,
from manufacture to nal purchase, and sometimes even afterwards (e.g., to
support targeted product recalls) [34]. Furthermore, with the tracking feature
enabled by the inter-enterprise RFID subsystem, it can provide information
and status of the tagged product or object, i.e. what, where, and why, pre-
vent counterfeiting, enhance traceability, oer added value services, and so on.
In the following sub-sections, we will be explaining the RF subsystem which
consists of two main components, namely RFID tag and reader, based on the
legacy standards and available commercial products. Thereafter, the RFID
middleware, i.e. enterprise and inter-enterprise subsystems, will be described
in more details in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1.2 RFID Tag
An RFID tag must consists of two basic parts, namely the microchip and the
antenna. The microchip in an RFID tag is a small electronic device that stores
a unique identier and may have also other features such as memory to store
additional data and security algorithms. The antenna enables an RFID tag
to communicate and exchange some data with RFID reader through the radio
signal. In addition to those basic parts, an RFID tag may also comprise of a
battery and sensor. The dierent components that made up a tag, may dene
dierent classications of RFID tag.
In general, RFID tags can be classied based on the following features
or criterion: power source, operating frequency, and identier format. Table
1.1 summarizes features of RFID system operating at dierent frequencies
based on ISO/IEC standard which also shows dierent power source modes,
i.e. passive or active, and their potential usages and applications.
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Table 1.1: Summary of RFID systems operating at dierent frequencies
< 135 kHz 13.56 MHz 433 MHz 860-960 MHz 2.45 GHz
Type A
(FDX): operate
at 125 kHz;
permanently
powered by the
reader
Mode 1: Reader-
to-Tag data rate is
1.65 or 26.48 kbps;
Tag-to-Reader data
rate is 26.48 kbps
Active RFID
with reading
range greater
than 1 meter
Type A:
Reader-to-tag
data rate is 33
kbps; Tag-to-
reader data rate
is 40 or 160 kbps
Mode 1: pas-
sive FHSS
backscatter or
narrow band
operation
Type B
(HDX): operate
at 134.2kHz;
powered by the
reader only in
the forward
link
Mode 2 (high
speed): Reader-to-
Tag data rate is
423.75 kbps; Tag-
to-Reader data rate
is 105.9375 kbps on
each of 8 channels
Type B:
Reader-to-
tag data rate is
10 or 40 kbps;
Tag-to-reader
data rate is 40
or 160 kbps
Mode 2: data
rate of R/W tag
is up to 384 kbps
and 76.8 kbps
for R/O tag; ac-
tive RFID with
backscattering
Mode 3 (high
speed): Option
1 (ASK based):
Reader-to-Tag
data rate is 26.7 -
100 kbps; Tag-to-
Reader data rate
is 424 or 848 kbps,
and 53 - 212 kbps
Type C:
Reader-to-
tag data rate is
26.7 - 128 kbps;
Tag-to-reader
data rate is 40 -
640 kbps, or 5 -
320 kbps
Option 2 (PJM
based): Reader-to-
Tag data rate is
212 kbps; Tag-to-
Reader data rate is
105.9375 kbps on
each of 8 channels
Type D: it is
a tag talks only
after listen tech-
nology
1.3.1.3 Identier format
Every tag has an identier (ID) that is used to uniquely identify it. Since
the RFID is used a global trading system which involves many companies and
stakeholders, there needs to be a standard ID format, such that the encoding
and decoding of the tags ID can be done across domains and organizations.
The organizations that are actively involved in developing tag ID format in
the context of EPC are the EPCglobal and GS1 (Global Standards One). The
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results of their work on this matter are collected as part of the EPC Tag
Data Standard (TDS) [29], which comprises a number of data formats for
encoding and decoding tags ID. [29] also covers the specication of EPC and
its relationship with GS1 keys and other existing codes. In general, the data
structure of an EPC tag ID scheme consists of three or four elds as follows
(see also Figure 1.1):
 The Header which species the EPC scheme or type
 TheGeneral Manager Number in GID, or the GS1 Company Prex in the
other EPC schemes. General Manager Number eld is uniquely assigned
by the EPCglobal and it identies an organizational entity (essentially
a company, manager or other organization) that is responsible for main-
taining the numbers in subsequent elds, while GS1 Company Prex is
assigned by GS1 to a managing entity or its delegates.
 The Object class or reference. Depending on the usage of the EPC
scheme, this eld can be called by dierent terms, e.g. item, service,
document, etc. This is essentially used by an EPC managing entity to
identify a class or "type" of thing.
 The Serial number is a unique, non-repeating code within each of the
object class. Please note that some of the EPC schemes do not have this
eld, e.g. GIAI and GSRN.
Header
General 
Manager 
Number
Object Class
Serial 
Number
Assigned by EPCglobal
Assigned by General 
Manager owner
Figure 1.1: EPC tag ID format
It is important to note though that there are many cases where the RFID
vendors are using their own tag ID data format in some commercial prod-
ucts; the organizations that choose to develop and implement their own tag
ID format; and other networking protocols using dierent ID data format that
are integrated to the RFID system. Therefore, various ID data formats in
the tags produced by dierent vendors or other networking protocols, e.g. IP,
need to be mapped to the standard EPC format, if te organizations that use
those proprietary tag ID formats want to make their business to be compatible
with the EPC network. To solve this issue, a translation process from those
"unstandardized" ID formats to the EPC TDS need to be done at the middle-
ware level. EPCglobal also provides a standard for this translation mechanism
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known as GS1 EPCglobal Tag Data Translation (TDT) [30], which also serves
the purpose of supporting the future development of EPC identiers scheme.
Issues related to the translation of the proprietary tag ID or other protocol ID
format to the standard EPC format and how the results of the implemented
solutions are, will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
1.3.2 IoT/M2M Middleware: Open RFID Middleware
platform
The middleware is an important component in the IoT/M2M architecture,
which essentially is a software layer mediated between the physical world and
the application layers [9]. One of its features is hiding the details of dierent
identication, sensing and communication technologies in the physical world,
such as RFID, Zigbee, Bluetooth, etc, is fundamental to accommodate the
IoT/M2M application developers from their lack of knowledge about certain
communication technology, and accelerates the development process. Further-
more, it also has a major role in simplifying the integration of legacy technolo-
gies into new ones, especially for companies that want to adopt the IoT/M2M
into their existing IT system.
The middleware that bridges the RFID and the rest of the application lay-
ers as well as the global RFID network is dened by by a set of standards
released by EPCglobal, also known as EPCglobal standard. EPCglobal stan-
dard is an industry-driven standard that assists the development of EPC to
support the spread use of RFID in the worldwide trading business, including
supply-chain and logistic industries. It consists of interfaces specication as
well as functionalities that an RFID middleware should have, and meant to
be a guideline for any RFID implementation. The rest of this section will be
dedicated to describe the EPCglobal architecture framework that covers all
the standards on EPCglobal based RFID middleware and the existing RFID
middleware implementation based on EPCglobal, along with its components
and functionalities.
1.3.2.1 EPCglobal architecture framework
\The EPCglobal Architecture Framework is a collection of interrelated hard-
ware, software, and data standards (\EPCglobal Standards"), together with
shared network services that are operated by EPCglobal, its delegates, and
others (\EPCglobal Network Services"), all in service of this common goal
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[28]". EPCglobal itself is a leading organization in regards of industry-driven
standards development for the EPC to support the use of RFID.
EPCglobal Architecture Framework is essentially an architectural guideline
or standard that works as an open system to end users and technology ven-
dors seeking to implement EPCglobal Standards and to use EPCglobal Core
Services. Thus, it does not dene a system architecture that end users must
implement, nor does it dictate particular hardware or software components an
end user must deploy. Figure 1.2 depicts the EPCglobal standards data ow
relationships under EPCglobal architecture framework for Inter-Enterprise sce-
nario which comprises dierent EPCglobal standards including parts of RFID
middleware, hardware, and interfaces that inter-connect among dierent com-
ponents within the same enterprise domain as well as inter-enterprise.
Figure 1.2: EPCglobal overall architecture, components and layers [12]
1.3.2.2 Existing RFID middleware
Essentially, an RFID middleware may be developed by any party or company
in ICT industry either IT companies, RFID vendors, in house built in by
the industries that apply RFID technology, or any open source initiative. As
stated earlier that EPCglobal architecture framework does not dene specic
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system architecture, software, or hardware to be used in RFID middleware
implementation, therefore RFID solution that is brought by each provider
may varies depending on for instance the inter-operability with their existing
IT solution.
One of the existing open source RFID middleware based on EPCglobal
architecture framework is ASPIRE [22]. Figure 1.3 displays the ASPIRE
project version of RFID middleware architecture based on EPCglobal architec-
ture framework. ased on the depicted gure, ASPIRE adopts and implements
Reader Protocol (RP), Low Level Reader Protocol (LLRP), Application Level
Events (ALE), and Electronic Product Code Information System (EPCIS)
module from EPCglobal standards.
Among others, the main parts that perform core functionality of RFID
middleware are ALE server and EPCIS. Basic functionality and features of
those two RFID middleware modules plus Object Name Server (ONS) will be
discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections.
ASPIRE 
Connector 
Application
EPCIS
Repository
ERP Bridge
WMS
Bridge
RDBMS
Bridge
CRM
RDBMS
WMS
ERP
ASPIRE Integrated Development Environment
S
O
A
P
/
H
T
T
P
ERP/WMS/DB 
Configuration
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
Event Data
Event Data
Event Data
M
a
s
t e
r  
D
a
t a E
C
S
p
e
c
 / L
R
S
p
e
c
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
CRM
Bridge
JDBC
A
D
A
P
T
E
R
A
D
A
P
T
E
R Event Data
Business 
Event 
Generator 
(BEG)
Capturing 
Application
C
a
p
t u
r e
 i
/ f
Q
u
e
r y
 i
/ f
Master Data
Event/Master
Data
JMX 
RMI i/f
JMX 
RMI i/f
JMX 
RMI i/f
JMX 
RMI i/f
X LLRP 
READER
FossTrak 
(Virtual)
READER
X RP 
READER
BRI (Intermec) 
READER
Mach1 (Impinj)
READER
Serial 
READER
X Protocol
READER
E
P
C
 R
P
 
I n
t e
r f
a
c
e
E
P
C
 L
L
R
P
 
I n
t e
r f
a
c
e
H
A
L
 
I n
t e
r f
a
c
e
ASPIRE 
Low Cost
READER
Reader 
Core 
Proxy
H
A
L
 I
n
t e
r f
a
c
e
FossTrak 
(Virtual)
READER
JMX 
RMI i/f
Application Integration (JSR-
257, JSR-275, Google KML )
OSGi
O
S
G
i
Based on Fosstrak  *
AspireRFID*
SOAP 
Client
SOAP 
Client
SOAP 
Client
OSGi
Filtering & 
Collection 
Server
EPC ALE 
Interface
e.g., NFC
Tracking
service
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
SOAP/HTTP
HTTP/TCP
S
O
A
P
/H
T
T
P
S
O
A
P
/H
T
T
P
Event Data
SOAP/HTTP
TS-DB
ONS
Owner request
Owner URI
SOAP/HTTP
Figure 1.3: RFID Middleware architecture of ASPIRE based on EPCGlobal
architecture framework [7]
1.3.2.3 ALE server
According to ASPIRE RFID middleware architecture (see Figure 1.3), the
main parts of ALE server which dene its functionality are as follow:
 Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL): ensures inter-vendor inter-
working since many RFID readers come with proprietary standards
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 Filtering and Collection (FC) layer: allows collection of specic
RFID tag ID pattern (after this point, RFID tag will be referred as tag
only), and lter out any unneeded ID due to multiple read of the same
tag ID or simply because of the application's need.
HAL is an interface that allows RFID reader, and even any type of reader
or device, for instance bar-code reader, NFC, bluetooth, or WSN, to communi-
cate with middleware regardless communication protocol that they are using,
i.e. RP and LLRP which are based on EPCGlobal standard, or any propri-
etary protocols. In the real implementation, in order to integrate a particular
RFID reader or other device which uses communication protocol other than
that dened by EPCGlobal standard, a HAL for that device need to be devel-
oped and be part of ALE server. It is worth to mention that HAL is one of
extension component from the original EPCGlobal standard in ASPIRE RFID
middleware.
As mentioned earlier, FC layer is a layer that performs collection particular
RFID tag ID pattern and lter out any unnecessary tag ID which can be read
by multiple readers or antennas in the vicinity of the tag and reduce the data
trac of unnecessary information in the higher layer. Additionally, ltering in
RFID middleware is necessary simply because the application requires it. For
instance, an RFID reader is placed in the dock door of a warehouse to monitor
how many items have been received. In that case, the application needs to
read a specic ID only once, i.e. the rst read, to understand that the item
has been received even though the reader might read multiple times.
1.3.2.4 Business Event Generator (BEG)
It automates the mapping between reports, i.e. ECReport (Event Cycle Re-
port), produced by FC layer and EPCIS events [58]. In EPC terms, BEG
can be seen as a specic instance of EPCIS capturing application that parses
ECReports, fuses these reports with business context data.
1.3.2.5 EPCIS
There are 3 main parts of EPCIS that are dened in the EPCGlobal speci-
cation namely EPCIS capture interface, EPCIS repository, and EPCIS query
interface.
EPCIS capture interface is dened as an interface that responsible to pro-
vide a path for communicating EPCIS events generated by EPCIS Capturing
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Applications to other roles that require them, including EPCIS Repositories,
internal EPCIS Accessing Applications, and Partner EPCIS Accessing Appli-
cations. In the actual RFID Middleware, EPCIS capturing application that
interprets the captured RFID data from the lower layer of Middleware, e.g.
FC layer or other component depending on the implementation, needs to be
implemented along with the EPCIS capture interface.
EPCIS repository is a database system that provides persistence informa-
tion not only raw RFID data, but also other RFID related events which are
dened in FC layer as well as business context information. Those data can
then be accessed by accessing application, both internal and external, through
EPCIS query interface as dened in EPCGlobal specication.
In principle, the main functionality of EPCIS component in an RFID mid-
dleware based on EPCIS standard [26] is as follow:
 Receive application-agnostic RFID data from the ALE server through
the BEG component (see Figure 1.3).
 Translate RFID data in corresponding business events. These events
carry the business context as well (i.e., they refer to particular companies,
business locations, business processes etc.).
 Make business events available and accessible to other upstream appli-
cations.
In general, the ASPIRE EPCIS repository is built to deal with two kinds
of data, namely:
1. RFID event data i.e. data arising in the course of carrying out business
processes. These data change very frequently, at the time scales where
business processes are carried out.
2. Master/company data, i.e. additional data that provide the necessary
context for interpreting the event data. These are data associated with
the company, its business locations, its read points, as well as with the
business steps comprising the business processes that this company car-
ries out.
It is worth to mention that in addition to two above mentioned points,
the ASPIRE EPCIS repository also deals explicitly with historical data (in
addition to current data) and operates within enterprise IT environments at a
level that is much more diverse and multi-faceted comparing to the underlying
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data capture and Filtering and Collection middleware components. Moreover,
as stated earlier that EPCIS repository makes the business events available
and accessible to other upstream applications, i.e. applications sitting at the
other enterprises, etc, the architecture in Figure 1.3 could be extended to
include external enterprises, and security as well as privacy issues related to
this scenario is even more exposed. The security and privacy issues on EPCIS
repository following the Inter-Enterprise will be elaborated in chapter 2.
1.3.2.6 Connector
Connector is responsible to interface the EPCIS repository with the other
legacy systems, e.g. corporate IT systems (CRM, ERP, database, etc). In
telecommunication world, it is similar to the role of gateway.
1.3.2.7 ONS
The ONS is a service that returns a list of network accessible service endpoints
that pertain to a requested EPC. The ONS does not contain actual data
about the EPC; it only contains the network address of services that contain
the actual data [58]. The ONS uses the Internet's existing Domain Name
System (DNS) for resolving requests about an EPC. In order to use DNS to nd
information about an item, the item's EPC must be converted into a format
that DNS can understand, which is the typical, \dot" delimited, left to right
form of all domain-names. The ONS resolution process requires that the EPC
being asked about is in its pure identity Uniform Resource Identier (URI)
form as dened by the EPCglobal TDS [27]. This URI conversion is done in
the local server by the TDT component.
The key components of the logical architecture are the Core ONS servers.
The core of the system comprises by the ONS servers themselves. Each com-
pany assigned part of the global EPC namespace is responsible to create and
maintain a functional ONS server to serve queries about EPC's inside that
namespace. Each ONS server is basically a standard DNS server with special
Naming Authority PoinTeR (NAPTR) records [27], mapping EPC's to service
access points. Typically EPCIS query and capture interfaces where additional
information can be obtained about the EPC in question [58].
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1.3.3 IoT/M2MNetworking Architecture, Components,
and Protocols
In this section, the networking aspect of IoT/M2M based on some proposed
or existing works and initiatives that have been done to achieve the vision of
IoT will be presented. As already discussed earlier that the network oriented
vision of IoT is an important factor towards a successful IoT/M2M deployment.
This vision leads to the necessity of developing and designing a good and
ecient networking concept, comprising the architecture, components as well
as protocols, for the IoT/M2M.
The authors of [60] proposed two types of network architectures for M2M
called hierarchical network architecture for scalable connectivity and hierarchi-
cal networks for high capacity. Both of them are primarily concern about the
networking infrastructures { especially wireless networks { i.e. WPAN/WLAN/Wireless
Wide Area Network (WWAN), to support high demand and trac load gener-
ated to and from M2M devices. The central idea of the rst architecture is to
increase the network scalability by preventing direct trac from M2M devices
to the Wide Area Network (WAN) through an M2M gateway that manages
the M2M devices and serves as an aggregation point. Moreover, it also con-
siders a peer-to-peer connectivity support depending on latency requirements
and the type of information exchanged. On the other hand, the second ar-
chitecture proposed multi-tiers and multi-radios architecture to increase the
capacity of the network. Multi-tiers hierarchy consists of some macro base
stations, e.g. in 3G/4G network, supporting large coverage and high mobility
for M2M devices, coexisting with pico/femto base stations or WLAN access
points that serves to improve link reliability and to increase system capacity.
In order to take the full advantage of this multi-tiers hierarchy architecture,
employing devices with multi-radio system is of a great favour. However, they
do not touch the networking protocols aspect within the IoT/M2M devices
themselves, as well as self-conguring and managing features that are urgently
needed in IoT/M2M.
On the other hand, another great eort towards realizing a networking
architecture and protocols platform in IoT/M2M has been carried out under
the development of 6LoWPAN standard, through Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) 6LoWPAN working group. The main reason why the 6LoWPAN
is highly pushed as the networking protocol for IoT is due to wide acceptance
of IP in the legacy networking devices and the fact that it supports the IP
implementation on low-powered wireless devices, especially those that are using
IEEE 802.15.4 standard and link layer or access technologies, e.g. sub-GHz
ISM band radio and low-rate power line communication (PLC). Furthermore, it
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also extends the already established Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET) into
the multi-hop wireless mesh routing where an internet gateway is introduced
in the topology. Besides, those aspects on link layer protocol adaptation for
low-power devices and routing protocol, 6LoWPAN denes some standards on
network management, neighbour discovery, and mobility, i.e. adapted from
Mobile IPv6. The 6LoWPAN architecture is also dened, which is made up of
several Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (LoWPAN) and consists
of Simple LoWPAN, Extended LoWPAN, and Ad hoc LoWPAN [55]. Figure
1.4 shows three types of 6LoWPAN architectures.
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Figure 1.4: The 6LoWPAN architecture
Another initiatives on attaining the networking architecture and proto-
cols in IoT/M2M has been performed in the context of PN within MAGNET
project [47]. Similar to the 6LoWPAN, [47] has done a huge contribution on
dening networking protocols for device-to-device, i.e. IoT/M2M, including
the infrastructure based and ad hoc architectures. However, the [47] focuses
a lot on the development of PN, and further the PN-F concepts, extending
the Personal- Personal Area Network (PAN) and/or WPAN, along with self-
organizing mechanism, service management, and context management. Fur-
thermore, security mechanisms as the key in creating secure PN and PN-F,
through long term trust establishment by means of public key and PN certi-
cate generation, have also been thoroughly researched and dened, particularly
in the context of PN and generally for the device-to-device communication.
The overall PN architecture consists of three abstraction levels view, namely
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connectivity abstraction, network abstraction, and service abstraction levels.
Within the network abstraction level, three types of communication architec-
tures are dened: intra- and inter-cluster communication (within the same
PN), and federated communication, i.e. among dierent PNs. Figure 1.5 de-
picts an example of the PN architectures.
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Cluster 1
Shop
Cluster 2
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University
Cluster
Internet
infrastructure
Member of PN 2
Member of PN 3
Member of PN 1
Member of PN Federation
Figure 1.5: Example of PN architecture
From Figure 1.5 we can see that the intra-cluster communication is done
within the home, oce, or hotel cluster, e.g. using WPAN interfaces of wireless
personal devices within the proximity. Furthermore, the inter-cluster commu-
nication can also be seen in the communication between hotel cluster and home
cluster in PN 1, or between airport cluster and oce cluster in PN 2. In this
type of communication, a logical entity called PN gateway in each of the clus-
ter is used. The PN gateway can physically be implemented in an edge router,
which is similar to the 6LoWPAN approach, or other routing capable devices.
Finally, PN Federated communication can be seen in Figure 1.5, among the
clusters and PNs within the orange line. In addition to the types of communi-
cation mentioned previously which rely on internet infrastructure, the ad-hoc
based PN can also be established as can be seen among the User 4, 5, and 6
in Figure 1.5.
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1.3.4 IoT/M2M Cloud Platforms
1.3.4.1 Cloud Computing Paradigm
Cloud computing has rapidly grown a huge attention in recent years due to its
great exibility, scalability, and availability in obtaining computing resources
at lower cost [32]. As cloud computing is an emerging form of distributed com-
puting that is still undergoing evolution and standardization, the term itself
is often used with dierent meanings and interpretations [32]. Nevertheless,
cloud computing system has some important characteristics and paradigms
which lead to a general taxonomy that describes dierent aspects of it.
1.3.4.1.1 Users and providers relationship The users and providers
relationship in cloud computing is more complicated than that in general web
services, consisting of three roles, i.e. Cloud System provider, Cloud Service
Provider, and Service Consumer, as depicted in Figure 1.6 [64]. The Cloud
Service Consumer is an individual or organization that consume the Cloud
Computing service provided by Cloud Service Provider. The Cloud Service
Provider is the organization that oers the Cloud Computing service, whom
is also a user of Cloud Computing system. The Cloud System Provider is the
organization that oers the Cloud Computing system or infrastructure, which
may be a corporate business, non-prot organization, or government agency.
In this type of relationship, it is important to note that Cloud Service Provider
acts as third party that maintains information about, or on behalf of, another
entity [64].
Cloud System 
Provider
Cloud Service 
Provider
Cloud Service 
Consumer
Web service/application
Utility  computing
Figure 1.6: Users and providers relationships in cloud computing
1.3.4.1.2 Essential characteristics Five essential characteristics of cloud
services that demonstrate their relation to, and dierences from, traditional
computing approaches are as follows [17]:
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 On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally provision com-
puting capabilities such as server time and network storage as needed au-
tomatically, without requiring human interaction with a service provider.
 Broad network access. Capabilities are available over the network
and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by hetero-
geneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and
PDAs) as well as other traditional or cloud based software services.
 Resource pooling. The provider's computing resources are pooled to
serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with dierent phys-
ical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according
to consumer demand. There is a degree of location independence in that
the customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact lo-
cation of the provided resources, but may be able to specify location at
a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or data center). Ex-
amples of resources include storage, processing, memory, network band-
width, and virtual machines. Even private clouds tend to pool resources
between dierent parts of the same organization.
 Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically provisioned
| in some cases automatically | to quickly scale out; and rapidly re-
leased to quickly scale in. To the consumer, the capabilities available for
provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be purchased in any
quantity at any time.
 Measured service. Cloud systems automatically control and optimize
resource usage by leveraging a metering capability at some level of ab-
straction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing,
bandwidth, or active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored,
controlled, and reported | providing transparency for both the provider
and consumer of the service.
1.3.4.1.3 Cloud deployment models
 Private cloud: Data and processes are managed within the organization
without the restrictions of network bandwidth, security exposures and
legal requirements that using public cloud services across open, public
networks might entail.
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 Public cloud: It describes the cloud computing in the traditional main-
stream sense, whereby resources are dynamically provisioned on a ne-
grained, self-service basis over the internet, via web applications/web
services, from an o-site third party provider who shares resources.
 Community cloud: The cloud infrastructure is shared by several or-
ganizations and supports a specic community that has shared concerns
(e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, or compliance considera-
tions). It may be managed by the organizations or a third party and
may exist on-premises or o-premises.
 Hybrid cloud: The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more
clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are
bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables
data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load-balancing
between clouds).
While the choice of deployment model has implications for the security and
privacy of a system, the deployment model itself does not dictate the level of
security and privacy of specic cloud oerings. That level depends mainly
on assurances and the extent of visibility into performance and management
details of the cloud environment, which are furnished by the cloud provider or
independently acquired by the organization [32].
1.3.4.1.4 Cloud service models Cloud service models are another im-
portant consideration in cloud computing just as cloud deployment models do.
The service model to which a cloud conforms dictates an organization's scope
and control over the computational environment, and characterizes a level of
abstraction for its use. A service model can be actualized as any of deployment
models [32]. The three fundamental classications of cloud service models are
as follows (see also Figure 1.7):
 Software as a Service (SaaS): SaaS model allows the cloud service con-
sumer to use the cloud service provider's applications running on a cloud
infrastructure through various client applications and devices. The con-
sumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, i.e.
network, servers, OS, storage, or individual application capabilities, with
the possible exception of limited user specic application conguration
settings [17]. It is a multi-tenant platform that uses common resources
and a single instance of the object code of an application as well as the
underlying database to support multiple customers simultaneously [50].
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Figure 1.7: Cloud service models
 Platform as a Service (PaaS): PaaS model allows the consumer to de-
ploy the consumer-created or acquired applications created using pro-
gramming languages and tools supported by the cloud service provider
onto the cloud infrastructure. A platform including all the systems and
environment comprising the end-to-end life cycle of developing, testing,
deploying, and hosting of sophisticated web applications as a service, is
provided to the developers (or consumer) [50]. With hundreds of tools
and services readily available in the platform, the development time can
be greatly reduced and quickly scaled. The consumer has only control
over the deployed applications and possibly application hosting environ-
ment congurations, but has no ability to manage or control the under-
lying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems,
or storage [17].
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): IaaS model allows the consumer to
provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental comput-
ing resources where the consumer can deploy and run arbitrary software,
including operating systems and applications. The consumer does not
manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control
over operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly lim-
ited control of select networking components (e.g., host rewalls) [17].
Besides the higher exibility, a key benet of IaaS is the usage-based
payment scheme which allows consumers to pay as they grow. Another
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important advantage is that by always using the latest technology, cus-
tomers can achieve a much faster service delivery and time to market
[50].
1.3.4.2 Existing IoT/M2M Cloud Platforms
There are numbers of IoT/M2M Cloud Platforms oered by companies as their
commercial product or service. Some examples are Axeda M2M Cloud Service
[10], Xively [63], Libelium [38], etc. Research projects that aims particularly
at developing a IoT/M2M Cloud platform and solving some research problems
at the same time, e.g. reliability, scalability, security, etc, are also present.
One example of such research project is Building the Environment for Thing
as a Service (BETaaS) project [12]. In what follows, some overview of the
existing IoT/M2M Cloud platforms from Xively will be briey presented in
this subsection.
Xively is a PaaS that provides the tools and services needed by developers
to connect sensor data (e.g. energy and environment monitoring of a building,
object, etc) to a public cloud and to create compelling applications based on
that data. Figure 1.8 shows a basic overview of Xively Cloud Services [63].
As illustrated in Figure 1.8, Xively Cloud Services provide messaging,
data archiving, device provisioning, and directory services which are acces-
sible through the Xively Application Programming Interface (API). Xively's
web applications leverage the API to provide connected product lifecycle man-
agement capabilities through Xively Developer Workbench and Xively Man-
agement Console [63]. At the bottom layer, the Xively API provides interfaces
to connected objects (e.g. sensors and hardware platforms), applications (e.g.
web and native), and customer backend services (e.g. Customer Relationship
Management (CRM)), in accessing Xively Cloud Services that is based on
RESTful services, through dierent protocols, such as HTTP/HTTPS, sock-
et/websocket, and Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT). On top
of that, various libraries are provided as Open Source to allow painless in-
tegration between dierent programming languages or device platforms and
the Xively API. Currently, the supported libraries are as follows: Android, C,
Objective-C, Java, Java Script, PHP, Python, Ruby, Arduino, ARM mbed,
and Electric Imp.
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Figure 1.8: Overview of Xively Cloud Services
1.3.4.3 Security models in IoT/M2M Cloud Platform
In order to draw a security model of a IoT/M2M Cloud Platform, it is impor-
tant to review some of the existing IoT/M2M architectural reference models,
such as IoT-A [31], ETSI M2M [18], Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
[56], and the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Focus Group (FG) M2M [40]. But as far
as the security model is concerned, the reference model of the IoT-A provides
the most concise and comprehensive security model. Hence it is going to be
the focus of the existing IoT/M2M security model review in this section. In
addition, the security mechanisms used in Xively will also be briey presented
in order to give a comparison with the general security model introduced by
IoT-A.
The security model in IoT-A consists of three main concepts: Trust, Privacy
and Security [31]. Those functional blocks are horizontal and also tightly
related among themselves. Figure 1.9 security features and general layering
of security features in IoT-A [31]. Trust in an IoT environment can be split
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into two layers: networking and application. Networking trust is related to
the integrity of the routing process while application trust is more related
to information quality, such as endpoint authentication and non-repudiation;
condentiality; privacy policy. Privacy is associated with the capability of a
person to protect their information, moreover by a legal perspective laws can
put restrictions and obligations on the way information concerning users is
stored and used. Security is a general concept that incorporates also Trust
and Privacy [31].
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Figure 1.9: IoT-A security features
To accomplish those concepts, the information model should include de-
scriptions of access policies, certicates and trusted identities. Moreover the
functional architecture should include components responsible for the manage-
ment of trust, security and privacy.
The denition of the model for communication security adopts the distinc-
tion between constrained and unconstrained networks from the communication
model. In fact, the heterogenity of devices represents a problem in designing
a security model. To overcome this issue the security model has a high level
of abstraction. Gateways, being at the edge between networks of the dier-
ent network types, are identied as central components for mediating between
dierent security components of dierent networks. This includes tunnelling,
ltering, and, most importantly, scaling down security (and other) functional-
ities from unconstrained networks in order to meet the limitations imposed by
the constrained networks [44].
In Xively, the platform and web tools run on LogMeIn's proprietary secure
cloud infrastructure [39], to ensure the service and client's data is protected,
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available, and fault-tolerant. Several security aspects emphasized in Xively,
especially for the developers, will be briey described as follows [62]:
1. API keys: The Xively API uses API Keys to authenticate requests
and to control access to all API resources. An API key is a hierarchy
of three objects: key object, permissions object, and resource object.
A key object is the main object of an API key. This key object must
consist of at least a permissions object which represents a dierent set
of permissions, while it is optional to have one or more resource object
within a permissions object. A ne-grained access control can be realized
by the API keys by conguring value of the permission object according
to the developer's needs. Thus, the access to a resource can be granted
on an as-needed, when-needed basis, and take it away when it's not.
2. OAuth: OAuth [46] is a method for allowing third-party application
access to a resource owner's resources without giving them access to re-
source owner's username and password. The Xively implementation of
OAuth 2.0 currently gives the third party site an API key which can ac-
cess resource owner whole account with congurable permissions. Using
OAuth in Xively is excellent for tying in administrative applications and
services, such as an application that is used by a company to monitor
all of its customers electricity usage and integrate it with an existing
management system, e.g. CRM. It is also good for an application in
which the users interact in a collaborative manner. However, it is not
recommended for applications in which the end users can interact with
their device because OAuth will give permission or authority to users to
access any feed or information under the account's owner.
3. Secure provisioning: A device is provisioned with a Feed ID and API
Key upon its rst Activation call to the Xively API. The exible acti-
vation processing infrastructure with secure and encrypted device provi-
sioning allows the user to automate what happens when the user's devices
wake up for the rst time. This allows calibration of secure connection
is established, credentials are exchanged, and devices, applications and
services into user's circle of trust.
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1.4 Challenges of the IoT/M2M System
1.4.1 Security and Privacy
1.4.1.1 The number of vulnerable systems
The number of vulnerable systems and attacks vectors will surely increase in
the context of the IoT, thus fault tolerance becomes essential. Not only we
must strive for security by default (robust implementations, usable systems,
etc.) in the IoT, but also we need to develop awareness mechanisms that
can be used to create the foundations of intrusion detection and prevention
mechanisms, which will help IoT entities to protect or even gracefully degrade
their services [51].
1.4.1.2 Access Control
Rolf H. Weber brings up the new security and privacy challenges in [59] in
which he points out that the technical architecture of IoT has an impact on
the security and privacy of the involved stakeholder. Among others, one of
the security and privacy requirements mentioned in [59] is the Access Control,
which necessitates that the information providers must be able to implement
access control on the data provided. Further on, [59] also mentions how the
access control has to be implemented in the presence of Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
system or Distributed Hash Table (DHT) which can be employed to increase
the security and privacy.
The authors of [9] also discuss the security and privacy challenges of the
IoT quite extensively. Apart from the types of security threats imposed to the
IoT, such as physical and eavesdropping, as well as the major security concern
on the authentication and data integrity whose solutions are mostly based on
cryptographic methods, privacy is another major issue that can be looked and
solved based on dierent approaches. One of the approach in dealing with the
privacy issue is to ensure that the personal data collected by the IoT system is
used only to support the authorized services by authorized providers [9], which
essentially suggests the proper usage of access control system.
From the cloud computing side, NIST published a set of guidelines to ensure
the security and privacy especially for the public cloud deployment in [32]. In
summary, the key security and privacy issues in cloud computing are as follows:
governance, compliance, trust, architecture, identity and access management,
software isolation, data protection, availability, and incident response. Again,
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access control { which comes under identity and access management { is listed
among the key issues to be taken care of also in the cloud computing. It is
important to note that, the security and privacy risks in the cloud computing
services vary signicantly among organizations, depending on the intended
purpose, assets held, legal obligations, and so on [32]. Therefore, the security
and privacy objectives of each organization is the key factor in determining
the appropriate mechanisms for securing their cloud services. In the context of
access control, it is necessary to have a exible access policy framework that
can cope with this challenge, i.e. compatible with various security and privacy
objectives of dierent organizations.
Last but not least, the authors of [51], and [20] in particular, highlight
the importance of resource and information protection, i.e. access control, in
distributed systems such as the IoT. With this, we can safely conclude that
the Access Control is one of the important security and privacy concerns in
IoT/M2M while its actual model and implementation in the IoT/M2M systems
is often overlooked and remains as an open issue. Unique characteristics of the
IoT/M2M system and architecture signify particular challenges in the access
control of such system. These issues will be further discussed in Section 1.4.2.
1.4.2 Distributed architecture
As have been discussed earlier, the vision of IoT/M2M to connect billions and
even trillions of devices over the internet will eventually make the commu-
nication topology or architecture be more and more distributed. Although
the early adopted approach of IoT/M2M is the centralized approach, the dis-
tributed architecture approach of IoT/M2M is a necessity in order to take
full advantage of it. Rodrigo Roman et al. in [51] analyse the features and
some specic security and privacy challenges of distributed IoT. In summary,
[51] specify some challenges and considerations specic to access control of the
distributed IoT, such as scalability and consistency, granularity, constrained
devices, context, and delegation mechanisms.
1.4.2.1 Scalability
The scalability and consistency issues will arise when storing the list of users
and their associated access rights in Access Control List (ACL)s [51] due to the
huge numbers of nodes and users interacting to each other in the IoT/M2M
system. Employing an existing access control mechanism, e.g. the Role Based
Access Control (RBAC), is not straight forward as it needs to dene roles that
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users can take, which might be dierent in various contexts even though they
refer to the same type of entity [51]. Indeed, the Identity-based access control,
such as RBAC, have been found to be inexible, don't scale well, and are
dicult and to upgrade [33]. Hence, designing an access control mechanism
that can cope with the scalability challenge a distributed environment such
as IoT/M2M is of upmost important, which is not as trivial as applying the
existing access control mechanisms.
1.4.2.2 Context
IoT is closely connected to its context [11]. The context or contextual informa-
tion includes environment context (e.g. sensing data), temporal context (e.g.
time and location), user context, system context, and some specic business
context (e.g. information about business step, business transaction type, etc,
in RFID middleware). However the context is inherently dynamic in nature
which will inuence the access policy decision [11]. It is also reported in [21]
that one of the requirements of the access control solution for IoT is to be ex-
ible to adapt to dierent contexts. In fact, the IoT/M2M is the dynamic nodes
connectivity and network topologies due to the mobility and other factors such
as power constraint. Therefore designing a exible access control system that
can cope with the dynamic nature of IoT/M2M and contextual information is
one of the challenging tasks.
1.4.2.3 Delegation
Another characteristic of a distributed or decentralized system is the decision
making can be delegated from the higher authorities to the lower level enti-
ties. In a totally distributed topology, i.e. without hierarchy, the authority
delegation can be performed among the entities. As earlier mentioned, the
dynamic nature of IoT/M2M is an inherent challenge in such a system, hence
the authority delegation is another way of coping with this characteristic. For
example, a node may delegate its authority to the other nodes before it dies
out, e.g. out of battery. The challenge for access control in IoT/M2M in this
regard is how to design a dynamic and ecient authority delegation which is
able to keep the delegation process under control, e.g. not delegating access
just to any entity.
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1.4.2.4 Granularity
The authors of [51] also indicate the importance of granularity (i.e. provid-
ing more information to people with the right credentials) and location (i.e.
whether users are accessing the thing services locally or remotely) for the ac-
cess control policies in certain scenarios. But actually it should be generalized
that not only the location, but the context along with granularity are two im-
portant elements for the access control policies in IoT/M2M, as the context
that are attached to the users and resources being accessed will determine the
granularity level of the information to be disclosed to the users. The real chal-
lenge in this aspect is how to design a ned-grained access control policy with
the help of contextual information to deal with large amounts of information,
including the measurements data and events, generated by IoT/M2M nodes.
1.5 Problem statement and research questions
As the attempt to answer the challenges explained in Section 1.4, the research
problems addressed in this PhD dissertation is on the design of a scalable,
exible, and ne-grained access control mechanism for the IoT/M2M Cloud
platform by making use of distributed approaches for resource constraint net-
works such as RFID and wireless sensor network. The problem statement is
divided into dierent sub-problems as follows:
 Management and security access control in IoT/M2M middleware
 Access control and authority delegation in federated IoT environment
 Intrussion detection system in the access control for the IoT/M2M Cloud
platform
The previously dened problem statement leads to the following research
questions:
 How to provide a ne-grained, ecient policy assignment, and interop-
erable access control in IoT/M2M middleware, particularly the RFID
middleware?
 How to support the ecient and scalable mobility management coupled
with the access control in the IoT/M2M middleware?
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 How to overcome the scalability and dynamic nature of the IoT/M2M is-
sues, and to provide a certain level of authentication in the access control
model?
 How to model the intrusion detection system incorporated with access
control system for the IoT/M2M Cloud platform, where there exist a set
of security assets to be protected, the uncertainty on the maliciousness
of the opponent, and some resource constraint?
1.6 Hypotheses and research methodology
1.6.1 Hypotheses
The research questions regarding the access control in the IoT/M2M Cloud
platform as described previously in Section 1.5 lead to several hypotheses de-
scribed as follows:
1.6.1.1 Fine-grained access control
An access policy design that incorporates access rule evaluation that consists
of specic RFID events attributes and conditions as well as the user proles
and trust can full the requirements of ne-grained and ecient access policy
assignment in the access control model for the inter-enterprise RFID system,
i.e. RFID middleware. In addition, a web service based implementation of
the access control system allows interoperability with the overall RFID mid-
dleware.
1.6.1.2 Ecient mobility management and access control
An architectural approach is needed in order to integrate the RFID system
to the global IP network and providing an ecient mobility management at
the same time. Moreover, it can also de-couple the access control system
in order to make it more scalable. For such reasons, a hypotheses is made
that a SIP-based location management system in the RFID middleware can
provide seamless integration between RFID system to the global IP network,
and ecient mobility management and access control.
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1.6.1.3 Capability-based and context aware access control
The scalability issue in the IoT/M2M networks which consists of huge numbers
of devices or \things" is addressed by using a capability-based access control
as it relies on a capability (also known as a \ticket") owns by each entity in
a distributed manner. Including some context information and a delegation
framework in the access control model will help the system to make a more
precise access decision and provide exibility against the dynamic nature of the
IoT/M2M, e.g. dynamic context and connectivity due to mobility and power
constraint. Based upon these arguments, the following hypotheses is made: the
capability-based and context aware access control with a delegation framework
will be able to overcome the scalability issue and the dynamic nature of the
IoT/M2M. As a capability comprises a token that needs to be validated prior
to granting an access, another hypotheses is made that the capability-based
and context aware access control can also provide some level of authentication.
1.6.1.4 Intrussion detection in the access control system
An intrusion detection system is needed to be part of the access control sys-
tem to detect and mitigate the threats, especially those that come from the
insiders of an M2M local cloud platform. The interaction between an attacker
and a defender equipped with intrusion detection can be modelled by the game
theory. It is further argued that the uncertainties that exists about the mali-
ciousness of the opponent can be modelled with a multi-stage Bayesian game
which include an analytical model of a set of assets with dierent values to be
protected by the defender and the resource constraint of each player.
1.6.2 Methodology
The high level overview of the research approach in this PhD work starts with
identifying the root cause of the problems, followed by creating a high level
model that bridges the problems and solution, then the proposed solutions are
designed (e.g. complete design of protocol, software architecture, and mathe-
matical model), veried (e.g. by means of computer simulation, software de-
velopment and experiments), and analysed. The method used in this research
is mainly the quantitative research method.
To carry out the quantitative research method, the data is collected through
some computer simulations and experiments. The simulation tools used to
carry out the computer simulation include MATLAB and AVISPA (a validation
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tool of internet security protocol and application) that are widely accepted by
the scientic community, and the detailed simulation procedure is explained
later in the respective chapter. The experiment activities in the context of this
PhD research work is carried out to follow up the software implementation
of the proposed solutions, which results in a collection of measured data for
further analysis. As a result, the qualitative analysis is performed based on
the simulated and measured collected data, which is explained in more detail
later in each of the respective chapter.
1.7 Research goals and scope
The background and motivation of the IoT/M2M and cloud computing systems
as well as the security and privacy challenges therein that have been outlined so
far in this dissertation lead to many interesting research questions and subjects
of study. However, given the limitation of time and resources that constitute a
PhD study, the scope of this dissertation is conned to investigating a number
of security and privacy issues for a specic IoT/M2M technology and cloud
computing model. In this section, we present the research goals as well as
the scope and limitations of the work, and the rationale behind the delimiting
choices.
1.7.1 Research goals
Based on the challenges and hypothesis stated earlier in Section 1.4 and 1.6,
the goals of this PhD research are dened as follows:
1. Design and implementation of ne-grained access control in the scope of
RFID middleware.
2. Design and implementation of a mobility management in RFID middle-
ware that supports the access control mechanism.
3. Desgin and implementation of scalable access control with a exible ac-
cess delegation for the IoT/M2M Cloud platform.
4. Analysis and design of an intrusion detection in the access control system
for the IoT/M2M Cloud platform.
5. Test bed implementation for proof of concepts towards real system real-
ization of the research works.
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1.7.2 Scope of the research
Most of the security and privacy issues that are researched and presented in
this dissertation are related to the access control. This PhD study is part of
several European Commission funded projects, such as My Adaptive Global
NETwork (MAGNET), Advance Sensors and Programmable middleware for
Innovative Rd Enterprise applications (ASPIRE), Intelligent System for In-
dependent living and SElfcare of seniors with cognitive problems or Mild De-
mentia (ISISEMD), and BETaaS, where security and privacy requirements
are mostly focussed around the access policies among dierent types of users
into the platform, middleware, or devices. With this background in mind, the
focus of this PhD work was limited to access control mechanism among the
stakeholders of the respective projects into the IoT/M2M and Cloud platform,
regardless of any method applied to authenticate the user or entity. Moreover,
the IoT/M2M is highly distributed and dynamic in nature. Such requirements
have motivated us to focus the large part of our research on designing a scalable
access control model with access delegation in multi-domain or federated envi-
ronment; and also designing of a scalable IoT/M2M Cloud platform, including
the middleware, in which such access control model are to be applied.
The target platform in terms of the identication, sensing, and communica-
tion technology in this PhD study is limited to the RFID and sensor technology.
The maturity and advance development of RFID technology towards realizing
the vision of IoT { besides the fact that part of this PhD study is done under
the scope ASPIRE project where RFID becomes the central point of interest
{ have become our strong motivation to limit our focus in this regard. Having
this decision in mind, the investigation of the middleware for IoT/M2M system
in the scope of this PhD study is limited to RFID middleware which has been
briey introduced in Section 1.3.2.
The type of services oered by most of the existing IoT/M2M cloud service
providers are generally either a Software as a Service (SaaS) or a Platform
as a Service (PaaS) models. In this regard, we include a new type of cloud
service model known as Things as a Service (TaaS), which contains a unied
representation of an M2M model and enables any high level IoT/M2M service
to be built. This is a concept that is introduced in BETaaS project, which also
introduces another concept of cloud model where a set of distributed IoT/M2M
gateways are able to form cloud locally. As pointed out earlier, a scalable
access control that supports exible access delegation is also a necessity in
such a distributed local cloud scenario. Furthermore, an intrusion detection
system needs to be part of the access control system to enable the monitoring
of important resources, and to detect of any malicious behaviour. In this
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study, the malicious behaviour monitoring is focused to that which is coming
from within the local cloud, i.e. the insider, because it is a great security
threat to the IT systems and network in general. Therefore, the study of
dynamic interaction between malicious and regular gateway which has a set
of accessible resources or security assets, under some constraint in terms of
attack and monitor resources, is presented in this dissertation.
An idea remains an abstract concept unless it is implemented in a real sys-
tem realization. Test beds and practical implementation of such an IoT/M2M
Cloud platform along with the security access control mechanism is a necessary
step in a life cycle of any novel research, i.e. to proof the proposed concepts
and to take the ideas further into the real product. E-Health scenario is our
rst focus in the test bed implementation within the scope of this PhD work.
The huge potential of eHealth to answer the challenge of ageing population and
to reduce the health treatment cost, yet lacking in maturity and real products
and services taking o in the market, have become our motivation to focus our
test beds implementation in such area. The supply chain use case is another
test bed implementation in this PhD work, which is motivated by the fact
that the supply chain scenario is the main driver in the development of RFID
middleware.
1.8 Overview of the dissertation and scientic
contributions
An overview of the chapters and the scientic contributions that constitute
this PhD dissertation are summarily discussed below.
In chapter 2, a proposed access control model designed to deal with a very
large and highly dynamic inter-enterprise RFID data is presented, along with
system implementation and evaluation. The key contributions of the proposed
access control model are as follows. First, a dynamic and ecient access policy
mechanism of an object or group of objects, based on the EPCglobal compliant
attributes and vocabularies is introduced. This access policy takes the prole
of the accessing entity (i.e. individual or organization that requests to access
RFID events information), and results in a suitable set of access rules of the
corresponding entity to the object(s). This way, the access policy can be
dynamically reuse for any user that even had no relationship before. Second,
ne grained policy access enforcement method to handle large amounts of
RFID events information, using the created rules and contextual information,
is presented. For evaluation purpose, a the proposed access control model
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implementation with the spirit of inter-operability is developed and tested.
This chapter fullls the research goals number 1 and 5 which are stated in
Section 1.7.1. The scientic contribution that constructs this chapter and is
published in [6] as a journal publication.
Chapter 3 highlights our contributions in the open IoT/M2M middleware
platform, along with our proposed secure access control mechanism. In this
regard, both the architectural design of RFID middleware and secure access
control approaches are employed to tackle the tag mobility and security issues.
First, an architecture based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signalling
is proposed for the location and mobility management in the inter-enterprise
RFID middleware sub-system. The proposed architecture is shown to greatly
reduced the delay and is easily scale to many number of tags as compared with
the existing system used as our reference point. Second, the access control
mechanism, as one way to control the RFID events information to be accessed
by other parties, is shown to integrate well with this approach. From the
architectural point of view, performing access control at the SIP gateway is a
better approach than at the EPCIS server because SIP gateway is the rst entry
point before the information stored at the EPCIS repository is accessed. This
chapter fullls the research goals number 2 and 5 which are stated in Section
1.7.1. The scientic contributions that constitute this chapter are published
in several conference publications [2, 4]. Other contributions in the scope of
ASPIRE project deliverables are also published [58, 57].
In Chapter 4, a secure access control model with authority delegation mech-
anism based on capability and contextual information is investigated and de-
signed for IoT/M2M system. The key contributions of the proposed access
control model are as follows. First, the scalability challenge in a highly dis-
tributed IoT/M2M system is addressed by introducing capability with identity
of the Subject, i.e. an entity that request for an access of a certain resource.
Secondly, the dynamic nature of IoT/M2M system that require a exibility in
access decision is tackled by incorporating contextual information in the access
policies, access delegation by means of capability propagation, and introduc-
ing a virtual identity that is linked with a certain prole which can be exibly
dened by the user or device owner. Moreover, the privacy issue in access
control is overcome by the virtual identity that is also linked with access poli-
cies. Third, the proposed access control model is shown to be secure against
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks and able to achieve the authentication
by introducing a nonce and some lightweight cryptographic operation. This
chapter fullls the research goals number 3 as stated in Section 1.7.1. The
major scientic contributions that constitute this chapter are published in a
conference publication [3] and a book chapter [5]. Other minor contributions
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related to this chapter are also published in conference publication [42, 41].
An identity establishment and authentication method based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) that complement the proposed access control model is
presented in [42] and practical implementation along with the performance
and security evaluation of the identity driven capability-based access control
is demonstrated in [41].
Chapter 5 presents a practical implementation and use cases of a capabil-
ity based access control for the IoT/M2M local cloud platform. The proposed
capability access control in this chapter is aimed at solving the inherent is-
sues, such as scalability and enforcing least privilege access principle, of the
existing access controls, e.g. ACL, Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [53],
and Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) (e.g. Extensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [61]), by using capability. It also solves the access
delegation issue in the existing IoT/M2M cloud platform that relies on API
key and OAuth [46] for the access delgation, in which the OAuth application,
i.e. the 3rd party application, is able to access all the resources tied with the
delegating party under a specic access permission, e.g. Read, Write or Delete,
by indicating a specic set of resource that can be accessed in the delegation.
The issue of controling the delegation chain through capability propagation is
also addressed by using a validation method based on a Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI). In addition, the aforementioned validation method also improves
the access delegation mechanism of the Capability-based Context-Aware Ac-
cess Control (CCAAC) model in chapter 4, i.e. to make it more exible and yet
keeping the access delegation under control. Several uses cases show that the
proposed capability based access control is suitable to the various operations of
the IoT/M2M cloud platform. But in principal, it is also suitable for any kind
of cloud computing platform. This chapter fullls the research goals number
3 and partly 5 which are stated in Section 1.7.1. The scientic contribution
that constitute this chapter is published in a conference publication [8].
In chapter 6, an analytical framework of an intrusion detection in access
control system based on game theoretic approach is presented. Similar to
chapter 5, the target platform being investigated in this study is the IoT/M2M
local cloud platform which consists of a collection of distributed IoT/M2M
gateways. Here, each gateway has a set of resources or assets with dierent
security values whom the access is governed by the access control system that is
integrated with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). To model such system,
a two-player multi-stage Bayesian game is proposed. The two players are
attacker and defender, each of them has a constraint in terms of attack and
monitor resource respectively. The Bayesian game is chosen due to some degree
of uncertainties in the IDS and naturally the defender does not know whether
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or not the attacker is malicious. The multi-stage type of game means the
game is played repeatedly and the previous actions may inuence the current
decision, consequently the player, e.g. defender, needs to update its belief in
each stage of the game and this is done by Bayes rule. Based on the proposed
analytical framework, the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) strategies
for both players in each stage game is formulated, and the framework is also
analysed numerically in order to validate the proposed analytical framework.
This chapter fullls the research goals number 4 as stated in Section 1.7.1. The
scientic contribution that constructs this chapter is published in a conference
publication [7].
In chapter 7, the overall research work conclusions and future scope for the
research work are contained. This ties up all the ndings in our PhD study
and enlightens the path for forthcoming researchers in this eld.
To summarize, all the thesis chapters are correlated with each other as
depicted in Figure 1.10.
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2
Ecient Fine-Grained Access Control
for RFID Inter-Enterprise Middleware
System
Access control management is a very challenging task in an inter-enterprise
RFID system due to huge amounts of information about things or objects
that can be collected and accessed to and from the system. Furthermore, the
information stored in the inter-enterprise RFID system contains sensitive and
condential data related to the activities of the organization involved around
the RFID system. Hence, the eciency and high-granularity are critical in
the design of access control for such system. This chapter presents a novel
access control model which is ecient and ne grained for such a system. A
detail denition and mechanism of the access control model are described in the
chapter. A system implementation is developed for the evaluation purpose. An
important performance measure in big data processing is delay in processing
time, thus the evaluation aims at measuring the access control processing time.
The evaluation results show that the model is consistent, and is able to achieve
less delay than the inter-enterprise RFID system without access control at a
certain point.
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2.1 Introduction
RFID technology allows the everyday things to be interconnected to the in-
ternet world, thus the key component towards the full deployment of the IoT
vision [2]. From the system components and architecture perspectives, RFID
system employed by any organization in its activity may consist of three sub-
systems, namely RF, enterprise, and inter-enterprise sub-system [11]. Inter-
enterprise sub-system in particular, is the most important component that
enables the objects or things visibility and tracking throughout their life cycle,
i.e. in supply chain industry, etc. When the information about thousands
of things or objects is able to be gathered and accessed, consequently access
control management of such information is a great challenge.
The technical specication, including the standard interfaces and data for-
mat, that enables the inter-enterprise information sharing of RFID events data
is specied in the EPCIS specication [8] issued by EPCglobal. The EPCIS
repository, i.e. software implementation of this specication, in particular aims
at receiving application-agnostic RFID data, translate it into a corresponding
business events (e.g. business process, business location, event time, etc), and
then make the events available and accessible by upstream applications. Since
the EPCIS repository potentially contains sensitive and condential data of
any individual or organization, the access to such information through its in-
terfaces needs to be managed properly. In this regard, it is important to men-
tion that the access control mechanism in the EPCIS specication is left open
to each specic implementation. Additionally, eciency, ne level of granu-
larity, and trust are important keys to the access control design since highly
dynamic and huge amount of events data is expected to be generated by po-
tentially thousands of tagged objects which are of any interest for individuals
or organizations that have even had any relationship before.
There are two main contributions of this chapter. First, a dynamic and
ecient access policy mechanism of an object or group of objects, based on
the attributes and vocabularies of EPCIS is introduced. This access policy
takes the prole of the accessing entity (i.e. individual or organization that
requests to access RFID events information { this term will shortly be referred
as user throughout the rest of this chapter), and results in a suitable set of
access rule of the corresponding entity to the object(s). This way, the access
policy can be dynamically reused for any user that even had no relationship
before. Second, ne grained policy access enforcement method to handle large
amounts of RFID events information, using the created rules and contextual
information, is presented. For evaluation purpose, a system implementation of
the proposed access control model is developed, tested, and veried.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: An overview of re-
lated works in access control is given in Section 2.2. The problems, require-
ments, and realistic assumptions along with a real life example for designing
an access control framework in RFID is described in Section 2.3. The proposed
access control framework, along with the denition of access policy of the ob-
ject(s), mechanism to generate access rules for the accessing entity, and the
access policy enforcement mechanism, is explained in Section 2.4. The system
implementation of the proposed access control model is presented in section
2.5. The evaluation results and ndings are discussed in Section 2.6. Some
qualitative discussion regarding important features of secure system and access
control constituted in the proposed model as well as comparison with existing
access control model are presented in Section 2.7. Finally, the conclusion and
future directions of this work are given in Section 2.8.
2.2 Related works
Study in various types of access control models have been quite well established
within the computing and information technology eld. Our particular inter-
ests are in incorporating the contextual information and dynamically create ac-
cess rules based on a pre-dened set of policies. XACML [13] is an eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) framework to describe access control policies for
web based resources. The XACML specication incorporates some contextual
information into access decisions, but it has no formal context-aware access
control model. In addition, the access decision from the evaluated policies in
XACML is only limited to four pre-dened categories, i.e. Permit, Deny, No-
tApplicable, or Indeterminate, which greatly reduces the granularity of access
decision results.
RBAC [12] is an access control model that is widely used and further de-
rived into dierent models, due to its suitability in almost any organization
which consists of dierent roles with some levels of hierarchy. Temporal as-
pects of RBAC were addressed in Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) [3], which fo-
cuses on temporal availability and dependency of roles. General Temporal
RBAC (GTRBAC) [10] is an extension of TRBAC model that is capable in
expressing a wide range of temporal constraints { in particular time period-
icity as well as duration, and de/activating as well as enabling constraints {
on roles. An XML specication of GTRBAC has been introduced in [5] and
the extension of X-GTRBAC which incorporates trust in assigning roles to
users has been presented in [4]. Although these models have a detailed de-
nition of context information but the role based model, i.e. with user-to-role
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and role-to-permission mapping, does not t with the requirement of RFID
inter-enterprise system.
CCAAC [1], another type of access control model that supports contex-
tual information and is based on capability. In addition, CCAAC provides
a framework where a valid capability as a mean for an access request to be
granted, is created for any user based set of access policies attached to an ob-
ject or group of objects. Here, object refers to resource to be accessed by any
user. The CCAAC oers ecient and dynamic way of managing access con-
trol through the evaluation of user's prole and contextual information via the
corresponding access policies upon the capability request to certain object(s),
which is important when dealing with huge numbers of objects and users si-
multaneously, e.g. in IoT or RFID system. Moreover, it also supports access
delegation and revocation. However, the type of action and access decision
result limits the level granularity, and the context information is not formally
modelled.
A ne grained access enforcement specially designed for the EPCIS events
data through a rule-based policy language for Auto-ID events, called Auto-ID
Authorization Language (AAL), has been introduced in [6]. In addition, an ef-
cient policy enforcement mechanism and implementation based on Structured
Query Language (SQL) query rewriting was presented. The main drawback
of AAL as presented in [6] is that the access policy is manually assigned to
users which is impractical in the real life situation. The dynamic generation,
assignment, and revocation of access policies were not considered as well.
2.3 Problem descriptions and the system re-
quirements
The RFID events data in the EPCIS repository, which is known as EPCIS
events, is categorized into four types of events namely ObjectEvent, Aggrega-
tionEvent, QuantityEvent, and TransactionEvent [8]. Each of them describes
dierent type of event taking place in relation to the RFID tag, which is rep-
resented by EPC ID, in the business process within the company. In addition,
two types of data, i.e. RFID application-agnostic and master/company data,
are comprised in the EPCIS repository. Here, the master data, e.g. eventTime,
action, bizStep, etc, provides some necessary business context to interpret the
EPCIS events [8].
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Figure 2.1: The interactions of EPCIS repository interfaces in an inter-
enterprise RFID system
A simplied example of an inter-enterprise RFID system deployment in-
volving an EPCIS repository is depicted in Fig. 2.1. In this example, the
EPCIS repository is owned by a company c1, and is accessed by companies c2
and c3. The RFID events consisting of RFID and master data generated by
a BEG module owned by c1 is captured via capture interface and stored in
the EPCIS repository as EPCIS events. The EPCIS events stored in EPCIS
repository can then be accessed by other companies through the query inter-
face. According to a comprehensive denition and description of the EPCIS
specication [8], the EPCIS events can be interpreted and gives a valuable
information regarding the business activities of company c1 by business con-
text information and RFID data. For example, the interpreted EPCIS event
can give a gure about production volume, sales activity of certain products,
inventory status, etc. Obviously, these are very sensitive information that a
company want to reveal as minimum as possible to other parties by managing
access to EPCIS event data in high level of granularity. In addition, the the
RFID tags' owner may want to restrict the access to particular information
related to the activity of the tags which might reveal another type of sensitive
information apart from the business related information.
Based on the identied problems, the following requirements for access
control in an inter-enterprise RFID system should be foreseen:
 Context-awareness: The access control system should be design to
support rich business context information that are contained in the EPCIS
events.
 Dynamic rule: Providing a ne grained access control in a highly dy-
namic EPCIS events data that is generated continuously, it is almost
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impossible to assign a static access rights for particular users to certain
part of data or attributes. Therefore, dynamic access rule should be
generated based on the specied rules in the access policy and the re-
quested set of information. In addition, the policy should support exible
inclusion of new events.
 Dynamic access assignment: There are certainly various types of
users that are trying to gain access to the EPCIS events data which are
probably not known before by the EPCIS repository's system adminis-
trator, i.e. the responsible person to create the access policy. Hence, a
dynamic mechanism to assign access rights to users is also required.
 Object based policy: The access policy based on particular RFID tag
IDs, e.g. on the Object Class or serial numbers level, is also required to
restrict the access to information related to tag's activities by the tag's
owner.
2.4 Access control model
2.4.1 Assumptions
Based on the identied problems and how the inter-enterprise RFID system op-
erates, the following assumptions are made as a baseline to design an ecient,
dynamic, ne grained access control for inter-enterprise RFID system:
 The authentication phase has been carried out before the access control
process takes place.
 The EPCIS events stored in the EPCIS repository are only events gen-
erated by the EPCIS repository's owner, e.g. a company.
 The set of contextual information, i.e. attributes of EPCIS events, such
as bizStep, action, disposition, readPoint, epcList, etc, and their values
are known to the EPCIS repository's owner. The values of some at-
tributes are always xed, e.g. action = f0ADD0;0OBSERV E 0;0DELETE 0g,
while the values of attributes like epcList are dynamics but the company
has a full knowledge of all EPC IDs involved in their business transac-
tions.
 The EPCIS owner may or may not know the users that are accessing its
EPCIS events through the query interface. But the user's prole, such
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as company name, location, business area, etc, can be obtained through
a trusted means, e.g. via trusted third party organization.
 For each query of EPCIS events, the user may optionally specify particu-
lar Event Type(s) and some contexts or event attributes, e.g. eventTime,
action, bizStep, etc, as stated in the EPCIS specication [8]. It is im-
portant to note that the default query operation according to the EPCIS
specication is that all the available information will be returned unless
specied otherwise in the query.
 The RFID tag's owners have the knowledge of their tags' IDs in order to
create access policies for an individual tag or a set of tags.
These assumptions lead us to propose an access control model that will be
explained in the following subsections.
2.4.2 Denitions
2.4.2.1 Elements, Attributes, and Values
First of all, the data structure in our proposed access control framework is
based upon Element ! Attribute ! V alue ternary relationship which maps
each element to its attributes and their values. Element is a set of elements
which could be user prole, P , or EPCIS event, E. Each of the element consists
of several attributes and each of the attribute can have a set of possible values.
2.4.2.2 EPCIS Event
Let Ei be the i
th EPCIS event within the set of EPCIS events element. As
mentioned previously, according to [8] Ei could be an ObjectEvent, Aggrega-
tionEvent, QuantityEvent, or TransactionEvent. Each of Ei consists of a set
of attributes as dened in details in [8]. Let us call the jth attribute of an Ei
as AEj. Here, the relationship between Ei and AEj can be expressed in the
following notation: Ei = fAE1;    ; AEng.
The value of each AEj, let us call it as V Ejk, can either be a single
value or a list of values, e.g. in the case of the epcList. Moreover, the
value of some attributes may be among some pre-dened values. In any
case, the relationship between AEj and V Ek can be generally expressed as
AEj = fV Ej1;    ; V Ejng.
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2.4.2.3 User prole
In addition to our previous assumption, the administrator can dene a set of
user prole based on several attributes and values. Now, let Pi be the i
th user
prole among a set of user proles dened by the administrator. Similar to
Ei, each Pi consists of several user prole attributes, e.g. APj, and each APj
may consists of a set of values, i.e. V APjk, dened by the administrator.
APj = fV APj1;    ; V APjng
2.4.2.4 Objects
The Object eld can be expressed as a single tag ID or as a pattern which can
apply to a set of tags, according to the TDS specication [9]. In mathematical
form, the Object O can simply be expressed as a set of object values: O =
fV Oi;    ; V Ong
2.4.2.5 Condition
Condition is the key component to provide dynamic rule and ne-grained ac-
cess control. It is important to mention that the condition in this proposed
model is not a requirement for granting an access or not. Rather, it is dened
as a set of constraint applied to the contextual information. In our case, the
contextual information is specic to the business contexts or the EPCIS event
attributes (AEj).
The way the condition is expressed in the proposed access control policy
follows the white-listing principle, meaning that the access to information that
is not explicitly mentioned in the condition is not allowed, which is the opposite
of the nature of the EPCIS query specication as explained earlier. This
principle is valid in general, and especially in our case where the EPCIS event
attributes are dened in great details.
With this principle in mind, a condition can be expressed in general as
subset of AEj, i.e. AE
s
j  AEj, with respect to a set of all possible values
of a particular AEj. This implies that a condition can set whether to allow
all, partly, or none of the values to be accessible. For example, let say an
EPCIS event attribute consists some pre-dened values, e.g. AEj = fa; b; cg.
Some possible condition for such an attribute AEj are AE
s
j = AEj = fa; b; cg,
AEsj = fb; cg, or AEsj = ?, which means that the values of AEj is shown fully,
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partially (e.g. only fb; cg), and none. This way of describing the condition is
also to full the purpose of maintaining the consistency upon the existence of
multiple rules.
On a practical stand point in writing a condition, there are two possible
ways to specify it: rst, by explicitly stating what set of values, i.e. V Ejk are
accessible; second, by describing values in certain ranges using a comparison
operator. The rst way is more static and suitable for attributes that have some
pre-dened values, e.g. action, business location, disposition, etc, whereas the
later one is more dynamic and capable of specifying a condition for event that
has not happened yet, such as the eventTime. In such a case, general statement
of the condition of the rule i with respect to AEsj is as follows:
Ci = AE
s
i1 ^    ^ AEsij ^    ^ AEsin (2.1)
2.4.2.6 Rule
A rule consists of a set of conditions, C and an EPCIS event type, ET . General
representation of a rule using a if -then relationship is: ET ) C. A set of
rules together with a user prole P or a set of objects O forms a policy that
will be explained in the next Subsection (2.4.2.7).
2.4.2.7 Policy
In the proposed model, there are two types of policies, namely user based and
object based policies. A user based policy consists of a set of proles P and
a set of rules, while an subject based policy consists of a set of objects O and
a set of rules. A set of dierent rules that are applicable for a request, i.e.
matched to the request 's P or O, and having the same ET value are combined
into a new applicable rule using a disjunction operation after resolving all the
conicting policies. In addition, multiple policies may also be applicable to
an access request, thus a policy combining mechanism should take place in
order to create a nal applicable rule for an access request. Finally, the nal
applicable rule would then be evaluated with the conditions presented within
the access request in order to get a nal access decision. Please note that the
access decision is not in a form of static permit or deny, rather it is in a set
of access constraints or conditions that explicitly authorize which data can be
accessed by the user. The whole mechanisms of the rule and policy combining,
and then evaluate them with the access request are explained in great details
in the Subsection 2.4.3.
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2.4.2.8 Request
An access request must consists of a prole P , and optionally a set of EPCIS
event types ET and a set of conditions C. Both ET and C are optional elds
in a request due to the nature of the EPCIS query specication. For a request
to be evaluated with a certain policy, the request's prole PREQ should match
with the policy's prole Ppol. If a single or set of ET (s) are specied in the
request, then only rules that matched with the specied ET s are applicable,
otherwise all rules in the policy are applicable for the request.
2.4.3 Access rules evaluation
Access rules evaluation is at the heart of the whole model in order to provide
a ne-grained access control. The results of this evaluation is a nal access
decision in a form of a set of explicit access constraints.
There are two important steps in the access rules evaluation. First, all
applicable rules are combined by using union operation. Second, the combined
rules' condition is then evaluated against the condition presented by access re-
quest using an intersection operation. The general expression of this evaluation
is depicted as follows:
CREQ \ (C1 [    [ Cp) (2.2)
where:
 p: number of matched access rules.
 Ci = (AEsij ^    ^AEsin): a set of conditions specied in the ith matched
access rule.
 CREQ = fAErk;    ; AErmg: a set of EPCIS attributes conditions specied
in user request.
The access rules evaluation as expressed in (2.2) is obtained through some
steps illustrated in the pseudo-code 1.
The procedure starts by combining all conict-free conditions of the appli-
cable rules using union set operation. Once a combined rule is obtained, the
access rule evaluation is started by grouping the similar event type attribute,
i.e. AE pair, from between the CREQ and the CombineRules, and then a set
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Algorithm 1 access rules evaluation procedures
procedure RulesEvaluation(CREQ; SC)
for all AEsij in Ci in SC do
for all Ci in SC do
AEs
0
j = UnionAll(AE
s
xj)
end for
CombineRules = Conjunction(AEs
0
j )
end for
Condition = ""
for all AEs
0
j in CombineRules do
if Condition 6= "" then
Condition += ^
end if
for all AErk in C
REQ do
if j == k then
Condition += AEs
0
j \ AErk
end if
end for
if notFound(k == j) then
Condition += AEsj
end if
end for
end procedure
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intersection operation is applied, i.e. AEs
0
j ^AErk, where j = k. In case of the
pair of AEs
0
j is not specied in the C
REQ, then only the condition as specied
in AEsj will be applied. At last, the nal expression of access rule evaluation
as depicted in (2.2) is obtained.
2.5 System Implementation
Two important components in this system implementation are the Policy
repository as well as evaluation, and Access Policy enforcement components.
In addition, the overall implementation is designed to be modular and complies
with the EPCIS query interface specication. For this purpose, the proposed
access control is implemented through web service interface and be part of the
AspireRFID middleware [7] module. The AspireRFID middleware itself is one
of the open source implementation of RFID middleware based on EPCglobal
specications.
2.5.1 System architecture
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Figure 2.2: System architecture of the implemented access control model
The system architecture of the implemented access control model is de-
picted in Fig. 2.2. The Access Control Framework is communicating with
the EPCIS repository through web service interface. Once the incoming query
or access request is received, the access policy enforcement point will query
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the Access Policies Repository to nd the matching policies with the request
according to the procedure explained in Section 2.4 earlier. Once a set of
matching policies or rules is found, it will be evaluated against the access re-
quest. Finally, the result of the access control evaluation will be sent back to
EPCIS repository through the Access Enforcement Point via the web interface.
The access policy enforcement is an important component in a policy based
access control implementation after an access decision has been taken. In
our implementation, the access control policy enforcement is implemented in
a form of a modied QueryParams, i.e. the query parameters dened in the
EPCIS specication. The advantage of this method is that the implementation
complies fully with the EPCIS query interface specication while stay modu-
lar without a necessity to greatly modify the EPCIS server implementation.
Moreover, it does not depend of the actual implementation of the database
technology for the EPCIS repository. However, the main drawback is that
this method does not fully leverage the proposed access control model due
to the nature of QueryParams description in the EPCIS specication where
the parameter that is not explicitly mentioned in the QueryParams will be
included in the query results. Nevertheless, it still allows us to perform an
evaluation over most of the important functionalities of the proposed access
control model. Additionally, if the access decision return an empty result, i.e.
no matching policy is found in the repository, the query results of the EPCIS
query interface implementation will return a SecurityExecption.
2.5.2 XML specication of access control policy
The policy repository and evaluation component implementation uses XML
and Java Architecture for XML Binding (JAXB) technologies. The proposed
access control policy specication as explained in Section 2.4 is translated into
a set of XML specication and is practically stored as an XML le. Thanks
to the JAXB technology, the access control policies can be created as an XML
le and the stored access control policies can be translated into Java Objects
to be further evaluated.
The usage of XML for describing policies in the proposed access control
model is motivated due to the fact that the XML has been well accepted and
widely used in the heterogeneous IT enterprise environment across dierent
platforms. Among others, XACML [13] is the most famous XML based access
control system. Particularly in our system implementation, the XML is used it
model the data structure of the proposed access policy elements as described
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in Section 2.4. To give an overview of the XML specication for the proposed
access control model, X-Grammar notion as introduced in [5] is used.
2.5.2.1 Proles
To match the incoming user request with the suitable access control policy,
the notion of user prole (Prole in short) is used. Dierent types of proles
are created by the system administrator based on several set of attribute-value
pairs. The snippet of Prole XML representation in the X-Grammar, e.g.
XProfiles is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: The grammar of of XProfiles in XML representation
<!- - Proles Denition> ::=
<Profiles>
f<!- - Prole Denition>g+
</Profiles>
<!- - Prole Denition> ::= <!- - Attribute Denition> ::=
<Profile <Attribute
ProfileId = (prole ID)> AttrName = (name)
<Attributes> IsMandatory = "truejfalse"
f<!- - Attribute Denition>g+ DataType = (type)>
</Attributes> (Attribute Value)
</Profile> </Attribute>
In Table 2.1, ProfileId is a unique Prole identier to dierentiate this
prole with others. IsMandatory indicates whether or not the Attribute is
a mandatory eld. A set of Attribute along with the IsMandatory attribute
in the XProfile provides a vocabulary to express the attributes needed by the
users upon sending a Request.
2.5.2.2 Object
The Object element is used for creating access policy for a set of EPC IDs.
It is also dened by the system administrator, in particular the tag's "owner".
To express a set of objects in the XML representation, the EPC ID patterns
format that is dened in the EPCGlobal TDS specication [9] is employed.
The XML representation of the Object is referred as XObjects. The snippet
of XObjects' grammar is depicted in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: The grammar of XObjects in XML representation
<!- - Objets Denition> ::=
<Objects
ObjId = (objects ID)>
f <ObjectPattern> (EPC Pattern) </ObjectPattern> g+
</Object>
The ObjId is a unique group of objects identier. According to [9], some ex-
amples of ObjectPattern's value are "urn:epc:pat:gid-96:145.233.*"are "urn:epc:pat:gid-
96:145.233.[350-360]". The rst pattern example applies to any tag whose
General Manager Number is 145, whose Object Class is 233, and whose Se-
rial Number may be anything. The second example applies to any tag whose
General Manager Number is 145, whose Object Class is 233, and whose Serial
Number is between 350 and 360.
2.5.2.3 Event Attribute
The Event Attribute refers to the elds of EPCISEvent classes and the query
parameters in the SimpleEventQuery that are dened in the EPCIS specica-
tion [8]. According to [8], the query parameters can be expressed by through
any comparison operators, e.g. =; <;; >;, over a single value or a set of val-
ues. The XML specication of the Event Attribute in our proposed model needs
capture such requirements to be compatible with the EPCIS specication. In
the actual system deployment, the Event Attributes are part of the access re-
quest which are translated from the EPCIS query parameters. The grammar
of Event Attribute XML representation { referred as XEventAttribute { is
shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: The grammar of XEventAttribute in XML representation
<!- - EventAttribute Denition> ::=
<EventAttribute
AttrId = (Event Attribute ID)>
<Operator>feqjltjleqjgtjgeqg</Operator>
f <AttrributeValue> (value) </AttrributeValue> g+
</EventAttribute>
The AttrId is a unique name of the EPCISEvent class's (and its subclasses)
eld as dened in [8]. The Operator is a comparison operator which can
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either be equal, less-than, less-than-or-equal, greater-than, and greater-than-
or-equal. It is particularly designed to support general expression of the query
parameters in the SimpleEventQuery [8]. Finally, the AttributeValue can
be one or more based on the specication of the query parameters where the
parameter value can be a single value or a list of values. For instance, the
LT_eventTime query parameter can be described by using "lt" Operator and
only one AttributeValue in the XML language, but the EQ_action uses "eq"
Operator and several AttributeValues.
2.5.2.4 Rule
A rule in the proposed access control policy consists of two mandatory ele-
ments, namely an EventType and a set of Conditions. The grammar of Rule
XML representation, which we call it as XRules, is shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: The grammar of XRules in XML representation
<!- - Rules Denition> ::= <!- - Rule Denition> ::=
<Rules> <Rule
f<!- - Rule Denition>g+ RuleId = (rule ID)>
</Rules> <EventType>fOEjAEjQEjTEg</EventType>
<Condition>
f<!- - Logical Expression>g
</Condition>
</Rule>
RuleId is a unique identier of the Rule. The value of EventType refers
to either ObjectEvent, AggregationEvent, QuantityEvent, or TransactionEvent
respectively. The Condition is expressed through Logical Expression, whose
the grammar in XML language is dened in Table 2.5.
The Logical Expression (LogicalExpr) consists of a set of Predicates, in
which all the Predicates are evaluated by a logical operator op: AND, OR,
or NOT. The LogicalExpr can also be nested inside the Predicate, allowing
the Condition to be expressed into dierent level of constraints. Apart from
the nested LogicalExpr, each of the Predicate also comprises a comparison
operator (Operator), a ParamName, and one or more ParamValue. Please note
that the Predicate's grammar is almost similar to EventAttribute, except
that the ParamName is added as its element. This is because the proposed access
control especially evaluates each Predicate within a Condition against the
corresponding EventAttribute constraint that is part of the access request.
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Table 2.5: The grammar of Logical Expression in XML representation
<!- - Logical Expression> ::=
<LogicalExpr op = fANDjORjNOTg>
f<!- - Predicate>g+
</LogicalExpr>
<!- - Predicate> ::=
<Predicate>
[f<Operator>feqjltjleqjgtjgeqg</Operator>
<ParamName>(parameter name)</ParamName>
{<ParamValue>(value)</ParamValue>}+ g
< !- - LogicalExpression> ]
</Predicate>
2.5.2.5 Policy
The grammar of XPolicies in XML language is shown in Table 2.6. As per the
denition of Policy in Section 2.4.2.7, a Policy may contain a set of Profiles,
i.e. subject based policy, or a set of Objects, i.e. object based policy. In
any case, any Policy should contain a set of Rules as the main component to
evaluate the access request.
Table 2.6: The grammar of XPolicies in XML representation
<!- - Policies Denition> ::= <!- - Policy Denition> ::=
<Policies> <Policy
f<!- - Policy Denition>g+ PolicyId = (policy ID)>
</Policies> [<!- - Proles Denition>]
[<!- - Object Denition>]
<!- - Rules Denition>
</Policy>
2.6 Evaluation results and analysis
A series of experiments or evaluation have been carried out based on our imple-
mentation in order to measure the performance of the proposed access control
model. The main purposes of the evaluation are to validate the functionality
of the proposed access control model and to measure the performance in terms
of delay time.
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2.6.1 Evaluation procedures
For the testing purpose, one policy for a particular user prole is prepared.
The policy consists of dierent rules with several conditions for dierent EPCIS
event types. It is important to note that since generating EPCIS events already
requires some complex procedures, we focuses on generating only one type of
business event in the test scenario. Hence, the generated EPCIS events are
always having xed event attributes values (V Eij), except for the eventTime,
recordTime and EPC ID. As a result, the nal access control enforcement
mainly depends on conditions related to eventTime and EPC ID parameters
or attributes in the practical experiments.
Regarding the rst objective of this evaluation, it is shown that the access
control works as it should be. The query results only returns the EPCIS event
data that full the conditions set in the policy and the nal access decision. On
the other hand, a SecurityException will be returned if there is no matching
policy found in the access policy repository.
Concerning the second objective of the evaluation, the delay performance
of the proposed access control model is compared against the EPCIS system
without any access control applied. For this purpose, we have tested our
proposed access control model on a system with Intel Core i7 2.80 GHz CPU, 8
GB RAM, running Windows 7, and Java 6.31. In addition, an Apache Tomcat
6.35 server is used to deploy all the AspireRFID Middleware modules as well
as our access control module, and a MySQL 5.2 Server is used as the EPCIS
events data repository. Although the measurement results strongly dependant
on the implementation, nevertheless we can expect to draw some qualitative
conclusion out of the results and further improve the system implementation
if necessary.
Two measurement scenarios are carried out to observe the delay perfor-
mance and behaviour of the implemented proposed access control model. The
delay is dened as the time consumed between the query request being sent
and received by the EPCIS query client, i.e. Treceived Tsent. For each scenario,
the same measurement point is done repeatedly for 700 times. For the purpose
of explanation in the rest of this chapter, we will refer the case when the access
control is used as the rst case and the second case refers to the case when
access control is not used.
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2.6.2 The impact of varying the number of read tags
The rst scenario aims to observe the delay time behaviour when the number
of read tags in each event stored in the EPCIS repository is varied. In this
scenario, the number of EPCIS events are xed to three events at the EPCIS
repository. It should be noted that the query results of the rst case always
returns one EPCIS events, while the second case always returns all three events
since no access control is applied.
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Figure 2.3: Query delay time for dierent number of tags with 95% condence
interval
There are two important ndings that can be derived based on the results of
this scenario which is shown in Fig. 2.3. First, the average delay of the rst case
is three times higher than that of the second case. This nding is quite expected
because it involves extensive XML processing, e.g. creating and parsing of
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) message and parsing the access policy,
which is time consuming. The delay performance could be improved in general
through a more tightly coupled implementation with the expense of sacricing
the exibility and modularity of such an open system. Second, the EPCIS
query delay time for both cases is relatively constant regardless of the number
of tags read in each EPCIS event. Although some small variation is shown in
the rst case, the condence interval margin is rather high and it could be due
to the inconsistency of web service invocation of access control service. Thus it
is quite safe to neglect the small variation. Nevertheless, the second nding is
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quite interesting because the amount of data queried from the database would
contribute to the query time delay.
2.6.3 The impact of the number of the EPCIS events
data in the repository
Based on the second nding in the rst scenario, we would like to check the im-
pact of varying the number of EPCIS events in the repository to the query time
delay. Knowing that the number of tags does not change the delay behaviour,
the number of tag included in the EPCIS events stored within the repository
is xed to only one tag in this scenario. Similar to the rst scenario, the rst
case always returns one EPCIS events while the second case always returns all
the EPCIS events available in the repository.
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Figure 2.4: Query delay time for dierent number EPCIS events in the repos-
itory with 95% condence interval
The results of the second scenario depicted in Fig. 2.4 shows that the
number of EPCIS events data queried from the repository does impact the
query time delay linearly. Obviously, the query delay time of the rst case
is relatively constant since it always return one EPCIS event as a result of
the access control mechanism. Based on this nding, it can be concluded
that both cases would achieve the same query delay time when the ratio of
the EPCIS events data returned between the rst and second case is around
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1 : 25. Consequently, the delay gap between both cases as shown in Fig. 2.3
would be bigger if the result of access control evaluation would return more
than one EPCIS events data. This ratio could be improved through a more
ecient implementation.
2.7 Discussions
Earlier in this chapter, we have mentioned several requirements of access con-
trol model in an inter-enterprise RFID system, and how the proposed model
fullled those requirements. In this section, we will present several important
features of a secure system { in particular an access control for big data sys-
tem { that are constituted in the proposed access control model. Furthermore,
some qualitative comparisons with other access control models will also be
given.
 High-granularity: The proposed access control model provides high-
granularity since it does not allows the access only based on permit or
deny action, but based on some specic types of data or context infor-
mation. The level of granularity can be dened in the access policy by
the system or security administrator of the system.
 High privacy: The high-granularity of access control policy provides
high level of privacy to the business activities related information stored
in the EPCIS repository.
 Trust: The access policy is applied to each user automatically based
on some pre-dened user proles, and a user is assigned to a particular
user-prole based on trust relationship and contextual information.
 Flexibility: The proposed access control policy model oers high ex-
ibility which is favourable in a big data system. It allows relative time
denition instead of xed time, EPC ID denition based on the EPC
pattern, and automatic user assignment to user-prole through trust in-
formation.
 Inter-operability: The proposed access control model complies with
the EPCIS Specication which is an open standard. The proposed sys-
tem is also implemented as a web service which is highly inter-operable,
i.e. independent of any specic programming language or server imple-
mentation.
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In comparison with other existing access control, the proposed access con-
trol model is better as compared to them in the following aspects:
 Trust-based X-GTRBAC [4] : Our proposed access control model allows
a way to incorporate trust in assigning user-prole to users which is quite
similar to the approach presented in [4]. However, [4] does not t the
requirement of providing high-granularity access to data, particularly in
an inter-enterprise RFID system.
 AAL [6] : A quite similar approach of a ne grained access enforcement
specially designed for the EPCIS events data that is proposed in our
access control model, was also introduced in [6]. However, automatic
way of assigning some access policy to a user was not considered in [6],
which gives a lot of burden to the system administrator, thus unrealis-
tic for the real system. Moreover, its SQL query rewriting method for
the access enforcement, does not inter-operable with the EPCIS imple-
mentation that is not based on the Relational Data Base Management
System (RDBMS).
2.8 Conclusion
Access control management in an inter-enterprise RFID system is a great chal-
lenge, since such system allows the tracking and monitoring of large numbers
of things, i.e. a path towards realizing the IoT vision. The most challenging
access control problems in such a system are in providing high-granularity ac-
cess of RFID events data, known as EPCIS events, with exibility and ecient
access policy management over a very dynamic and huge amounts of EPCIS
events data. A novel access control model to address these problems has been
proposed in this chapter along with complete denition of access control model
and evaluation through the system implementation of the model. The ndings
in the evaluation show that the proposed access control model is consistent
and could achieve less query time delay than the inter-enterprise RFID system
without access control if the ratio of the returned EPCIS events data is less
than 1 : 25.
The proposed access control model relies on the trusted third parties en-
tity to obtain the user prole, but the mechanism on dealing with such trust
management has not been addressed yet. Incorporating trust into the access
control model, i.e. through PKI Certicate Authority (CA), is one possibil-
ity of the future work. Another direction targeted in the near future is to
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improve the current system level implementation, especially in addressing the
limitation described in Section 2.5.
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3
Secure Open M2M-RFID Middleware
The addressing and networking are amongst the most important issues in or-
der to make the IoT concept a reality. In the RFID based IoT context, the
most challenging issue is on the integration of the RFID network into the IP
network. The development of the RFID technology, which is driven mainly
by the logistic related industries, is based on enterprise system that does not
take full advantage of the IP based networking features, such as the mobility
management. On the other hand, most of the existing works towards the in-
tegration of RFID and IP network do not take the full advantage of all the
RFID middleware components dened in the EPCglobal standard. Therefore,
the full integration of RFID middleware with the IP network through a testbed
implementation which is fully compliance with the EPCglobal standard and
having the location and mobility management at the same time, is the main
contribution of this work. The performance of our proposed work is measured
in terms of delay in two cases, i.e. tags registration and tracking, and there-
after it is compared with the existing RFID middleware implementation. The
measurement results show that the delay of our proposed work is signicantly
lower than that of existing solution, especially in the tags registration case.
73
Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
The IoT is a novel paradigm in which the basic idea is to enable the interaction
and cooperation of pervasive things or objects, such as RFID tags, sensors,
actuators, etc, with their neighbors to reach common goals [2], and to be
accessible through internet. RFID as one of technology that enables object
level service on the internet, follows a certain standard, namely EPCGlobal
standard [8], in order to realize the IoT vision on RFID.
One of the major problem in current RFID network architecture is that of
its infrastructure has a limited accessibility in the global IP network. EPC-
global standard has been driven mainly by the industry sectors that realy
utilize RFID and gain benets from it, e.g. logistics and supply chain, in a
form of RFID middleware that aims to inter-connect the RFID system with
enterprises IT infrastructure. As a result, the existing EPCglobal specica-
tion is very enterprise and middleware "oriented", e.g. focuses on adopting
web-service/SOAP technology which is computationally heavy for low-powered
mobile device. In the context of the RFID tag tracking service, the EPCglobal
RFID middleware relies on an entity called ONS which requires the client to
access directly a computationally heavy service provided by the EPCIS query
interface. Moreover, the root ONS which is an application of DNS has no
support on mobility. By far, the mobility is not a very important issue since
biggest customers of RFID technology are mostly logistic industries which do
not really require real-time tracking. However, when a sensing capability is
included within the RFID tag and real-time monitoring is required, mobility
becomes an important part to be considered. By having all those aspects to-
gether in mind, the main objectives of this work are to increase the accessibility
of RFID data over the internet with mobility support in the current EPCglobal
specication, while keeping all the advantages of the EPCglobal based RFID
middleware.
With its support in mobility management, SIP is a strong candidate to
provide such functionality in the RFID. Besides that, SIP is widely used in
many of the popular IP networking services such as Voice over IP (VoIP),
tele/video-conference, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), etc, thus suitable for
the purpose of integrating RFID with the global IP network. However, most
of the SIP based proposed solution did not leverage the rich functionality of
RFID middleware as dened by EPCglobal standard. The main contribution
of the proposed solution is that it takes the full benet of the RFID middle-
ware dened in the EPCglobal architecture, which allows us to obtain richer
information such as business context information. Moreover, it provides the
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RFID location management and integration with the Next Generation Net-
work (NGN) through SIP functionality.
Besides the location management, security and privacy are of the most
importance for the RFID system, especially when the RFID events data is ac-
cessible across several dierent organizations. In Chapter 2, a ne-grained and
ecient access control for the inter-enterprise RFID system has been proposed.
The proposed access control system provides solution to problems in such a
system, such as granularity, privacy, trust, exibility, and inter-operability.
From the system architecture perspective, applying access control before the
EPCIS component (i.e. at the Tracking module or the proposed SIP gateway)
is intuitively considered to be more secure than at the EPCIS because it acts
as the rst \gateway" in providing access to the EPC tags ID tracking request
before reaching the EPCIS. However, it is necessary to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed location management architecture for the RFID system
combined with the access control model proposed in Chapter 2 to measure the
eectiveness of such methods objectively.
The remaining of this chapter will be organized as follow. The architecture
EPCGlobal and SIP network is presented in section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes
our proposed solution in terms of architecture and protocol.The testbed im-
plementation of our proposed architecture is explained in 3.4. Performance
evaluation based on the testbed implementation along with some discussion
is presented in section 3.5. Finally conclusion and future insight are given in
section 3.6.
3.2 Related Works
An approach to fully convert EPCglobal into SIP network to be compatible
with IP based solution was proposed in [3]. It introduced an entity named
Surrogate User Agent (SUA) which acts as a SIP Client, i.e. performing the
SIP signalling that supports the location management. The types of SIP sig-
nalling message performed by SUA are REGISTER and INVITE. The REG-
ISTER message is used in the location registration procedure and INVITE
message is used in the tag tracking procedure. The authors of [3] also intro-
duced an entity called SRMS Name Server (SNS) which has the similar role as
DNS in the internet world or ONS in the RFID network, but it translates the
EPC tag ID into a SIP URI format instead of translating URL into IP address
or EPC tag ID into an RFID tracking or EPCIS query service interface. How-
ever, it was not clear how such translation is technically done. Moreover, with
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regards to an RFID middleware functionality, SUA only performs tag ltering
which is a small portion compare to the overall RFID capabilities according to
the EPCglobal standard.
Another approach to integrate the RFID network with the global IP net-
work was introduced in [12], in which an IP based infrastructure to retrieve
EPC tag ID's location was proposed. The proposed architecture consists of
RFID readers, location database, RFID agent, location server, and name server.
In the proposed architecture, the registration and tracking are also introduced
in order to manage the location of the RFID tag, and then a SIP-based RFID
location management system is again used as a proof of concept. However,
the paper does not explain clearly how the tag ID is translated into a name
that can be recongnized in SIP, i.e. SIP URI, in fact the paper assumes a
generic name such as doctor1. More importantly, the RFID middleware is not
even utilized in the proposed architecture, thus the full advantage of RFID
middleware cannot be leveraged by the platform.
ROADS (RFID Oce Application for Document tracking over SIP) [11] is
another attempt to integrate RFID with the global IP network. The paper
emphasized its solution on the compatibility with NGN, in particular with
the IMS which is also based on SIP. The SNS entity which was introduced
in the [3], and SIP for Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extension
(SIMPLE) protocol which is a transport of Instant messages in SIP that works
based on publish-subscribe principle are also introduced in the ROADS system
[11]. Similar to the previous solutions, this system does not leverage the full
advantage of an RFID middleware.
On the other hand, the development of RFID middleware based on the
EPCgloblal standard has been done by several companies as licensed and pro-
prietary solutions as well as by the open source communities. One of the
existing open source RFID middleware is AspireRFID [10] which has been
previously described in section 1.3.2. It introduced some components that
extends the original EPCglobal standard, specially Tracking Service that pro-
vides the tracking service and interface between ONS and EPCIS. However, it
relies fully on the web service implementation which does not support mobility
management and it is heavy weight to be implemented in the mobile devices,
such as smart phone and tablet.
3.2.1 Contributions to the existing works
According to the review of the existing works on the IP based RFID loca-
tion and mobility management solutions as well as the RFID middleware, it
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is clear that an integrated solution that combine both solutions into a single
platform. The major contribution in this work is to realize an integration of
an EPCglobal RFID with the global IP network based on SIP, which provides
location and mobility management functionality and also leverages the EPC-
global based RFID middleware capabilities. This means that the platform will
be incorporated with the business contexts information and more light weight
which means that the performance will be more ecient. On top of it, the
platform is also integrated with the security access control designed especially
for the inter-enterprise RFID systtem as explained in Chapter 2.
3.3 Proposed architecture
To achieve the objectives as described earlier in Section 3.1, a system architec-
ture is proposed as depicted in Fig. 3.1. The proposed architecture consists
of the components from AspireRFID middleware [10] and SIP components,
along with the interfaces enabling their integration. Besides that, a protocol
to allow communication between dierent components and identity translation
between two dierent systems, e.g. RFID and SIP, is also proposed.
3.3.1 EPCglobal RFID Middleware { SIP Architecture
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Figure 3.1: Proposed EPCglobal-SIP architecture
Each of the component in the proposed EPCglobal-SIP architecture shown
in Fig. 3.1 is briey explained in the following subsections in order to give an
idea of how the overall system works.
77
Chapter 3
3.3.1.1 ALE Server
It handles the connection with RFID readers and the collection of RFID raw
data. Furthermore, it performs ltering of RFID tags with certain pattern of
EPC ID and with certain kind of action, e.g. addition, current, or deletion of
RFID tags passing the reader. Therefore, only RFID data that matches criteria
sets by the lter can be passed to the next component of RFID middleware,
e.g. BEG, in the form of ECReport (Event Cycle Report).
3.3.1.2 BEG
BEG is a component proposed in ASPIRE RFID Middleware [10] as an exten-
sion to EPCglobal architecture. It essentially processes the report from ALE
server, and then send the data into the EPCIS Repository through the EPCIS
Capture Interface. The forwarded data to EPCIS repository depends upon
the business transaction that is dened in the BEG, known as Master Data.
BEG is able to retrieve those available Master Data in the EPCIS repository
through EPCIS Query Interface.
3.3.1.3 EPCIS
EPCIS is the heart of RFID middleware based on the EPCglobal architecture
framework. Its main functionality is to process two kinds of data, namely
Event Data and Master Data [6]. Given that, EPCIS transforms the Fil-
tered raw RFID data into more meaningful information in regards to business
transaction, e.g. the transaction ID, type of business step, business location,
disposition, etc. In order to enable the sharing of information in the repos-
itory to other components, EPCIS has two types of interface called Capture
and Query interfaces. In the query interface, there are two available meth-
ods to query the data in EPCIS repository, namely \poll" and \subscribe".
The \poll" method allows the query results to be returned once it is invoked,
while the\subscribe"method allows the subscriber to retrieve the query results
periodically according to the time period that is dened in the subscription.
Moreover, the\subscribe"method requires a so called Query Callback interface
to allow it sending a periodical query report to the subscriber.
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3.3.1.4 SIP Gateway
SIP Gateway is the main component that enables the communication between
RFID middleware and other devices through SIP protocol. In the proposed
architecture, SIP gateway has two main functionalities: location or mobility
management of RFID tags using SIP protocol, and tracking of RFID tag.
Based on the architecture depicted in Fig. 3.1, those two main functionalities
are represented by orange and blue lines. The mobility management which is
represented by orange line is accomplished by applying "subscribe"method to
the EPCIS Query interface which returns periodical query report, and then by
invoking a SIP "REGISTER"message any time a new tag ID is reported. On
the other hand, the tracking of RFID tag is initialized by a SIP "MESSAGE"
sent by a tracking client that contains a tracking request. Upon receiving a
tracking request message, SIP gateway invokes a "poll"method towards EPCIS
which returns some results and nally sends the tracking results back to track-
ing client through another SIP "MESSAGE". It is important to mention that,
the benet of having a SIP based RFID tag tracking is to allow the tracking
client to access the EPCIS repository through the SIP gateway which is more
light-weight than the direct access to the EPCIS query interface, that is done
in the traditional ONS based tag tracking.
3.3.2 SIP Protocol
The proposed architecture as explained earlier will not be able to perform mo-
bility management and tracking of RFID tags functionalities properly without
the support of SIP protocols as well as its infrastructure. With that in mind,
the details of SIP protocols along with the infrastructure supporting the pro-
posed architecture will be explained in this section.
3.3.2.1 EPC ID-to-SIP URI translation and address resolution
In order for an RFID tag with a certain ID that follows EPCglobal standard to
be "connected" in the internet world through SIP protocol, there are at least
2 steps required: EPC-to-SIP URI translation and address resolution itself.
The EPCglobal has dened ONS standard [7] that allows an EPC tag ID to
be resolved as an internet address through a specic DNS implementation.
However, it does not support the EPC ID -to-SIP URI translation and further
resolve it into an IP address along with the communication port and transport
protocol. [3] introduced a new entity called SNS (SIP Naming Service) that
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translates EPC-ID into SIP-URI and denes how the address translation is
done hierarchically. However, [3] does not explain clearly how the SIP address
resolution is being carried out. Given with limited information in the literature,
we proposed a method that consists of 2 steps as mentioned earlier.
An important assumption in the translation process is that the EPC ID
translation from the initial reading of RFID tag in the form of pure Hexadeci-
mal or Binary format into a URI format has been done by a TDT [9] module,
which practically can be part of the ALE server or running as a standalone
service that is connected to ALE server. Given this assumption, a method to
translate an EPC ID in a pure identity URI form into a SIP URI is proposed.
A typical EPC ID in a pure identity URI form would be following a general
syntax as follows:
urn:epc:id:EpcScheme:CompanyPrex.ItemReference.(SerialNumber)
The EpcScheme can be gid, sgtin, grai, etc. The serial number is an op-
tional eld, since it is applicable in some of EpcSchemes but inapplicable
in others. For example, the following EPC ID in a pure identity URI for-
mat: urn:epc:id:gid:6776251.255.480, is mapped into the following SIP URI:
sip:480.255@6776251.gid.id.anydomain.com. This means that the SIP domain
of the URI example 6776251.gid.id.anydomain.com and the SIP user ID is
480.255. Having the EPC ID mapped into the SIP URI, the complete address
resolution of SIP URI along with the port and transport protocol is done based
on the guideline in RFC 3263 [1]. Practically speaking, the address resolution
relies on DNS infrastructure which is quite similar to the ONS, but its detail
implementation involves conguration of the SeRVice (SRV) record in DNS
besides the NAPTR record.
3.3.3 Access Control Module
The detail implementation of the access control module is thoroughly explained
in Section 2.5. The main dierence on how the access control is integrated
in the overall architecture between the one proposed in Chapter 2 and this
current chapter where a SIP gateway is introduced, is that the access control
in Chapter 2 is performed at the EPCIS server level (as seen in Figure 2.2),
while in this chapter it is performed at the SIP gateway level. Upon adding
the access control module into the proposed EPCglobal-SIP architecture, the
architecture will look like as it is depicted in Figure 3.2.
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3.4 The Testbed implementation
The testbed consists of RFID middleware components, e.g. ALE server, BEG,
EPCIS server, and Accada RFID reader simulator, that are developed and
adapted from the ASPIRE project [4], SIP gateway to the EPCIS middleware
component, tag tracking client based on SIP protocol, and two SIP proxy
servers based on OpenSIPS project implementation [5].
The SIP gateway implements both the SIP protocol and EPCIS query
interface as shown earlier in Fig. 3.1. Moreover, the SIP gateway is also
capable of translating the EPC-ID into a SIP URI format and then resolving
the SIP URI based on the guideline in [1] as explained previously in Section
3.3.
To explain better how the whole procedures work, a simple scenario will
be presented. The scenario being considered in this work is rst of all a retail
company Ret receives some items with RFID tags from a producer Prod in
its receiving RFID gate. When the items arrived at the RFID gate of Ret ,
the middleware processes the tags and other information, and nally the tags
registration into the SIP servers owned byRet andProd is carried out. On the
other hand, a user who would like to know the latest location of the item and
other information, would use a tracking application and receives information
that he/she requests for. Two cases for the measurements are being done. The
rst one being the registration of tags through SIP protocol and the second
one is the tags location tracking.
The overall procedure of tag registration process involving the query sub-
scription to EPCIS server and registration using SIP protocol is presented in
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Figure 3.3: Tag registration procedure
Figure 3.3. The tag registration process relies on the subscribe method of the
EPCIS query interface in which the SIP subscribes to a particular event in the
EPCIS (step 1 in Figure 3.3), i.e. a new tag is added into the EPCIS repos-
itory (step 2 in Figure 3.3), and then a periodic message with a congurable
time interval would be sent to the SIP gateway as long as the event matches
the subscription criteria (step 3 in Figure 3.3). As soon as a new tag is read
by the reader and processed by the middleware up until the SIP gateway, the
tag registration process by using SIP protocol is performed. Before that, SIP
gateway would perform an EPC-to-SIP URI translation as well as a SIP ad-
dress resolution by using a DNS query (step 4 in Figure 3.3). Since the tag
is received at the Ret premises which is considered as the foreign domain to
the Prod , the tag registration is done to both Ret 's and Prod 's Registrar
Servers. Upon the registration at the Prod 's home registrar server (step 5 in
Figure 3.3), the domain part of the Contact address in the SIP header contains
the Ret 's domain, which in this case is essentially corresponds to the Ret 's
Proxy Server. The purpose of this is that when a tracking request is received
at the Prod 's Proxy Server, the request will be forwarded to the Ret 's Proxy
Server which will be explained in a more detailed when we describe the track-
ing procedure later on in this section. Further on, upon the the registration
at the Ret 's local Registrar Server (step 7 in Figure 3.3), the domain part
of the Contact address in the SIP header contains the IP address of the SIP
gateway which is the main contact point in querying the requested EPC tag
ID to the EPCIS server. Finally the 200 OK message will be sent back to the
SIP gateway upon successful registrations (step 6 and 8 in Figure 3.3).
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The overall procedure of tag tracking process is depicted in Figure 3.4.
First of all, the tracking client would translate the EPC tag ID to be tracked
into its corresponding SIP URI (step 1 in Figure 3.4). After the SIP URI is
obtained, a SIP message that contains some query parameters, such as EPC
ID, date, and time, is sent to the Prod 's Proxy Server (step 2 in Figure 3.4).
In the implementation, the query parameters are formatted in Java Script
Object Notation (JSON) format. The Prod 's Proxy Server would do a lookup
of the given SIP URI stated in the To eld of the message's header, in its
Registrar (step 3 in Figure 3.4). After the Contact address, which is the Ret 's
domain, is found in the Registrar, the Prod 's Proxy Server would resolve its
internet address and then forward it (step 4 in Figure 3.4). Upon receiving
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the message, Ret 's Proxy Server would forward it to the SIP gateway (step
5 in Figure 3.4), that can be obtained from the Ret 's Registrar after the
registration process. Further on, the SIP gateway would invoke a poll method
through the EPCIS query interface, unlike in the tags registration process that
uses subscribe method (step 6 in Figure 3.4). The EPCIS repository would
then return the query results to SIP gateway according to the query parameters
that are requested (step 7 in Figure 3.4). Upon receiving the query results,
the SIP gateway would send a 200 OK response message including the query
results down until the tracking client side (step 8-10 in Figure 3.4). Finally,
an ACK message is sent to the SIP gateway (step 11 in Figure 3.4). Upon
integrating the access control mechanism in the tag tracking procedure, some
additional steps are required in the overall tracking process as shown in Figure
3.5. Those additional steps are essentially an access control request and a set
of access control resutls sent by the SIP gateway to the access control module
and vice versa (steps 6 and 7 in Figure 3.5).
3.5 Results and discussion
3.5.1 Measurement procedures
A series of experiments have been carried out to measure the performance of
the proposed system architecture in both tags registration and tracking cases,
which is particularly interesting due to the fact that a high number of tags are
being read at one cycle in logistics, shipping, and such. The parameter that is
being measured is the time consumed to perform each operation over dierent
number of tags. The time consumed for the tags registration is dened as the
time between the rst SIP REGISTER request message among all the tags
being sent and the last SIP 200 OK response message being received by the
SIP gateway. Similarly, the time consumed for the tags tracking is dened as
the time between the rst SIP MESSAGE being sent and the last received SIP
200 OK response message. For each number of tags, 700 measurements have
been done for the tags tracking case, and more than 600 measurements were
taken for the tags registration case. The measurement results of our proposed
method are then compared with the ONS Tracking Service from ASPIRE [4],
which will be referred as the reference method, under the similar scenario. It is
important to note that there exists other tracs other than the trac for the
measurement purpose, e.g. LAN and internet trac, during the experiment
due to the needs of the DNS. As a result, that factor greatly aects the delay of
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some tiny numbers of measured data which were discarded in the nal statistics
analysis.
3.5.2 Analysis of measurement results
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 0  5  10  15  20
R
e
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Tags
RFID tag Registration Time with 95% confidence interval
Proposed method
Reference method
Figure 3.6: Time consumed in the registration process for dierent number of
tags with 95% condence interval
The measured delay as a result of the experiments for tags register and
tracking cases are depicted in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7 respectively. Both mea-
surement results show clearly that the delay in tag registration and tracking
mechanisms of the proposed method are lower then the one being compared,
especially in the registration mechanism in which the delays dier signicantly.
The main reason behind it is that because the reference method fully utilizes
web based operation that takes relatively high delay to perform, such as the
tracking service methods as well as the EPCIS poll query, which involves web
service methods invocation and database query. That is why the delay of ref-
erence method is signicantly higher than the proposed method which is fully
utilizes SIP protocol in the tags registration case. This argument is even more
conrmed when the two cases of our proposed method are being compared.
Here, we can obviously see that the tags tracking process takes roughly more
than 10 times the delay of the other case. This is due to extra signalling and
processing within the SIP Proxy servers, e.g. registrar lookup and address
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Figure 3.7: Time consumed in the tag tracking for dierent number of tags
with 95% condence interval
resolution, as well as the query operation to the EPCIS server, that it has to
perform. In fact, the query of EPCIS server takes around 5=6 of the total delay
in the tags tracking process. Even so it is still higher than the delay of tags
registration process which is obvious since more SIP signalling is involved, the
process involving SIP signalling alone in the tags tracking procedure is signi-
cantly lower than the delay of the web based operation. Based on the ndings
in Figure 3.7, we can also conclude that the proposed method is more scalable
than the reference one under the same condition. This behaviour is due to the
database query in the reference method is done twice, that is two times higher
than the proposed one, which makes the delay dierence between two cases
increases almost double as the number of tags increases.
Furthermore, condence interval has been calculated in order to check the
reliability of the data. As stated earlier, a series of experiments of more than
600 measurements for each scenario which is independent to each other and
results in a large enough population of data, implies that the distribution of
the sample mean approach a normal distribution. This is true according to the
central limit theorem for a large enough sample size as long as the population
has a nite standard deviation. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the sample
data has normal distribution which is then used in deriving the 95% condence
interval values of the measured data, which are presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: 95% condence interval values of the measured data
Proposed Reference
Register Tracking Register Tracking
2 tags 0.000134 0.000471 0.004006 0.001357
5 tags 0.000208 0.001112 0.004607 0.002315
10 tags 0.000618 0.002819 0.009175 0.005213
15 tags 0.000672 0.004948 0.011330 0.005799
20 tags 0.001979 0.007190 0.014357 0.010330
The condence interval general trends show that, the higher the number
of tags the higher the 95% condence interval values, although the values over
dierent tags does not have linear relationship. As the condence interval
value is highly inuenced by the standard deviation, this nding shows that
the measured delay values varied a lot especially when high number of tags
are used. One of the reason is that because the message in the either case
is sent as an individual request message that represents an individual tag ID,
especially for the case of the proposed method and the tags tracking case of
the reference method. Therefore, the probability of the message being delayed,
e.g. due to packet retransmission or congestion in the network, is higher when
more individual messages are sent as a whole.
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In addition, the Cummulative Distribution Function (CDF) plots of the
proposed method for both registration and tracking cases are shown in Fig.
3.8 and 3.9. Those CDF plots conrm the previous results that the SIP tag
registration process takes very low delay, i.e. less than 60 milliseconds for 20
tags in average, and the condence intervals increase as the number of tags is
increased in both cases.
3.5.3 The impact of access control in the tags tracking
case
In order to test the impact of access control in the tags tracking case in the
proposed system architecture and the reference system, another series of mea-
surement is performed similar to the procedure carried out in 3.5.1 for the tags
tracking case. The measured delay of the experiment for tags tracking case
with the impact of access control is presented in Figure 3.10. The measurement
result shows a peculiar behavior of the proposed system architecture when the
access control is applied, especially when there is 15 or more number of tags
to be tracked. Initially, the tags tracking time of the proposed system archi-
tecture combined with the access control mechanism is comparable with the
reference system even without access control, i.e. in the range of 0.5 second,
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for 10 or less number of tags. But it goes up as high as 5.5 seconds and 7.4
seconds when the number of tags is 15 and 20.
The main reason of such strange behavior is because the access control
framework is implemented in web service, which is similar to the reference
system, while the proposed system is based on SIP. As previously shown in
Figure 3.5, the overall tag tracking procedure which is based on SIP protocol is
\interrupted"by a time consuming web service based access control mechanism.
In addition, the proposed tracking procedure requires the multiple tags to be
tracked one by one. As a result, the protocol necessitates the invoking of access
control service in multiple times, depending on the number of tag to be tracked,
thus the tracking time grows extremely high when the tags reach a certain
number, e.g. 15 tags or more according to the results depicted in Figure 3.10.
This problem does not occur in the reference system because both the reference
tracking method and the access control rely on web service. Furthermore,
the web service operation is invoked only once regardless of the tag numbers,
i.e. one web service invocation each for the tracking and access control. In
summary, this result tells us that the access control mechanism needs to be
implemented in a more ecient way, yet maintaining the interoperability, i.e.
compatible with the overall RFID middleware as well as the specic location
management implementation method.
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3.6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this work is the integration of the EPCglobal based
RFID architecture with SIP to their full advantage, i.e. providing functionali-
ties of RFID middleware as well as RFID mobility and location management.
A testbed implementation has been developed and a series of experiments have
been carried out to measure the performance of the proposed architecture in
terms of delay, for tags registration and tracking scenarios. Moreover, the
measurement results of the proposed architecture are then compared with a
reference method from an existing RFID middleware implementation. The
results show that the proposed method performs signicantly better than the
reference method in terms of delay and scalability.
Some future directions of the development in this work include the inte-
gration of the system with IMS, integration with cloud platform either at the
RFID middleware component or the SIP as well as IMS network entities, and
an implementation of the security and privacy mechanisms.
90
3.7. References
3.7 References
[1] Rfc 3263 - session initiation protocol (sip): Locating sip servers. June
2002.
[2] Luigi Atzori, Antonio Iera, and Giacomo Morabito. The internet of things:
A survey. Computer Networks, 54(15):2787 { 2805, 2010.
[3] Kideok Cho, Sangheon Pack, Taekyoung Kwon, and Yanghee Choi. Srms:
Sip-based rd management system. In Pervasive Services, IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, july 2007.
[4] http://wiki.aspire.ow2.org.
[5] http://www.opensips.org.
[6] EPCglobal Inc. Epc information services (epcis) version 1.0.1 specica-
tion. September 2007.
[7] EPCglobal Inc. Epcglobal object name service (ons) version 1.0.1. May
2008.
[8] EPCglobal Inc. The epcglobal architecture framework. December 2010.
[9] EPCglobal Inc. Gs1 epcglobal tag data translation (tdt) 1.6 - ratied
standard. October 2011.
[10] John Soldatos, Nikos Kefalakis, Nektarios Leontiadis, Nikolaos Konstanti-
nou, Nathalie Mitton, Loc Schmidt, Roudy Dagher, Mathieu David, Bayu
Anggorojati, Simone Frattasi, Neeli Prasad, Didier Donsez, Gabriel Pe-
draza, and Kiev Gama. D3.4b: Core aspire middleware infrastructure.
Technical report, ASPIRE, 2010.
[11] P. Solic, N. Rozic, and N. Ukic. Roads: Rd oce application for docu-
ment tracking over sip. In Software, Telecommunications Computer Net-
works, 2009. SoftCOM 2009. 17th International Conference on, september
2009.
[12] P.N. Tran and N. Boukhatem. Ip-based rd architecture and location
management. In Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks,
2008. SoftCOM 2008. 16th International Conference on, sept. 2008.
91

4
Secure Access Control and Authority
Delegation based on Capability and
Context Awareness for IoT
Access control is a critical functionality in IoT, and it is particularly promising
to make access control secure, ecient and generic in a distributed environ-
ment. Another an important property of access control system in the IoT is
exibility which can be achieved by access or authority delegation. Delega-
tion mechanisms in access control that have been studied until now have been
intended mainly for a system that has no resource constraint, such as a web-
based system, which is not very suitable for a highly pervasive system such as
IoT. This chapter presents the CCAAC model including the authority dele-
gation method, along with specication and protocol evaluation intended for
federated M2M/IoT. By using the identity and capability-based access con-
trol approach together with the contextual information and secure federated
IoT, this proposed model provides scalability, exibility, and secure authority
delegation for highly distributed system. The protocol evaluation results show
that the capability creation and access mechanism of CCAAC is secure against
a rigorous man-in-the-middle attack, e.g. eavesdropping and replay attacks,
and is able to provide authentication as well.
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4.1 Introduction
The Future Internet (FI) will be shaped by the rapid growth of the current
internet in terms of penetration, services, capacity and contents along with
ultra-small yet powerful mobile communication devices. The vision of internet
connectivity by anyone, any time and anywhere, will be augmented by a new
dimension, namely connectivity of anything driven by the advancements in the
development of smart devices including WSN, RFID, Near Field Communica-
tion (NFC), etc. This is often referred to as IoT and enables dierent modes
of communication, i.e. things-to-person, things-to-things and person-to-things
communication along with various intelligent services and applications. A large
number of research challenges remain in order to ensure the successful opera-
tion of IoT and some of the most signicant of these relate to the capabilities
of the network to oer security, privacy and trust.
IoT is ubiquitous and heterogeneous in nature. As a result, a large numbers
of risks and threats emerge that can threaten the system's security and user's
data privacy. Among others, access control is one of the main security issues
to be addressed in IoT that is highly pervasive. A novel access control model {
CCAAC is proposed to overcome this issue. Furthermore, as IoT is character-
ized by highly dynamic nodes connectivity and network topologies due to the
ever-changing nature of wireless channel, mobility, and factors such as limited
power, a dynamic and exible design of access control system that is suitable
for IoT is of the most importance. For this purpose, the proposed CCAAC
model also considers the delegation of authority in order to gain access to a
certain resource which belongs to dierent security domain in a Federated IoT
network.
The chosen approach for the model with access control based on the capa-
bility concept, and in particular the Identity based Capability (ICAP) system
[8], is considered in order to cope with the scalability of IoT system since it
is well suited for providing authentication and access control in distributed
systems. By using the capability concept, the proposed model to some extent
also contributes to the authentication mechanism, which will be shown later
in Section 4.7. Furthermore, in order to full the exibility and adaptabil-
ity in IoT, context awareness and dynamic security as well as privacy policy
enforcement is applied in the proposed model. The Context Aware Security
Manager (CASM) model originally proposed for a PN [18] will be used as a
reference point due its suitability in distributed systems, especially in the case
of federated IoT. Along with that, exible access control system by means
of authority delegation method based on a dynamic capability propagation is
also included in the proposed model [1].
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4.2 Related Works on Access Control and Au-
thority Delegation Models
Capability based access control was derived from the capability system con-
cept in the computing world [15] in order to address the shortcomings of ACL
based models. Both capability based access control and ACL are two com-
plementary traditional access control systems derived from an Access Control
Matrix (ACM). Basically, an ACM consists of several columns that list the
objects or resources to be accessed, and rows that list a set of subjects or users
who have privileges to access dierent resources. Each row in the ACM can
also be seen as a capability owned by a subject that needs to be presented
whenever it wants to access any object or resource in a system.
A simple example of capability used in the real life is a ticket that allows a
passenger to embark on dierent modes of city transportation, e.g. bus, tram,
train, etc. If the ticket contains all the transportation modes in which the
passenger can embark, then the capability based access control is used. On
contrary, if the system check whether the credential contained in the ticket
is listed in the access control list, then the ACL is used. In comparison [3],
capability based access control is better than ACL in tackling e.g. the con-
fused deputy problem and other security threats, it is more robust due to its
distributed architecture, it supports more levels of granularity, access right del-
egation and revocation. The Identity based Capability or ICAP was proposed
in [8] which solves the problem of capability propagation and revocation in
classical capability based access control.
In Context aWare Access Control (CWAC) [13], the surrounding context
of subjects and/or objects is considered to provide access but it has scalabil-
ity issues and no support for delegation and revocation. In Context Aware
Role Based Access Control (CARBAC) [14], context is integrated with RBAC
dynamically which is dened as characterization of the surrounding entities
for performing appropriate actions. With CARBAC each dierent role can be
associated with certain contexts. For instance, a Professor role in a university
can be associated with some contexts, such as PhD degree, x years of research
experience, and y numbers of journal publications in the related eld. However,
improper association of context and roles results in ineciency in scalability
and time and context dependency results in complicated delegation.
A Personal Trusted Device (PTD) [2] is used to provide access to locked
resources and places, which consists of access controllers, the PTD and an
administration point, while embedded security of the PTD is not considered.
In [16], an access control model is designed as standalone components each
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managing its context and thus limiting the reuse and context sharing. [5]
and [9] proposed solutions for decoupling the applications from the context
resources which require permanent access to the server. However, in a Wireless
Personal Area Network (WPAN) as one scenario considered in PN, access to
xed infrastructure cannot be guaranteed due to constraints like frequently
changing connectivity, resource unavailability and battery power. In [17], an
identity establishment scheme for IoT as well as authentication mechanism
based on ECC and capability was proposed.
Research on delegation of authority using capability has been investigated
in [11] and [10]. [11] addressed the issue of role and/or permission delegation
based on a RBAC model in a cross-domain environment using capabilities. The
central idea behind their proposed mechanisms was the mapping of capabilities
into roles and permissions in each domain. Hasebe et al. extends the approach
presented in [11] by adding the delegation of task to be performed in the model
for workow systems in [10].
Research on dynamic authorization delegation in federated environment
between entities or machine-to-machine delegation has been reported by Gomi
et al. in [7]. Authors of the paper investigated chain of delegation in multiple
entities and how to provide secure delegation framework. To better illustrate
the delegation chain in multiple entities being investigated in [7], we can think
of a user who is authorized in his company's web server and wanting to access
some information from other company's server, i.e. destination server. In this
scenario, his request has to go through his company's server and other interme-
diate servers in between before reaching the destination server. Consequently,
the user has to delegate his authority over the chains of intermediate servers
in a relay-like fashion. The delegation framework proposed in [7] also intro-
duced Delegation Authority and Authentication Authority entities to enable
such authorization delegation. Another related work in this topic has also been
reported by the same author, Gomi, in [6]. Unlike his previous work in [7], [6]
focuses on the user-to-user delegation and does not consider multiple entities
delegation. The main contribution was a delegation framework in federated
environment using an access token, regardless of the access control model be-
ing used. In this context, an access token is an opaque string representing a
delegator's authorization to delegate their privilege to a delegatee whom they
specify, which does not contain any information about delegator's credentials.
The paper also explains the mechanism of issuing a token, asserting it into an
authorization document, and service provisioning based on the delegate token.
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The existing delegation methods are designed mainly to serve web-based
services which involve a large IT infrastructure. These kinds of delegation mod-
els are not practically visible for an IoT system, which has a lot of constraints,
e.g. power, memory, etc. It is important to mention that the delegation of
authority by means of capability propagation is part of CCAAC overall design
model. Therefore, delegation method in CCAAC is not an extension of any
existing access control model, e.g. RBAC, as presented in most of the previous
works.
The federated IoT networking has not been much discussed in the litera-
ture. There is a signicant amount of work done in the context of a federated
device-to-device or machine-to-machine communication known as PN feder-
ation, which includes the networking, management, security framework and
identity management in [18]. Federated IoT environments based on the PN
concept [18] will be further elaborated in Section 4.3.2.
4.2.1 Contributions to the existing works
According to the review of the related works on access control and authority
delegation, some challenges are still left open, especially in the context of IoT.
The biggest challenge on the access control for IoT are the scalability and exi-
bility, not to mention the secure access control. As we understand already that
the IoT is highly pervasive and distributed in nature, thus scalability aspect
of access control system is one important characteristic to have. While access
control system is usually centralized or "distributed" in a particular entity, e.g.
server, our approach is to distribute the complexity to the accessing entity by
using capability. The exibility challenge in access control here refers to two
things: the exibility in the process of access decision making by considering
the contextual information and the exibility in terms of authority delegation.
Based on the review of challenges related to such requirements in Section 4.2,
the proposed access control scheme will tackle both aspects at the same time.
4.3 System Architecture
4.3.1 System architecture to support the CCAACmodel
The system architecture for supporting the CCAACmodel is depicted in Figure
4.1. It is important to note that the Personal Network (PN) [18] has been
referred in this work due to its advance networking concept for device-to-device
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communication that opens a path as one candidate of network implementation
in IoT. Correspondingly, the security framework brought up within the PN
would be a good starting point in designing a security framework, considering
their similarities in characteristics and requirements.
Security Decision Point
Policies
Profiles
Access 
List
Figure 4.1: System architecture for supporting the CCAAC
Security Decision Point (SDP) in Figure 4.1 is the most important module
in the system architecture to receive the capability creation or access request
and make the nal decision of the request. Policies serves as Policies Repos-
itory that consists of a collection of various policies for accessing available
resources or objects. Proles serves as Prole Repository, which essentially
consists of subject as well as object proles. Both of these components will be
referred to as Policies Repository and Proles Repository later on in Section
4.4. Finally, Access List plays an important role in supporting the capability-
based authority delegation of access control by controlling the capability prop-
agation as well as revocation through maintenance of a propagation tree as
proposed in [8].
In principle, a new propagation tree is created at the Access List whenever
a new capability is created, with the original capability owner becomes the root
of the tree. When the capability owner delegates his authority by propagating
his capability to someone else, then the propagation tree is updated by adding
a new node. The one who propagated the capability can revoke the authority
delegated to someone else before by requesting a revocation message to Access
List. If the revocation message is valid, the corresponding node will be removed
from the propagation tree.
4.3.2 Federated-IoT
Identity "Federation" is known term within the web security world and refers
to management of a web user's identity across dierent security domains. The
main reason of enabling federation in the web environment is that the work
ow of the system often requires a user that is authenticated in one domain
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to be authenticated in other domains as well. However, a concrete denition
of the Federated IoT which is conceptually dierent as compared to the web
security world, needs to be determined before addressing the issue of authority
delegation in such environment.
First of all, the identity in the web-based system refers to a person's identity
while in IoT, identity refers to a device or "thing". Therefore, the interaction
of identities in IoT is in the form of device-to-device communication.
Warehouse
Cluster
Factory
Cluster
Shop
Cluster 1
Shop
Cluster 2
Home
cluster
University
Cluster
Internet
infrastructure
IoT Private user network domain
IoT Retail Shop network domain
IoT Goods producer network domain
IoT network federation 1
IoT network federation 2
Figure 4.2: An example of Federated IoT network with delegation scenario
An example of federated IoT network in our context is depicted in Figure
4.2. Three IoT network domains are considered, i.e. private user, retail shop,
and goods producer network, and two IoT-Federated networks are considered.
An IoT network domain consists of one or more IoT cluster and the inter-
cluster communication can be done either through the Internet infrastructure
as shown in Figure 4.2 or through a wireless ad-hoc connection. Device-to-
device communication within a cluster, i.e. intra-cluster communication, can
be carried out by using dierent wireless access technology, e.g. RFID, ZigBee,
bluetooth, wi, etc.
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4.3.2.1 Motivating scenario for access delegation
A good scenario example of how an authority delegation is needed in the
Federated IoT networks can be shown as an inter-working of an intelligent-
shopping service oered by a retail shop and a smart-fridge device that belongs
to private user domain. The retail shop oers an intelligent service to its
customer such that it is able to suggest a list of foods items based on their
availability or expiration dates in the smart-fridge. In order for the retail
shop to be able to come up with list of suggestions, it needs a privilege to
access the smart-fridge which belongs to dierent network domain. To solve
this issue, a valid privilege will be delegated to a device belongs to retail shop
network. Before access delegation can be performed, it is assumed that the
IoT network federation has been created, hence network authentication and
trust relationship between two network domains have been established.
Another scenario of the authority delegation is when a device owned by
a private user is trying to access the shop cluster 1 which belongs to retail
shop network domain. In this scenario, suppose that a user that has a "smart
fridge" at home is currently at the retail shop 1. He is checking the foods at
home that need to be resupplied, at the same time checking those foods that
may be available in the shop by accessing any wireless network device in retail
shop 1. Since he does not belong to retail shop network domain, he needs a
privilege in order to read information required by him. To solve such problem,
a device that belongs to shop 1 cluster can delegate its privilege to private
user's device. Before access delegation can be performed, it is assumed that
the IoT network federation has been created, hence network authentication
and trust relationship between two network domains have been established.
The proposed delegation mechanism and the infrastructure to support the
authority delegation will be presented in Section 4.6.
In such authority delegation scenario, some privacy problems could arise.
For example, the private user do not want to reveal all food or drink items in
his smart-fridge to the retail shop. With the authority delegation, the private
user can delegate some of his access rights to retail shop. It should be noted
that delegating authority does not mean to give full authority to other party
as if the other party has the same role as the one delegating it. Furthermore,
the delegated authority can be revoked at any time.
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4.4 Proposed CCAAC Model
The proposed CCAAC model also includes properties of ICAP and context
aware security, especially the concept of CASM and Virtual Identity (VID)
[18]. This lls the gaps in current solutions as emphasized in Section 4.1.
4.4.1 Proposed capability structure in CCAAC
In the remaining of this chapter, the notations listed in Table 4.1 will be used.
Table 4.1: Notations used in the CCAAC denition
S Representing identier of Subject that requests an access.
O Name of object or resource to be accessed.
AR Type of access right, e.g. read, write, execute.
C Context information.
Rnd Random number generated from a one-way hash function to prevent
forgery.
extCAP External capability that is held by the Subject.
inCAP Internal capability that is kept in the Object, server, or whatever
physical entity that is be accessed.
V ID Virtual Identity.
ID Unique identier of the Subject.
P A set of Subject's proles.
C A set of contextual information that are used to dene the VID and
Policy.
Firstly, in order to support the context awareness in ICAP, an additional
eld is added in the extCAP for the Subject Si that contains the context infor-
mation, C, related to the capability. By including this, the external capability
structure in CCAAC is dened as follow:
extCAPi = fO;AR; C; Rndig (4.1)
where
Rndi = f(S;O;AR; Rnd0) (4.2)
Rnd0 = f(O;AR) (4.3)
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The internal capability (inCAP ) that creates a pair with the extCAP which
is stored in the object itself or an entity that has higher "authority" over the
object (e.g. in hierarchical type of network), is dened as follows:
inCAP = fO; Rnd0g (4.4)
where Rnd0 is dened exactly as in Equation 4.3.
4.4.2 Basic denitions
The important denitions used in CCAAC are presented in this section in
which PN is the targeted platform.
4.4.2.1 Contexts
The Contexts C, that are used to dene the VID and Policy is essentially a
set of contexts (CSet) with dierent types (CType). The type of context can be
a concrete property such as time or location, but also security related context
such as authentication and trust level. In order to apply the context in the
access control decision, each of the context types has to be evaluated with a
certain constraint (CConst).
The overall context denition in CCAAC can be expressed with the follow-
ing notation:
CType 2 fauthLevel; trustLevel; time; location;    g (4.5)
CSet = fCType(1); CType(2);    ; CType(n)g (4.6)
CConst := hCTypeihOP ihV ALUEi (4.7)
where OP is a logical operator, i.e. OP 2 f>;; <;;=; 6=g and V ALUE is
a specic value of CType. Finally, we dened C as a set of context constraint
CConst as follows:
C = fCConst(1); CConst(2);    ; CConst(n)g (4.8)
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4.4.2.2 Policy
A policy is associated with certain VID(s) that describes VID(s) preferences
upon allowing other entities to access them. Please note that the entity or
subject requesting access is described by its prole, e.g. subject's attributes, in
the policy. A policy in the proposed CCAAC model holds an important role in
access control decision as well as any process involving capability creation and
delegation. Hence, it can simply be dened as a set of rules with parameters
related to the user as follows:
Policy 2 fP ; C;ARg (4.9)
It is important to note that since a Policy is linked with a VID, and a VID
itself is already linked with an Object, therefore the Object O notation is not
included in the Policy statement. Furthermore, unlike the denition of the
VID, the P and C that are included in the Policy statement are related to the
Subject S who tries to access the Object O.
4.4.2.3 VID
An entity, i.e. subject or object, may have more than one identity, namely one
main identity and numbers as other alias identities; this is referred as VID.
A VID consists of a user identier and a set of disclosure policies where the
same disclosure policy can apply to dierent VIDs. Therefore, the relation-
ship between VIDs and disclosure policies is a many-to-many, which can be
implemented using a pointer or hash map.
A VID is also attached with a particular context as well as prole infor-
mation of the corresponding user [18] and it can be assumed that the prole
information can be pre-dened as a set of default proles or customized to a
specic VID. The prole is assumed to have an one-to-one relationship with
the VID and, for the context, to have a many-to-many relationship with the
VID.
Based on these relationships and assumptions, the VID is dened as follow:
V ID 2 fID;P; C; Policiesg (4.10)
The Profile P in VID may consist of Objects' O attributes and personal
information. C refers to Contexts that can be a security context, such as trust
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level, authentication level as well as other common contexts such as time and
location (see Subsection 4.4.2.1). The ID is a unique identier that can be
acquired through cryptographic operations. The Policies is a set of Policy
that was explained in 4.4.2.2.
From the practical point of view, the "attributes" attached with the VID,
Policies, P , and C do not necessarily need to be physically contained within the
VID itself. The VID could for instance contain just the pointers to the relevant
Policies or Profile, and be implemented using overlay DHT approach that
is commonly used for sharing the information in the P2P or ad-hoc networks
in a distributed manner. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of the
VID as well as the networking and communication protocols used among the
communicating entities are outside the scope of this chapter.
4.4.2.4 Other denitions
Other denitions that are used in the formal specication of CCAAC are as
follows:
P = fProfile1; P rofile2;    ; P rofileng (4.11)
Policies = fPolicy1; Policy2;    ; Policyng (4.12)
AR 2 fRead;Write;NULLg (4.13)
Please note that P is a set of entity's Profile contained in the V ID, and
is stored in the Proles Repository. The same goes for Policies, it is a set of
any entity's Policy and is stored in the Policies Repository. The usage of both
Proles and Policies Repository will be shown when the detail mechanisms of
CCAAC will be explained in the next sub section. As for the AR, it can either
be fReadg, fWriteg, fRead;Writeg, or fNULLg. If AR = fNULLg, the
permission to access a particular object is not allowed.
4.5 Specication of CCAAC Mechanisms
In the following, the formal specication for two of the four main processes
in the CCAAC secure access control mechanism is given in details, i.e. the
capability creation and access. The specication assumes that CASM is used
and the message exchanges among the internal modules are as depicted in
Figure 4.1. In the proposed CCAAC model, the SDP is not only acting as
a central point for security decisions as was the case in CASM, but is also
responsible of performing other functionalities as explained in the following.
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Si SDP
Profiles
Repository
Policies
Repository
Access
List
Req(VIDi)
Map VIDi
with profiles
(1)
(2)
Check the policy
of returned profiles
(3)
Relevant policies
(4)
extCAP or
Rejection
(5)
Report
(6)
CAP creation
decision
Add new 
Access List
CASM
Figure 4.3: Capability creation protocol in the proposed access control mech-
anism
4.5.1 Creation
The capability creation protocol in the proposed access control mechanism is
presented in Figure 4.3 and can be explained as follows:
1. The Subject (S) sends a capability creation request of a certain Object
(O) along with its own VID (V IDS) and the VID of the O (V IDO) to
be accessed are sent by S to the SDP. As discussed earlier, S accesses O
according the V IDO that can be "seen" by the O. Whereas the V IDS
will be used later by the O to obtain P and C related to S later on.
2. Upon receiving this request, the SDP asks the Proles Repository to map
the proles of S given its V IDS. This process will return the Prole P
of S.
3. The returned Prole P , together with C, are sent to the Policies Reposi-
tory, to check the relevant Policies of the corresponding ObjectO (based
on its V IDO).
4. The Policies repository gets all relevant Policies from the given P and
C of the O of interests represented by its V IDO, and then gives them to
the SDP.
5. The SDP combines the received policies with a policy combining algo-
rithm and comes up with a decision whether to create a new capability
(CAP) for S or not. In case of positive decision, the SDP creates internal
capability of the object (inCAP ) and stores it in the CASM, as well as
creating extCAP for the S and then sends it away. In case of negative
decision, rejection message will be sent to S instead.
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6. The SDP sends a report regarding the CAP creation of an Object O for
the Subject S to the Access Control Servers (ACS) which will be followed
by the creation of a new propagation tree.
The specication of the capability creation in CCAAC can be expressed by
two pseudo-codes. The rst pseudo-code presented in Algorithm 2 requires a
specic ObjType as the argument and returns either an extCAP to the subject
or an error message if certain conditions are not fullled. The other pseudo-
code, which is presented in Algorithm 3, does not require a specic ObjType
as its argument and returns either a set of external capabilities or an error
message to the subject.
Algorithm 2 Capability creation for a particular object type
procedure CAPCreation(V IDS, V IDO)
P  getProfiles(V IDS)
C  getContexts(V IDS)
Policies checkPolicies(P ; C; V IDO)
AR  combinePolicies(Policies)
if AR 6= NULL then
if inCAP == 0 then
inCAP  createIntCAP (V IDO)
end if
extCAP  createExtCAP (V IDS;AR; V IDO)
sendExtCAP to S
else
Send Err to S
end if
end procedure
4.5.2 Access Provision
The capability access protocol in the proposed access control mechanism is
presented in Figure 4.4. The access mechanism based on CCAAC is relying
fully on the processing of the extCAP , i.e. extCAP validation and evaluation
of Contexts C within the extCAP , thus it results in an ecient access control
mechanism. Furthermore, the authentication can also be achieved along with
the access control as we will explain later on in the next section. The overall
proposed access mechanism in CCAAC can be further explained as follows:
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Algorithm 3 Capability creation in the general case
procedure CAPCreation(V IDS)
MapAR < O;AR >= [ ]
P  getProfiles(V IDS)
C  getContexts(V IDS)
Policies checkPolicies(P ; C)
MapAR < O;AR > combinePolicies(Policies)
if MapAR 6= NULL then
for all O in MapAR do
if AR 6= NULL then
if inCAP == 0 then
inCAP  createIntCAP (O)
end if
extCAP  createExtCAP (V IDS;AR;O)
SendExtCAP to S
else
SendErr to S
end if
end for
end if
end procedure
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1. The Subject S presents its extCAPS and V IDS to the SDP upon access
request.
2. SDP checks the validity of the extCAPS by running a one-way hash func-
tion f(S;O;AR; Rnd0) and the compare its result with Rndi within the
extCAPS.
3. In case of a valid extCAPS being received, SDP will then evaluate a series
of CConst which are contained within the C.
4. The evaluation will return true if all the conditions in all of the CConst
are met, otherwise it will return false.
5. The access request response will nally sent back to S.
The extCAP validation (step (2) in Figure 4.4) is done by comparing the
received Rndi within the extCAP with the calculated Rndi by means of a one-
way hash function f(S;O;AR; Rnd0). The most important components in
the hash function of Rndi to be highlighted are the S and Rnd0. The S can
be obtained from the S within the submitted V IDS and the Rnd0 is obtained
from the inCAP that is stored within the O itself. A secure access control
against eavesdropping or replay attacks can be ensured by inserting a nonce
within the Rnd0 as will be shown in Section 4.7.
After the extCAP validation is successfully done, the actual contextual
information will be evaluated against Contexts C within extCAP (step (3) in
Figure 4.4). It is assumed that the O, i.e. device, is able to obtained the actual
contextual information from the environment, e.g. sensors or time of access,
or by means of messaging mechanisms.
Si SDP
Req(VIDi,extCAPi)
(1)
Access decision
result
(5)
(3) Contexts evaluation
(2) Validate CAP
CASM
(4) Access decision
Figure 4.4: Capability access protocol in the proposed access control mecha-
nism
The specication of the access mechanism in CCAAC can be expressed as
in the pseudo-code presented in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Access control with external capability
procedure Access(V IDS, extCAP )
AR0 = [ ]
Rnd0i = f(S;O;AR; Rnd0)
if (Rnd0i! = Rndi) then
SendErr to S
else
CtxEval = true
for all CConst in C do
CtxEval = CtxEval \ CConst
if CtxEval then
AR0 = AR
else
AR0 = NULL
end if
end for
end if
end procedure
4.6 Secure CCAAC based Delegation Frame-
work
4.6.1 High level delegation model
To support a federation network in IoT, it is necessary to have an established
trust relationships prior to the authority delegation of all the entities involved
in this process. The existing solutions in [18] allow all Federation members
(in the context of PN) to mutually authenticate to each other, thus establish-
ing trust relationships, by means of key management and security associations
mechanisms. By using the similar approach in the context of federated IoT,
it is assumed that the trust relationships have been established in all entities
joining the federation when it is formed and any new cluster join that fed-
eration. Based on this assumption, the proposed high level delegation model
can be illustrated as in Figure 4.5. In this gure, Delegator is an entity that
delegates some or all of its authority to another entity, while delegatee is an
entity that receives an authority delegation from the delegator. According to
the rst motivating scenario stated in 4.3.2, the user's private device that has
the authority to access the information from the smart-fridge is the delegator
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that delegates its authority partly to the delegatee which is the device belongs
to retail shop network domain.
Network 
domain 1
Network 
domain 2
Delegator/
Subject
Resource/
Object
Delegatee 2 1
3
Figure 4.5: High level delegation model on Federated-IoT
Please note that in CCAAC notation, terms such as Subject and Object is
dened. Any Subject can be either Delegator or Delegatee, but Delegator will
be referred to as Subject (S) for the sake of the protocol explanation. The
resource to be accessed by Subject is referred as Object (O).
A trust relationship is assumed to have been established among all the
entities when the federated network is created as discussed extensively in [18].
Therefore, S sends a delegation request to O. The delegation request is signed
with its public key that contains a federated IoT certicate, which is valid
in this particular federation, upon requesting its authority delegation towards
D (step 1 in Figure 4.5). Upon receiving the delegation request from S, O
would verify the signature and then evaluate the delegation request based on
some available policies which will be further explained in the next subsection.
In case of a positive delegation request evaluation result, a delegation request
response in a form of external capability (extCAPD) withD's identity would be
sent to S, otherwise an error message would be sent instead (step 2 in Figure
4.5). Finally, the S would send the extCAPD encrypted with a public key that
is known byD as a result of trust relationship when federated network between
two domains was established (step 3 in Figure 4.5).
4.6.2 Delegation mechanism based on CCAAC
The complete process of the delegation mechanism along with the delegation
request evaluation in O is depicted in Figure 4.6.
It is important to mention that Figure 4.6 is the micro-level view of Figure
4.5 where S and O belong to Network Domain 2, and D belongs to Network
Domain 1. The delegation mechanism depicted in Figure 4.6 is presented as
follows:
1. Sending authority delegation request: Authority delegation request
is being sent by S to the SDP within O. The request message is signed
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S SDP
Profiles
Repository
Policies
Repository
Access
List
Sign{Req(VIDj)}
Map VIDi
with profiles
(1)
(2a)
Check the policy
of returned profiles
(3)
Relevant policies
(4)
extCAP or
Rejection
(5)
Report
(6)
delegation
decision Add new 
Access List
D
Validate
Signature
Error 
if sign invalid
(2b)
CASM in Object
Send delegation statement
(7)
Figure 4.6: Capability propagation protocol for authority delegation in our
proposed access control
with S's public that contains a Federated IoT certicate so that O is
able to make sure the message is indeed sent by S and the integrity is
maintained. Please note that the type of public key and the specic
encryption algorithm being used are not within the scope of this work.
2. Mapping the V IDD to Prole: The SDP checks the message's signa-
ture. If the signature is valid, the SDP then asks VID-Proles mapping
box to map the proles of D given V IDD. It will return the prole of
D.
3. Check the relevant policies: The returned Proles P , together with
the C and V IDO, are then sent to the Policies Repository, to check the
disclosure policies of the corresponding Object (based on its VID).
4. Return the relevant policies: The Policies Repository gets all the
relevant policies from the given P and C of the object or resource of
interest represented by its V IDO, and then gives them to the SDP.
5. Delegation decision: The SDP combines the received policies with a
policy-combining algorithm and comes up with a decision whether to
approve the authority delegation by creating a new capability (CAP) for
D or not. In the case of a positive decision, the SDP creates a delegation
statement in the form of extCAP for the D and then sends it to S. The
dierence between the newly created extCAP and the one that is owned
by the S, lies in the D's identier D within the Rndi component. In the
case of a negative decision, a rejection message will be sent to S instead.
6. Update propagation tree: In parallel to sending the delegation deci-
sion, the SDP sends a report regarding the CAP creation of an object
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for Subject i, Si, to the ACS which will be followed by the creation of a
new propagation tree.
7. Sending authority delegation statement: Finally, S sends the au-
thority delegation statement in the form of extCAP particularly for D.
Moreover, in order to maintain the condentiality and integrity of the
extCAP , it can be signed with a shared secret key between S and D,
based on an assumption that both domains have established a trust re-
lationship by authenticating each other through a certain key pair.
Steps 2 through 5 is expressed in the pseudo-code in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Capability delegation decision
procedure delegateCAP(V IDD, V IDO)
P  getProfiles(V IDD)
C  getContexts(V IDD)
Policies checkPolicies(P ; C; V IDO)
decision combinePolicies(Policies)
if decision 6= NULL then
if IntCAP = 0 then
inCAP  createIntCAP (V IDO)
end if
extCAP  createExtCAP (V IDD;AR; V IDO)
end if
end procedure
It is assumed that S as the delegator knows the identity of the O and D.
This is possible when the delegator S, subscribes to a service, in which a device
in the service provider's domain needs to be given an authority delegation, i.e.
as delegatee D, in order to access a device or resource within the delegator 's
network domain, i.e. O. With this assumption, S needs to submit a delega-
tion request by stating the identities of D and O in the form of V IDD and
V IDO, respectively. Once submitted, delegatee's Prole (P) and Context (C)
can be obtained from V IDD as they are attached to it (see Equation 4.10).
Afterwards, all relevant policies related to V IDO that contain delegatee's P
and C are gathered from the Policies Repository to be further evaluated by a
certain Policies Combining Algorithm to obtain a delegation decision.
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4.7 Evaluation and analysis
The evaluation will focus on secure capability creation and access mechanisms
as the most important processes in the access control, especially when capa-
bility is involved. In order to secure the access control mechanism, simple
mechanisms of generating nonce in both sides and a secret key cryptography
to encrypt the message are introduced. The Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [12] which is based on the
Dolev-Yao [4] model is used for model verication purposes as well as for eval-
uating the secrecy and authentication between the subject, i.e. the one that
requests access, and the object, i.e. the one that is being accessed.
4.7.1 Evaluation procedure
In order to carry out the evaluation using AVISPA, the following assumptions
are made:
 Both Subject and Object have already obtained shared key(s), i.e. either
symmetric or asymmetric, through key generation and sharing mecha-
nisms prior to the capability creation process.
 To prevent a replay attack, a nonce is incorporated within the Rnd0 of
inCAP and extCAP .
 A new key, which is a result of a one-way hash function using nonce
generated by both parties, is presented by S that wants to access O.
 The access mechanism using external capability is used immediately after
the capability creation in order to have an integrated evaluation of both
mechanisms.
The complete protocol evaluation is presented in the following model:
S! O: fS:Req:Nsg Kso
S O: fS:Oxo:ARs:Cs:No:Rndig Kso
S! O: fS:Oxo:ARs:Cs:Rndig KN
where
 S: Subject identier.
 O: Object identier.
 f g : A symbol of encryption.
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 Req: A capability creation request message.
 Ns: A nonce generated by S.
 No: A nonce generated by O.
 Kso: A shared secret key shared by the S and O prior to the capability
creation process to encrypt the whole message.
 KN : A new shared secret key generated by the S as a result of a one-way
hash function, f(Ns:No).
 Rndi: A result of a one-way hash function f(S:Oxb:ARs:Cs:Rnd0).
 Rnd0: A result of a one-way hash function f(Oxb:ARs:No).
Besides the protocol that involves S and O, an intruder, I, based on Dolev-
Yao intruder model has been introduced in the evaluation. The intruder I is
assumed to have the knowledge of the following:
 S: the Subject's identier.
 Ksi: the shared secret key between S and I.
 Kio: the shared secret key between I and O.
 all the hash functions being used in the protocol, i.e. f(Ns:No), f(S:Oxo:ARs:Cs:Rnd0),
and f(Oxo:ARs:No).
The goal of the evaluation is to verify the secrecy of the new generated key
presented by S, e.g. KN , in order to access O, and the No generated by O in
order to create Rnd0. Furthermore, No is also used to authenticate S over O.
These two important aspects in the evaluation will be discussed further in the
coming subsections.
4.7.2 The secrecy
The secrecy of No is an important component to prevent replay attacks on the
extCAP that is submitted by S. The evaluation result using the AVISPA tool
shows that the secrecy of No is kept. It is important to note that the Dolev-
Yao intruder model used in the evaluation is assumed to have knowledge of
Subject's identier S, the hash functions being used, and the shared keys, Ksi
and Kio. The intruder cannot decrypt the message being sent by either side
even if he can capture it since he has no knowledge of Kso. In other words, the
knowledge of Ksi and Kio that might be used by the intruder to fool both sides
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will be useless in this case. As a result, both nonce, i.e. Ns and No, remain
secret. Secondly, the secrecy of KN which is a result of simple one-way hash
function f(Ns:No) as presented in the evaluation model is another important
fact to be evaluated. Similar with the No, the evaluation result by AVISPA
tool also shows that KN remains secret. As explained previously, the secrecy of
KN is a result of the secrecy of both Ns and No due to inability of the intruder
to decrypt the message without having the knowledge of Kso. Based on this
evaluation result, i.e. the fact that KN remains secret, it could be concluded
that the extCAP is safe from eavesdropping and replay attacks.
4.7.3 The authentication
The authentication of S against O can be achieved when O receives a valid
Rndi. In particular, the received No within the Rndi, which is supposed to be
a secret nonce generated by O and known only by S, has to be valid and kept
secret. The evaluation result by AVISPA tool shows that authentication is
achieved as well. As stated previously in the secrecy analysis, the fact that the
secrecy of No that can be ensured in the protocol results in the validity of Rndi
within the extCAP , thus S can successfully authenticated by O. Furthermore,
this result also shows that the proposed CCAAC model is not only able to
provide access control but also authentication at the same time. Hence, the
main objective of providing security mechanisms, i.e. authentication and access
control, in order to prevent security threats, especially in the context of IoT,
has been achieved.
4.8 Conclusion
Access control is of paramount importance for a full thrive of IoT, especially
due to the dynamic network topology and distributed nature. In this chap-
ter, dierent access control models with their advantages and limitations have
been discussed. Based on this, the secure CCAAC model with specications
of the capability (CAP) creation and access mechanisms has been proposed.
The denition of Federated IoT is used as a baseline in designing the proposed
authority delegation mechanism that is part of the overall CCAAC model. The
protocol description and security consideration involving the usage of crypto-
graphic keys are further presented in the chapter to give some guidelines in
the practical implementation. The proposed CCAAC has been analysed in the
presence of security threats, such as eavesdropping and replay attack by an in-
truder, in order to test its resilience. Security proofs and evaluations by using
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AVISPA tool show that the CCAAC model achieves not only access control
but also the secrecy of CAP and authentication.
The are several works remain to be done in this research area. First, in-
corporating the CCAAC model with light-weight authentication supporting
capability, such as the one proposed in [17], and to evaluate it with a more
realistic adversaries model. Second, the current authority delegation frame-
work in the proposed CCAAC assumes trust relationships that are already
established among entities in dierent federation domain. The future outlook
will consider the case in which no prior knowledge of the trust relationship
between two network domains in Federated IoT. Unlike the approach used in
this chapter, an additional entity that is trusted by both domains, for instance
Identity Provider (IdP), needs to be involved in the design. Lastly, prototype
implementation of all aspects in CCAAC by using the existing access control
realization model or on a device level will be something to look forward.
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Capability-based access control in the
M2M local cloud platform: A practical
implementation perspective
Protection and access control to resources plays a critical role in a distributed
computing system like M2M and cloud platform. The M2M local cloud plat-
form considered in this paper, consists of multiple distributed M2M gateways
that form a local cloud { presenting a unique challenge to the existing access
control systems. The most prominent access control systems, such as ACL
and RBAC, lack in scalability and exibility to manage access from users or
entity that belong to dierent authorization domains, and thus unsuitable for
the presented platform. The access control approach based on API keys and
OAuth that is used by the existing M2M Cloud platform, fails to provide ne
grained and exible access right delegation at the same time when both meth-
ods are used together. The proposed approach is built upon capability-based
access control that has been specically designed to provide exible, yet re-
stricted, access rights delegation. A number of use cases are provided to show
the usage of capability creation, delegation, and access provision, particularly
in the way application accesses services provided by the platform.
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5.1 Introduction
The concern about security and privacy play a huge role for mass adoption of
the IoT/M2M as cloud services [8]. More specically, access control to infor-
mation and resources is very critical to ensure security and privacy of a system.
The M2M local cloud platform is a platform that consists of distributed M2M
gateways that forms a cloud locally and provides M2M services collectively.
Consequently, some unique challenges in access control is imposed, especially
in the scalability and exibility aspects.
ACL is the most common way of providing access control, but it becomes
more and more complex as the number of subjects and resources increases.
The RBAC [9] is introduced to cope with this issue, by mapping subjects into
roles. Many access control models are also derived based on RBAC model.
However, it cannot cope with the problems of role explosion and multi admin-
istrative domains. The ABAC system tries to solve the roles explosion issue
by specifying access policies and rules based on the attributes of the subjects
and resources, thus potentially reducing the number of rules. However, den-
ing a consistent attributes is not an easy task, especially in the M2M world
where the context is highly dynamic. Overall, all previously mentioned access
control mechanisms have a common problem which is diculties in enforcing
least privilege access principle and scalability problem which is a major re-
quirements in M2M. Additionally, they do not provide exible access rights
delegation feature.
One of the existing IoT/M2M Cloud platform, Xively, relies on the typical
access control solution in many cloud services. The API keys can be created
for the devices, client applications, and actual users to authorize the access of
specic resource in Xively [10]. However, this API key is managed centrally in
Xively cloud platform and is not delegable. On the other hand, OAuth [7] is
implemented in Xively to allow access of third party application to resources
owned by a user. However, using the API key in the OAuth application would
mean granting access to all resources tied with the application to the third
party.
A capability-based access control have been seen as a promising solution
to problems in IoT/M2M by some recent research works, but its actual imple-
mentation is still a big challenge. The CCAAC presented in Chapter 4, tries
to solve the above mentioned issues in the context of IoT using the capability-
based access control, but the use of access policy based on VID is not clear
and quite impractical to be implemented. Additionally, the attempt to highly
control the capability propagation signicantly reduce the exibility of access
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right delegation. Another capability-based access control in IoT has been done
in [4] in which the rights delegation and revocation based on capability have
been emphasized. However, it does not explain how the capability is requested
and granted, which is the most important part especially in the IoT and M2M
world. The proposed solution is built upon capability-based access control
designed to provide exible, yet restricted, access rights delegation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: An overview of the M2M
local cloud platform architecture and the way applications access the platform
is described in Section 5.2. The detail of the proposed approach is presented in
Section 5.3. Some use cases explaining how the proposed approach is applied
in the real platform is explained in Section 5.4. Finally, the conclusion and
future outlooks are given in Section 5.5.
5.2 System Description
Dierent approach in the IoT or M2M architectures, as reported in [8], will
impact the security challenges and their solutions. As the access control mech-
anism presented in this paper is particularly designed and developed for the
M2M local cloud platform within the European FP7 BETaaS (Building the
Environment for the Things as a Service) project, thus it is necessary to ful-
l the unique technical requirements and architecture of this platform. This
section is dedicated to explain the BETaaS platform's architecture, and the
mechanism in which the applications and users can access the services pro-
vided by BETaaS platform. It is important to note that although the access
control mechanism is designed and developed for BETaaS project, it is also
applicable to other platforms, especially the M2M and Cloud platforms.
5.2.1 BETaaS architecture
BETaaS is a content-centric platform distributed over a local cloud, hosted by
gateways, providing an environment for applications accessing M2M services
and devices through a set of services [6]. In principle, the platform consists
of multiple distributed M2M gateways (GW)s that are collaborating to each
other and forming a so called local cloud or BETaaS instance. With this
approach, there can exist dierent BETaaS instances which do not necessarily
connected to each other. This approach is totally dierent than the typical
M2M deployment where the cloud is hosted in a centralized cloud provider.
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Figure 5.1: High level architecture of the BETaaS platform
The high level architecture of BETaaS platform consists of three layers:
Service layer, Logical layer, and Physical layer, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. On
the practical deployment perspective, the main functionality of the platform
resides in the logical and service layers, which are implemented in a GW. It
is important to note that since a GW is implemented in a device more likely
to have very minimum user intervention, the access control mechanism should
work in the same manner also.
At the functional architecture point of view, BETaaS consists of several
managers that perform dierent functionalities, one of it is the security man-
ager [2]. The layered structure as in the high level architecture is also applied
in the design of the managers, e.g. security manager. The purpose of such de-
sign is to allow clear division of security tasks in dierent layer, e.g. application
level security resides in the service layer, the GW level security is at the Thing
as a Service (TaaS) sub-layer, and the adapation sub-layer handles things level
security. Please note that in the context of BETaaS, thing(s) refers to any
device or object with communication capability, such as sensor, actuator, tag,
etc.
5.2.2 Security manager
The security manager consists of some sub-managers, namely Key, Authen-
tication, Authorization, and Trust managers, which perform functionalities
according to their respective names. Brief description of each sub-manager
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of the proposed security manager in BETaaS which are closely related to the
proposed access control mechanism is presented in the following sub-sections.
5.2.2.1 Key Manager
Key management is a very important functionality which denes how to man-
ager the secret (and shared) keys, as the important components to perform any
security operation. The key management has a role to manage the associations
of dierent entities (e.g. GWs with an instance, application with an instance,
etc), which will be used to perform authentication, and later on to manage
application and user sessions as well as to perform encrypted communication.
A common security mechanism to provide trust relies on the PKI in a form
of a digital certicate issued by the trusted third party, i.e. CA. In some cases
however, the BETaaS instance does not have a constant access to the external
CA, e.g. local cloud that is built upon ad-hoc network, the method which
involves external CA cannot be directly applied. Therefore, a key management
mechanism that relies on local certicate issued by an internal CA is proposed.
In the context of BETaaS, the internal CA refers to a gateway which acts
as a common CA of that particular instance, also known as GW*. At the
beginning of BETaaS instance creation, the GW* would initiate the creation
of root and intermediate certicates which forms the root credential of this
particular instance. For a new GW to join the instance, it needs to generate
a key pair, i.e. public and private keys, and then sends a join request to GW*
along with the generated public key. Upon receiving join request, GW* would
create a credential for the new GW which includes a certicate generated from
the public key and other submitted information by the new GW and is signed
using the private key of the GW*'s credential. This new created credential
plays an important role to provide trust relationship among all the GWs within
the local cloud or instance, including the access control mechanism as well as
in deriving key for establishing secure communication between two GWs.
The ECC based PKI is used in the practical implementation of key manager
because it requires smaller key size compared to other crypto algorithm, such
as RSA, to provide the same level of security. For example, a 160 bit ECC is
equivalent to a 1024 RSA, a 192 bit ECC is equivalent to a 1536 bit RSA, a
224 bit ECC is equivalent to a 2048 bit RSA and so on. A set of European
Commission (EC) domain parameters recommended by National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and Standard of Ecient Cryptography
(SEC) are chosen in order to generate a key pair of ECC.
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5.2.2.2 Authentication Manager
In the context of BETaaS, two level of authentications are considered, namely
gateway level authentication and application and service level authentication.
The gateway level authentication mainly deals with the mutual authen-
tication in order to establish secure communication between two GWs. The
method to perform mutual authentication is based on the Elliptic Curve Menezes-
Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) protocol. ECMQV is a three-pass key agreement pro-
tocol that has been standardized in ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363, ZigBee Smart En-
ergy 1.0, etc [5]. In principle, it is an extension of the ordinary Die-Hellman
key agreement protocol with the ECC. Among the benets of ECMQV are
lower computational complexity and bandwidth reduction. Detail explanation
of how ECMQV protocol works can be reviewed in [5].
The application and user level authentication also relies on the ECC based
PKI. But unlike the key management mechanism that relies on local certi-
cate issued by the internal CA, an external CA is used to issue certicate for
application. The certicate for application is obtained through a registration
process and the authentication by means of certicate verication only oc-
curs upon application installation in the platform. Further explanation about
the application authentication and installation process is presented in Section
5.2.3.
5.2.2.3 Authorization Manager
Authorization manager is the central component that performs access control
mechanism in the platform. The detail explanation of how the access control
mechanism within the authorization manager works and how it interacts with
other components will be presented in Section 5.3 and 5.4.
5.2.2.4 Trust Manager
In the context of BETaaS, trust represents the level of reliability on a Thing or
Thing Service to produce certain data and/or perform certain actions, in the
expected conditions. In the end, this is related to the reliability trust, since it
is assumed that the system relies on a set of Things in order to execute services
in BETaaS platform. However, the detail explanation of trust manager is out
of the scope of this chapter because it is totally independent with the proposed
access control mechanism.
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5.2.2.5 Interaction with other managers in BETaaS platform
Trust 
manager
Key manager
Authentication 
manager
Authorization 
manager
Context
Manager
Services
Manager
Instance
Manager
TaaS Resource
Manager Security
Manager
Figure 5.2: The interaction of the Security Manager with the other Managers
Figure 5.2 shows the interaction among the sub-managers in the security
manager with the other managers in BETaaS platform. The Instance Man-
ager is responsible for GW joining and un-joining process, thus some inter-
action with the Key Manager is required in order to acquire a certain long
term key to prove that the GW is part of the local cloud. The context man-
ager is responsible to provide contextual information and semantic data, e.g.
location information, sensor and actuator data, etc, to the platform; includ-
ing the trust manager which requires this information to calculate the trust
score of all thing(s) that are connected with the local cloud, and authorization
manager that may need to make an access decision based on a certain context
information. The service manager is a component in BETaaS that has a direct
contact with the external application. In the practical API design, the only
interaction between service manager and security manager is at the beginning
of application installation process, when the application presents its API key
to be validated by the authentication manager. Lastly, the TaaS resource man-
ager is a central component in the operation of BETaaS GW, thus it has all
the interfaces to the security manager sub-components. The TaaS resource
manager also acts as a bridge between security manager and service manager
in most of the API interactions.
5.2.3 Access to BETaaS platform
The M2M services exposed by BETaaS platform can be accessed by users
through applications. The term application in BETaaS { also in other cloud
platform { is considered as a process outside of the platform that can consume
the services provided by any BETaaS platform through BETaaS APIs. In
the typical cloud service deployment, including the M2M Cloud platform, an
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application obtains a set of API keys that allows it to access dierent set of
services provided by the Cloud platform. These keys are normally generated
during the registration process, e.g. the application developer would register
its application in the cloud platform before starting the development process.
However, the same approach cannot be applied in BETaaS due to multiple
BETaaS instances or local clouds with dierent owners that may exist in all
over the world, while implementing the same sets of APIs.
On the other hand, such a distributed cloud deployment also impacts the
way an application accesses dierent BETaaS platform. For example, the
same intrusion detection application developed for BETaaS platform will not
necessary be able to consume the same service through the same API from a
BETaaS instance deployment in the same way as those in the other BETaaS
instances deployment. That is due to the availability of a particular thing
service and other requirements that pertaining to each independent local cloud.
To cope with this issue, an installation procedure is needed when an application
accesses a BETaaS instance for the rst time [2]. The purpose of this procedure
is for allocating the resources required for the application according to a set of
requirements in the local cloud. The authenticity check of the application is
also performed during the application installation. It is based on the typical
PKI where the CA can be any external trusted third party (unlike the key
management at the GW level), such as BETaaS application store. However,
relying on the authenticity check in the installation procedure and the typical
API keys solution are still unable to solve the access control issue, let alone the
issues of scalability and exibility in access rights delegation that are inherent
in the existing access control mechanisms, which have been pointed out in
Section 5.1.
5.3 The proposed approach
The proposed approach is based on the capability based access control. Some
enchancements are made in order to the problems faced by the other capability
based access controls. This section explains the overall capability design along
with the mechanisms involved in the capability based access control.
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5.3.1 Capability design
The proposed capability consists of internal and external capability, e.g. inCAP
and extCAP respectively, similar to the basic use of capability in our previ-
ous work [1]. In BETaaS's context, the resource or object is the thing service
which is owned by a GW, thus inCAP is created and owned by any GW that
oers thing services. Thing service refers to a service provided by a thing,
e.g. temperature sensing service by a temperature sensor. The extCAP can be
obtained by any party that wish to access a resource that corresponds to the
inCAP , including another GW in the local cloud, applications, and users.
The basic structure of inCAP is as follows:
inCAP = fO; DSigng
where
 O: The name of object or resource to be accessed.
 DSign: A digital signature of this inCAP , which is obtained by signing
the hash of the inCAP 's content, i.e. O, with GW's private key that is
obtained by the key management mechanism in Section 5.2.1. It is used
to check the integrity of the capability's content.
On the other hand, extCAP contains much more information than the
inCAP which is necessary for the capability delegation and revocation mech-
anisms.
extCAP = fI;S;AR;O;VC;R; DSigng
where
 I: The information about the issuer of this extCAP .
 S: The information about the subject or the extCAP holder.
 AR: The details of access rights over the object or resource granted to
the subject.
 O: The name of object or resource to be accessed.
 VC: The validity condition of the extCAP , e.g. validity period.
 R: The URL of the capability revocation service.
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 DSign: A digital signature of this extCAP , which is obtained by signing
the hash of the extCAP 's content with issuer's private key.
I is a data structure that contains fIssuerType, IssuerCerticate, Issuer-
Capabilitiesg. The IssuerType can either be a GW, application, or user. The
IssuerCertificate is the certicate obtained by a GW upon joining a local
cloud, or by an application upon the registration (i.e. before using the APIs of
the cloud services in the application), or by a user upon the registration (i.e.
within the local cloud platform or the individual GW). The IssuerCertificate
eld plays an important role in the access delegation because the validity of
a delegated capability depends on the validity of the issuer's certicate. In
addition, it is also used to check the validity of the digital signature (DSign)
eld of this capability. IssuerCapabilities is the chain of capabilities which
shows the access delegation chain that the issuer hold.
S is another data structure that contains fSubjectType, SubjectPublicKey-
Infog. Similar to IssuerType, the Subject Type can be a GW, application, or
user. The SubjectPublic KeyInfo is an optional eld that gives an informa-
tion about the public key of the subject, i.e. capability's holder.
AR is also a data structure that contains the following eld: fAccessType,
AccessConditionsg. The AccessType is either GET, PUT, POST or DELETE,
which is equivalent to Read, Write, Modify or Delete. The AccessConditions
states some access conditions to be excercised upon granting the access per-
mission, which may include some context information.
5.3.2 Capability creation
Initially, the object or resource owner, i.e. GW, creates inCAP s for all the
objects that it have authority over. In BETaaS context, a inCAP is created
when a thing that provides thing services is connected to the GW. The extCAP
can then be granted upon request by the external parties that wish to gain
access to the a resource that coresponds to that particular extCAP .
In principle, the detail mechanism of the extCAP creation is similar to
the capability creation presented in Chapter 4 with the exeption that no VID
is used in this approach. Rather, it uses a digital certicate that contains a
GW's or application's public key, that is signed by the GW* or by the BETaaS
Apps's trusted CA respectively. In addition, a set of access policies is created
and updated by the GW's owner, thus allowing a ne tuned access that ts
the needs and requirements of each individual GW in a local cloud.
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5.3.3 Access right delegation mechanism
The access right can be easily delegated by propagating the extCAP , but it
is dicult to control its propagation [3]. Some attempts have been made to
control the capability delegation in the previous works. Our previous work
uses a mechanism where the delegator needs to ask the original resource owner
before delegating its extCAP which reduces the exibility of the access rights
delegation through capability [1]. On the other hand, [4] tries to control the
right delegation by specifying the delegation depth in the access right eld
within the capability. However, it is impractical to predict the proper depth
of delegation in advance as one can always need to go one more level down.
In the proposed approach, it is assumed that the extCAP is delegable by
default, i.e. no need to specify the delegable and delegation depth as in [4].
Anybody can delegate a subset of its access rights stated in the extCAP by
creating another extCAP , specifying its ID, certicate, and a list of extCAP
chain in the issuer eld, and sign the extCAP with its own private key. When
the delegatee, i.e. the extCAP holder that receives a delegated access, accesses
the resource and presents its extCAP to resource owner for the rst time,
the resource owner will evaluate the extCAP . The most critical point in the
evaluation that controls the access right delegation is by validating the extCAP
issuer based on the issuer's certicate (for GWs and applications) or user
credential (for the registered user in the corresponding GW). If the certicate
or credential cannot be validated, it simply means that the issuer has no right
to delegate the extCAP , thus access request is rejected immediately. Otherwise,
the extCAP 's signature is validated based on issuer's public key to ensure that
the delegated extCAP has not been tampered either by the delegatee or other
parties. The evaluation also includes all the validity check that is performed
in the capability access evaluation (see Section 5.3.4), both for the delegatee's
and the delegator's extCAP s. The evaluation process also makes sure that the
AR and VC specied in the delegatee's extCAP are the subsets of those in the
delegator's extCAP . If the extCAP passes all the previously mentioned validity
checks, the resource owner can optionally check the access policies and renew
the delegated access rights. Finally, a new extCAP signed by the resource
owner's private key will be granted to the delegatee, thus allowing a simpler
validity check as a normal extCAP in the next access time.
In this way, the access right delegation mechanism in the proposed approach
allows a more exible access right delegation as compared to the approach in
Chapter 4, while providing more control over capability delegation as com-
pared to [4], and maintaining a ner-grained access control as compared to the
approach used in [10].
129
Chapter 5
5.3.4 Capability access evaluation
Upon access request by receiving the extCAP , the resource owner validates
the submitted extCAP by checking its validity period, validating the extCAP 's
DSign, and denitely checking whether the requested access right is listed in
the extCAP . In addition, the resource owner also checks the validity of the
inCAP and/or extCAP which are specied in the IssuerCapabilities eld, and
whether or not the extCAP has been revoked through the revocation service.
To make it even more secure, the extCAP holder can also sign the extCAP and
submit it along with its public key information to prove that he/she really is
the extCAP holder, e.g. in case the extCAP is stolen.
5.3.5 Capability revocation
The delegator or extCAP issuer can also revoke a set of extCAP s delegated
earlier for many dierent reasons, for instance due to maliciousness, stolen
extCAP , etc. In principal, this mechanism is the same as certicate revocation,
but it is much simpler since the capability is only used in a single place, i.e.
the resource owner. The delegated capability can be revoked by sending a
capability revocation request to the URL specied in theR eld by mentioning
the extCAP 's ID and reason of revocation. It is important to mention the
reason of revocation because it can determine whether the further delegated
extCAP should be revoked or not.
5.4 Use cases
Some use cases will be presented to show how the proposed capability-based
access control work in dierent operations of the M2M local cloud, e.g. GW
join to local cloud, application installation, and other delegation cases. For
the sake of simplicity, the presented use cases only show the security aspects of
the actual operations, i.e. other aspects like resource allocation, context and
QoS evaluations are not completely shown.
5.4.1 GW joining process
In Fig. 5.3, the GW joining process is shown. In this process, the new GW
that wants to join to the local cloud sends a join request to the GW* by
including its long term public key and some information about it, e.g. user
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GW* New GW
Pub. Key + GW info
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extCAPn
extCAPn
extCAP request
List of services
extCAP*,x
Figure 5.3: Capability creation and delegation during GW joining process
friendly name, address, etc. If the join request is accepted, GW* will issue an
instance certicate for the new GW that is used to provide trust among all
GWs member of the local cloud. Upon joining the local cloud, the new GW
is also required to present the list of services it oers to all other members
of the local cloud through the GW*, such that all GWs can synchronize the
existing services with the new services provided by new GW. Upon receiving
list of services from the new GW, GW* sends an extCAP creation request
over all the services or resources provided by the new GW. Upon receiving all
the extCAP s from the new GW, i.e. extCAPn, GW* will then delegate the
extCAPn to the remaining GWs (if there is one) and also delegate the extCAP s
of all the other GWs including itself, i.e. extCAPX and extCAP to the new
GW. Please note that each extCAP is signed by the private key of each GW
that provide its services, and this signature can be validated by another GW
through the public key (as pair of the signing key) that can be extracted from
the instance certicate attached in the I of the extCAP . In this way, the
receipient of the extCAP , both direct and delegated recipients, can verify it
safely. In addition, the service provider GW can also verify the issuer of the
extCAP , upon receiving an access request by another GW that obtains the
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extCAP by means of delegation. It also means that another GW is able to
further delegate access right to external application or users.
5.4.2 Application installation
SM GW X Application
SM GW X Application
manifest + cert.
xxM GW X,Y,Z
xxM GW X,Y,Z
SecM GW X
SecM GW X
auth(cert.)
true
allocateResource(featuresList)
equivThingServList in GW X,Y,Z
extCAPxyz req.
extCAPxyz
extCAPxyz
Figure 5.4: Capability delegation during application installation process
Fig. 5.4 shows the application installation process that involves access
right delegation through capability propagation. Please note that registration
process is required by the application developer in order to receive a certicate
from a trusted external entity, e.g. BETaaS Apps Store, before the application
can be developed, which is a normal procedure in any cloud platform. The
application can start installation procedure by including a manifest and its
certicate. Application manifest is essentially an XML document that contains
a list of required services and other requirements, e.g. QoS, trust score, etc,
to run the application properly. After certicate validation by the Security
Manager (SecM). It is important to mention that the installation request can
arrive at any GW (GW X in Fig. 5.4) in the local cloud and the services
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required by the application can be provided by all the other GWs. Therefore,
Service Manager (SM) of GW X sends a polling to all participating GWs
asking them whether they provide services required by the application. Notice
that the illustration in Fig. 5.4 has been really shortened to avoid irrelevant
sequence diagram that involves other managers (xxM). Upon receiving a list
of equivalent services by all GWs, the SM would then request the extCAPns of
all the equivalent services. Thanks to the access right delegation feature, the
SecM of GWX can delegate extCAPns that correspond to all equivalent services
provided by all GWs, thus providing simplicity and exibility in the application
installation. As mentioned earlier in Section 5.4.1, when application accesses
the service for the rst time, the GW service provider is able to validate the
delegated extCAPn by verifying the GW X's certicate. In the same way,
the application can further delegate the extCAPn to its user (assuming the
application is hosted the external server), and the GW service provider is
able to validate the delegated extCAPn by verifying application's certicate.
However, the user of that particular application is not able to delegate the
extCAPn since it is registered in the external server, thus the corresponding GW
is not able to validate the extCAPn. Nevertheless, if the user is registered in
the local cloud platform itself, then the user is able to delegate its extCAPn any
external applications. Thus, it provides exible yet restricted access control
by secure certicate or user credential verication.
5.5 Conclusion
Despite having a critical role, access control in the M2M local cloud platform
is faced with unique challenges due to distributed nature of the platform. A
capability-based access control coupled with the key management mechanism
have been proposed in this paper, providing a secure and scalable access control
mechanism with exible right delegation feature. Some use cases have been
presented to show how the proposed approach can provide the desired features
in some operations of the real platform. Although the use cases are taken from
BETaaS project, it is also applicable to any cloud platform.
Currently, the proposed access control mechanism is still under develop-
ment in the context of BETaaS project. It is therefore in our interest to test
how the proposed capability-based access control approach will work in the
real platform deployment and what results can be obtained out of it.
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Intrusion Detection Game in Access
Control System for the M2M Local
Cloud Platform: A Game Theoretical
Approach
A distributed M2M local cloud platform which consists of distributed M2M
gateways, needs to be equipped with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
to monitor its resources against security attacks, especially from the insider,
e.g. another gateway within the local cloud. In this chapter, the interaction
between rational attacker and defender in the context of an M2M local cloud
platform as a multi-stage Bayesian game is studied. In this game formulation, a
defender is able to update its belief upon the maliciousness of the attacker. The
feasible Nash equilibrium of the game is reviewed and an analytical framework
for the rational attacker and defender is provided for a given set of resources
with dierent security values under some constraints on the attack and monitor
resources. In the numerical analysis, it can be shown that by having multiple
resources to be attacked and/or monitored simultaneously provides a kind of
diversity which helps to improve the belief update of the defender.
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6.1 Introduction
The attacks coming from insider is a great security threat to the IT systems
and networks in general, not only in the impact but also in the quantity. To
detect and mitigate such threat is a dicult task for the access control system
which requires to control access permission to important resources within the
system through a set of policies [5]. To this end, an IDS is needed as the
integral part of the access control system to detect the various threats.
A distributed local cloud concept in the M2M system deployment has been
proposed recently in BETaaS project [9]. The local cloud platform is hosted
by multiple M2M gateways cooperating with each other in order to leverage
the set of M2M services provided by each gateway. The M2M gateway can
be a router, set-top box, or other computing devices (e.g. even tablet and
smart phone) that act as a gateway to the M2M devices, thus a local cloud is
equivalent to a network of distributed M2M gateways.
Having distributed M2M gateways cooperating with each other forming a
local cloud, it is necessary for each gateway to dene a set of access control
policies to restrict access to its own set of resources from other nodes within a
local cloud, including the malicious ones. Here, resources of a gateway include
sensor, actuator, data, and service, with dierent levels of security values, i.e.
depending on their cost and importance. The node refers to the M2M gateway,
or gateway in short, because gateway is the main actor that enables local cloud,
and malicious gateway is a gateway that would cause security threat to the
network by attacking the resources owned by another gateway.
We can imagine a situation where a malicious node disguises as a good
node such that it can join the local cloud, but once it becomes part of the
cloud it would cause a huge damage to the system. For example it could
manipulate access right of an actuator controlled by a gateway, e.g. to open
a gate or turning on or o some switches, stealing some sensitive data from
sensors, and so on. We should keep in mind that this local cloud environment
is heterogeneous and the human interaction should be as minimum as possible.
Therefore, the IDS should be able to learn and update its knowledge based on
the interaction with the other nodes.
This chapter models and analyses the interaction between malicious node
(attacker) and the regular node with IDS (defender) with game theory, in or-
der to suggest the best strategies for both sides. Game theory is an analytical
framework used to model rational decision making or strategies of multiple
agents having dierent objectives interacting with each other in the same sys-
tem. Numerous works related to game theory and IDS have been carried out,
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each with dierent objectives [1, 11, 4, 3]. In this chapter, the game is formu-
lated as a multi-stage Bayesian game, as the defender has no prior knowledge
about the node it is interacting with, i.e. whether it is malicious or innocent.
Through the interactions, which is modelled in a multi-stage game, the de-
fender is able to update its belief about the attacker intention via Bayes rule.
On a side note, further action can be taken by the defender, e.g. removing the
malicious gateway from the local cloud, once its belief about the attacker be-
ing malicious converges to one. Finally, an optimum strategy for both attacker
and defender will be derived by considering their respective costs and benets.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: A review of some
related works within the eld of game theory in security and intrussion de-
tection is described in section 6.2. A brief overview of a M2M local cloud
system along with its security consideration is presented in section 6.3. The
game model and denition of sensible resource set are described in section 6.4.
The analysis of proposed multi-stage Bayesian game is explained section 6.5.
A numerical analysis is performed in section 6.6. Finally, the conclusion and
future outlooks are given in section 6.7.
6.2 Related works
Game theory has been applied widely in modelling the network security system,
including the interaction between IDSs and the attackers. Alpcan and Basar
[1] model the intrusion detection in access control system as a non-cooperative
non-zero-sum game in both nite and continuous-kernel versions. The IDS
sensor network is also introduced in their model as a ctitious player which
models the imperfect detection capabilities of the sensor. The existence and
uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) was shown, and the repeated games
of the continuous-kernel version was studied analytically and numerically by
the authors. Bloem et al. further developed an algorithm to optimally allocate
between system administrator's response under the time and eort constraints
in managing the attacks, and the automatic response to the attacks with some
imperfections [2], as a discrete model based on the continuous game version
in [1]. The overall cost function is minimized as the linear programming op-
timization problem, and the simulation results of the algorithm are presented
by the authors.
Y. Liu et al. [11] model the attacker and IDS in the ad hoc wireless networks
as a Bayesian game, in both static and dynamic or repeated game. The Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game is shown, and a hybrid IDS at the
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defender side is proposed in order to balance the trade o between the energy
cost and monitoring gain. Chen et al. [4] proposed a framework which applies
two stages of game theoretical models for economical deployment of intrusion
detection agent. In their model, the rst scheme models a two-person non-
cooperative game between the attacker and IDS agent, and a unique security
risk value, which is the NE derived from the proposed pay-o functions, is
assigned to the agent. The second scheme uses the security risk value to
compute the Shapley value of intrusion detection agent in order to grouped the
IDS agents into coalition groups by the various threat levels so as to provide
fair and optimal IDS deployment.
Chen and Leneutre [3] model the game theoretical framework for IDS in
heterogeneous networks consisting of nodes with dierent non-correlated secu-
rity assets. In the model, a non-cooperative game is considered and a set of
sensible targets with various attack and monitor resource constraints is dened,
in order to analyse and derive the NEs. Various feasible NEs for dierent types
of game, i.e. two-person game, multiple attackers/defenders, Stackelberg Net-
work Intrusion Detection Game, and the game with generalized attack model,
are studied, and a numerical study is performed to validate the analytical
results.
A dynamic Bayesian game between regular and malicious nodes in mobile
ad-hoc networks is studied in [10]. In the model, the regular node would either
cooperate or decline the cooperation with another node, and the malicious
node would either attack or cooperate with another node in order to confuse
or deceive the opponent. On top that, the regular node has an option to
report the malicious node at certain point, i.e. after it receives enough evidence
provided that the reporting gives better pay-o than the other actions. On the
other hand, the malicious node has an option to ee provided that the pay-o
of eeing is higher than the risk of being reported. The pure, mixed, and PBE
strategies of both types of players are studied, and the simulation results to
evaluate those strategies are presented.
6.3 The M2M local cloud system and security
consideration
The M2M local cloud system considered in this chapter refers to the platform
being introduced and developed in BETaaS project. According to BETaaS
description in [9], it is a content-centric platform distributed over a local cloud,
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hosted by gateways, providing an environment for applications accessing M2M
services and devices through a set of services.
The high level architecture consists of three layers: Service layer, Logical
layer, and Physical layer. The service layer contains a set of semantic and
high level services that are built using the functionality of the TaaS reference
model and can be used by the external M2M applications. The logical layer
consists of a TaaS reference model which contains the core logic of the BETaaS
platform that allows the implementation of service modules through a unied
representation of an M2M model, and an adaptation layers which provides
an abstract view of a generic M2M system to the TaaS over various M2M
system specic implementation (e.g. ETSI M2M or proprietary systems). The
physical layer consists of smart things, i.e. the IoT or M2M devices. Although
it is part of the BETaaS architecture, the physical layer is out of the research
scope in BETaaS. However, two relevant initiatives in M2M, e.g. ETSI M2M
[6] and IoT-A [8], are used as reference to create an appropriate abstraction
of TaaS reference model. Figure 6.1 depicts the high level architecture of the
M2M local cloud system in BETaaS.
According to this description of the M2M local cloud system, it is obvious
that the main functionality of local cloud system resides in the logical and
service layers. On the practical deployment perspective, these layers are im-
plemented in a BETaaS gateway, in which one or a set of distributed BETaaS
gateway(s) are able to establish a local cloud. A BETaaS gateway is a logical
entity which reside in a physical gateway e.g. router, set-top box, and other
computing devices like tablet and smart phone. It is important to note that
a physical gateway may contain multiple BETaaS gateways, i.e. by means of
virtualization. However, to simplify our modelling and analysis, a BETaaS
gateway is considered to be equivalent with a physical gateway, and will be
referred only as gateway throughout the rest of this chapter.
As mentioned earlier, at this point a local cloud can be seen as a dis-
tributed network consisting of multiple gateways, and therefore the security
consideration is focused on the gateway level upon its interaction, especially
with the other gateways within the local cloud. Given that, having an IDS
in a gateway is a realistic assumption as an IDS is usually implemented as
an autonomous software agent which resides at network devices, e.g. router,
server, or terminal.
Based on the system description and our previous argument of a big chance
in having great threat or enemy from within the system, an intrusion detection
game between two gateways (attacker and defender) within a local cloud is
considered. The defender naturally has no full knowledge of whether or not
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Figure 6.1: High level architecture of the M2M local cloud system based on
BETaaS
the attacker, i.e. another gateway, is malicious, and this knowledge could
be obtained through some interactions. Therefore, a multi-stage Bayesian
game with two-player is considered as this model is suitable to model such
interaction. In the rest of this chapter, the dynamic Bayesian game formulation
and solutions to model such interaction will be presented.
6.4 Single stage game model
A local cloud system with a xed number of gateway in the network is consid-
ered. It is assumed that each gateway, i.e. acting as a defender, is equipped
with an IDS which can detect any attacker in the network or local cloud.
The players participating in the game are a potential attacker and a de-
fender, denoted by index A and D respectively. The defender has a set of
resources R = f1; 2; :::; Ng to be protected. To avoid any confusion with the
term resource used on dierent context in this chapter, this set of resources R
will be reered as asset throughout the rest of the chapter. The type of player
A is dened in a nite set A = fA0; A1g, where A0 denotes a regular type
and A1 denotes malicious type. The type of player A is a private information
for itself, i.e. whether or not he is a malicious node unknown to the player D.
On the other hand, the type of player D is only regular and its type is known
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by both players A and D. Given that, player D 's belief about the type of player
A being malicious is expressed as a prior probability, denoted by 0.
The interaction between attacker and defender is modelled as a non-cooperative
game, which extends the basic two-player game formulation in [3] into a Bayesian
game. The malicious type of playerA has two pure strategiesAAm = faA0; aA1g,
where aA0 denotes strategy Not attack and aA1 denotes strategy Attack, and
the regular type of player A has only one pure strategy: AAr = faA0g. Here,
the objective of the malicious type of player A is to attack a set of assets
R without being detected. On the other hand, the player D has two pure
strategies: AD = faD0; aD1g, where aD0 denotes strategy Not monitor and
aD1 denotes strategy Monitor. Here, the action Monitor refers to monitoring
a set of its own assets R so as to minimize its loss or optimize its payo.
It is assumed that each asset i 2 R worth of a security asset valueWi, where
Wi > 0. In reality, Wi could be an economic value of the asset, whose value
may depend on how valuable the information it holds, its role in the network,
etc. Therefore  Wi expresses the loss of security value due to a successful
attack, e.g. loss of important data or data integrity, loss of revenue due to
damage of a certain asset, etc. It is also assumed that upon a successful attack
of asset i, both player A and D receive an equal gain/lossWi, i.e. the payo for
player A and D isWi and  Wi respectively. In this chapter, it is assumed that
the security assets of dierent assets are independent. This assumption holds
for ad-hoc network scenario where each node operates independently of each
other [3], e.g. in our case ad-hoc nodes represent the the sensors or actuators
operating "behind" the gateway.
In general, the player A's strategy is to attack a set of assets R under
a probability distribution p = fp1; p2; :::; pNg, where pi is the probability of
attacking asset i and
P
i2R pi  P  1 indicates the resource constraint of the
player A. On the defender D side, its strategy is to monitor a set of assets R in
order to detect the attacks with a probability distribution q = fq1; q2; :::; qNg,
where qi is the probability of monitoring the asset i and
P
i2R qi  Q  1
indicates the player D 's resource constraint.
Table 6.1 illustrates the payo matrix of the attacker/defender Bayesian
game for the asset i in strategic form. In the matrix, the x and y denote the
detection rate (true positive) and false alarm rate, i.e. false positive rate, of
the IDS respectively, and x; y 2 [0; 1]. The cost of attacking and monitoring
of asset i 2 R are denoted by CaWi and CmWi respectively, and are assumed
to be proportional to the security asset value of i, Wi. CfWi denotes the cost
of a false alarm. In this study, the Ca; Cm 2 [0; 1) is assumed so as to give
incentive to player A/D to attack/monitor.
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Table 6.1: Strategic form of the attacker/defender Bayesian game for the asset
i
Monitor Not monitor
Attack (1  2x)Wi   CaWi, Wi   CaWi,  Wi
(2x  1)Wi   CmWi
Not attack 0,  yCfWi   CmWi 0; 0
(a) Player A is malicious with prior probability 0
Monitor Not monitor
Not attack 0,  yCfWi   CmWi 0; 0
(b) Player A is regular with prior probability 1  0
In Table 6.1a, for the strategy combination (Attack, Not monitor), player D
payo is  Wi, and the malicious type of player A's payo is his gain of success
minus the attacking cost, i.e. Wi   CaWi. For the strategy combination (At-
tack, Monitor), the overall payos of both players are dened as the expected
gain/loss of detecting the attack minus the cost of monitoring/attacking asset
i, i.e. CmWi and/or CaWi respecively. The expected gain of detecting the
attack depends on the value of x, which is xWi   (1   x)Wi = (2x   1)Wi,
where 1  x is the false negative rate. On the other hand, the player A would
receive an equivalent gain due to the defender's loss, i.e. (1  2x)Wi. For the
other two strategy combinations, when player A plays Not attack, his payo is
always 0. On the other hand, player D 's payo is 0 if she does not monitor,
and a monitoring cost of CmWi plus an expected loss of yCfWi due to false
alarms would be utilized if the monitor strategy is chosen. Please note that for
the payo matrix in Table 6.1b, i.e. if player A is a regular type, it basically
has a similar payos combination to the second row of the payo matrix in
Table 6.1a.
The overall payos of both player A and D are dened as the following
utility functions:
UA(p;q) =
X
i2R
[piqiWi(1  2x  Ca) + (1  qi)Wi(1  Ca)]
=
X
i2R
piWi(1  2xqi   Ca)
(6.1)
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UD(p;q) =
X
i2R
[0(piqiWi(2x  1  Cm) + (1  pi)qiWi( yCf   Cm)
+ pi(1  qi)( Wi)) + (1  0)qiWi( yCf   Cm)]
=
X
i2R
qiWi(p(2x+ yCf )0   (yCf + Cm)) 
X
i2R
0piWi
(6.2)
6.4.1 Sensible set of assets
In order to optimize its strategy under some attack resource constraint, a
rational attacker A would rather to focus its attacks to some assets to minimize
the risk of being detected, which has been shown by Chen and Leneutre in [3].
Given a set of resource R, it is assumed that each asset has a security asset
valueWi sorted in the following order: W1  W2      WN , and the sensible
assets set RS and the quasi-sensible asset set RQ are dened such that8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Wi >
jRsj:(1 Ca) 2xQ
(1 Ca)
P
j2Rs
1
Wj
 ; 8i 2 RS
Wi =
jRsj:(1 Ca) 2xQ
(1 Ca)
P
j2Rs
1
Wj
 ; 8i 2 RQ
Wi <
jRsj:(1 Ca) 2xQ
(1 Ca)
P
j2Rs
1
Wj
 ; 8i 2 R RS  RQ
(6.3)
where jRSj is the cardinality of RS, and R   RS   RQ denotes the set of
assets in set of assets R but neither in RS nor RQ. According to [3], RS
consists of NA assets with the largest security asset values such that they
incentive for player A to attack them. On the other hand, attacking any asset
i 2 R RS RQ gives no incentives to attacker A. In other words, focusing only
to attack the assets set RS and RQ is enough to maximize the attacker's payo,
while the security assets values of set of assets R RS RQ are not "attractive"
enough to draw attacker's A attention, even if they are not monitored by the
defender D. Consequently, the defender D has no incentive to monitor any
asset i 2 R RS  RQ.
6.5 Proposed multi-stage Bayesian game
To analyse the multi-stage Bayesian intrusion detection game, it is assumed
that the single stage Bayesian game model is played repeatedly in each time
period tk, k = 0; 1; :::. The payos of each player in each stage of the game
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are the same as the payos dened in Section 6.4. To simplify the analysis,
the discount factor with respect to each player's payo is not considered, thus
the payos remain the same in each stage. Another assumption is that each
of the gateway has been authenticated upon joining the local cloud, thus the
identity of all the gateway, i.e. player, is maintained throughout the game.
At the beginning of each stage game, e.g. time period tk, each player
chooses its action among its own pure strategy set simultaneously that is re-
vealed at the end of the stage. In this case, a malicious type of player A will
choose its action at time tk, aA(tk), from its strategies set AAm = faA0; aA1g,
and similarly player D chooses action aD(tk) from the strategies set AD =
faD0; aD1g. In addition, the single stage game model in section 6.4 implicitly
suggests that the game is played by each player using mixed strategy, i.e. a
probability distribution over pure strategies [7]. Similarly in the multi-stage
Bayesian game, a strategy of each player prescribes a behaviour strategy which
essentially is a probability distribution  that maps the set of possible set of
action history prole h(tk) = (a(t0); a(t1); :::; a(tk 1)) and types  into the ac-
tion spaces a, i.e. (aj; h(tk)) [7]. In our case, the behaviour strategy of player
A is dened as A(a
i
A(tk)jA; hiA(tk)), where A denotes any type of player A
within a set A, h
i
A(tk) = (a
i
A(t0); a
i
A(t1); :::; a
i
A(tk 1)) indicates the history
prole of player A with respect to asset i 2 R that belongs to player D at the
beginning of stage tk, and a
i
A(tk) represents the action prole of player A with
respect to asset i 2 R at stage tk. Likewise, the behaviour strategy of player
D is dened as D(a
i
D(tk)jD; hAi (tk)).
Following the mixed strategies of both players dened in section 6.4, i.e.
the attack probability p and monitor probability q over the asset i 2 R, the
set of behaviour strategy  of each player in each stage game tk can be dened
as follows:
A(a
i
A1(tk)jA; hiA(tk)) = pi
A(a
i
A0(tk)jA; hiA(tk)) = P   pi
D(a
i
D1(tk)jD; hiD(tk)) = qi
D(a
i
D0(tk)jD; hiD(tk)) = Q  qi
Player D who has no knowledge of player A's type A, has to choose
its strategy at each stage game tk according to its belief about the type of
player A at the beginning of the stage. By observing the action and history
prole of player A towards the asset i 2 R at the end of the stage game,
player D is able to update its belief on the posterior probability distribution
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D(AjaiA(tk); hiA(tk)) that will be used at the beginning of the subsequent stage
game.
The posterior belief update of player D about the maliciousness of player A
based on its observation of player A's action and history prole at stage game
tk to the stage tk+1 is done based on Bayes rule, and is computed as follows:
D(A1jaiA(tk); hiA(tk)) =
D(A1jhiA(tk))P (aiA(tk)jA1; hiA(tk))P
A2A D(AjhiA(tk))P (aiA(tk)jA; hiA(tk))
(6.4)
where D(AjhiA(tk)); hiA(tk) > 0, P (aiA(tk)jA1; hiA(tk)) is the probability that
any action aA of player A is observed at stage tk, given the type of the player A
being malicious and the history of the set of action from player A throughout
the game, and D(A1jhiA(tk)) is the prior belief of player D at stage tk which
was the result of the posterior belief update at stage tk 1.
Player A
Player D
t0 t1 tk-1
aA(t0)
aD(t0)
D aA(t0), hA(t0) D aA(tk-1),hA(tk-1)
D hA(tk)
tk
aA(tk-1)
aD(tk-1)
aA(tk)
aD(tk)
D aA(tk),hA(tk)
tk+1
Figure 6.2: Illustration of the player D 's posterior belief update in the multi-
stage Bayesian game
Figure 6.2 illustrates the player D 's posterior belief update process using
Bayes rule in the multi-stage game between player A and D, to give a better
understanding of the multi-stage game.
To compute posterior belief according to Equation 6.4, all possible condi-
tional probabilities P (aiA(tk)jA; hiA(tk)) need to be specically dened. In our
case, this depends on the probability of the player A launching an attack p, the
detection rate and false positive rate of the IDS, x and y respectively. Hence,
the conditional probabilities can be computed as follows:
P (aA1(tk)jA1; hiA(tk)) = xpi + y(P   pi)
P (aA0(tk)jA1; hiA(tk)) = (1  x)pi + (1  y)(P   pi)
P (aA1(tk)jA0; hiA(tk)) = y
P (aA0(tk)jA0; hiA(tk)) = 1  y
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where 1 x indicates the false negative (miss detection) rate, and 1 y indicates
the true negative rate.
6.5.1 PBE analysis
In a multi-stage game, the best strategy of each player should represent a Nash
Equilibrium in every stage game of the whole game which known as subgame
perfect equilibrium. Those strategies are determined by considering the re-
sponses or reactions of the other players in each stage of the game. However,
the opponent's in a dynamic game with incomplete information responses are
highly dependent on the player's belief about the opponent. To extend the
subgame perfection in a dynamic Bayesian game, i.e. PBE, it is necessary
to obtain strategies that yield a Bayesian Nash equilibrium not only for the
whole game, but also at every stage of the game. In order to satisfy this, the
players' belief about the opponent must be specied at the beginning of each
stage game. As mentioned earlier, the player's belief is updated according to
the Bayes rule.
In what follows, the existence of PBE in the proposed multi-stage IDS game
is shown and then the mixed strategies equilibrium are determined. First, it
is shown that the proposed multi-stage game satises the Bayesian conditions
B(i)-B(iv) and equilibrium condition P, which guarantee that the incomplete-
information game has a PBE [7].
Lemma 1. The described multi-stage IDS game satises the four Bayesian
conditions [7]:
B(i) Posterior beliefs are independent, and all types of player D have the
same beliefs, for all , t, and h(tk). It requires that even unexpected events will
not change the independence assumption for the type of the opponents.
B(ii) Bayes' rule is used to update beliefs from D(AjhiA(tk)) to D(AjhiA(tk+1))
whenever possible.
B(iii) The players do not signal what they do not know.
B(iv) All players must have the same belief about the type of another player.
Proof. B(i) is satised because player D has only one type. From the pro-
posed belief updating system, the game satises B(ii). Condition B(iii) means
D(A1jaiA(tk); hiA(tk)); D(A1ja^iA(tk); hiA(tk)), if aiA(tk) = a^iA(tk). In our IDS
game, the belief update of player D about player A's type is only inuenced
by player A's signal, thus B(iii) is satised. Since there are only two players
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are in the game at any stage game, and there are no other players inuencing
the belief updates of the two players, hence it satises condition B(iv).
The main point stated in Lemma 1 is that each player's belief updating
is consistent in every stage game. By assuming that the players are ratio-
nal, player D 's optimal strategy at each stage game is to maximize its payo
according to his new beliefs.
Lemma 2. The described multi-stage attacker/defender game satises the
equilibrium condition P for multi-stage games of incomplete-information:
(P) For each player n, type n, player n's alternative strategy 
0
x, and
history h(tk), the expected payo achieved by employing strategy n, denoted
by un, satises the following condition:
un(jh(tk); n; (jh(tk)))  uA((0n;  n)jh(tk); n; (jh(tk)))
In principal, condition P states that each player's behaviour strategy is
sequential rational in each stage game. To proof Lemma 2, the optimum
behaviour strategy of each player will be shown.
Proof. Player D 's optimal behaviour strategy D with respect to his beliefs
about player A's type D(AjaiA(tk); hiA(tk)) at stage game tk satises the fol-
lowing relation:
uD((A; 

D)jD; hiA(tk); D())  uD((A; 0D)jD; hiA(tk); D()) (6.5)
where 0D is an alternative behaviour strategy of defender D, and h
i
A(tk) is
the action history prole of player A with respect to the asset i 2 R, D() is
the abbreviation of D(AjaiA(tk); hiA(tk)), and uD() is the expected payo of
defender D under strategy prole (A; 

D) at stage game tk.
In the same manner, attacker A's optimal behaviour strategy A with re-
spect to his beliefs A(DjaiD(tk); hiD(tk)) at stage game tk satises the following
relation:
uA((

A; D)jA; hiD(tk); A())  uA((0A; D)jA; hiD(tk); A()) (6.6)
where 0A is an alternative behaviour strategy of player A, and h
i
D(tk) is the
action history prole of player D with respect to the asset i 2 R, A() is
the abbreviation of A(DjaiD(tk); hiD(tk)), and uA() is the expected payo of
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player A under strategy prole (A; D) at stage game tk. Since player D has
only one type, Equation 6.6 reduces to
uA((

A; D)jA; hiD(tk))  uA((0A; D)jA; hiD(tk)) (6.7)
Based on the optimum strategies of each player dened in Equation 6.5 and
6.7, given player D 's belief D, the multi-stage attacker/defender game has a
strategy pair  = (A; 

D) that satises the above inequality formula, hence
the equilibrium condition P is satised.
Theorem 1. The described multi-stage IDS game has a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium.
Proof. Since the described multi-stage attacker/defender game satises the
four Bayesian conditions B(i)-B(iv) (Lemma 1) and the equilibrium condition
P (Lemma 2), the game has a strategy prole (; ), where  = (A; 

D) is
a strategy pair for the two players, and  = (A(DjhiD(tk)); D(AjhiA(tk)))
is the vector of beliefs for the two players. Note that A is not needed since
player D 's type is common knowledge. By the denition of PBE [7], (; ) is
a PBE.
Next, the types of potential PBE, namely separating equilibrium, pooling
equilibrium, and hybrid equilibrium [7], are analysed. In our IDS game, the
separating equilibrium cannot be satised because the Attack launched by the
malicious type of player A cannot perfectly reveals its type to player D due to
the error detection rate that the IDS has. On the other hand, player A only
wants to play Not attack if by playing the opposite it will receive a negative
reward. Therefore, it can be seen that the only type of PBE exists in our
game is of hybrid or semi-separating equilibrium, in which both players may
randomize or mix their strategies in order to maximize their respective payo,
while none of them have incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies.
This also conrms the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium solution in each
stage game.
Please recall that there is a set of assets i 2 R with dierent security
values to be attacked and monitored by player A and D respectively, under a
given resource constraint to each player. In such a case, the mixed strategy
equilibrium should be determined by analyzing dierent cases, i.e. depending
on the resource constrains. For this purpose, a similar analysis explained in
[3] will be followed.
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First, let (p;q; ()) denote the PBE of the game, and given the utility
functions of each player, UA and UD, the following relations are satised:
0 (1  2xqi   Ca)Wi = (1  2xqj   Ca)Wj
(1  2xql   Ca)Wl8i; j; l 2 R; pi ; pj > 0; pl = 0
(6.8)
0 [pi (2x+ yCf )D(A1j)  (yCf + Cm)]Wi
=[pj(2x+ yCf )D(A1j)  (yCf + Cm)]Wj
[pl (2x+ yCf )D(A1j)  (yCf + Cm)]Wl
8i; j; l 2 R; qi ; qj > 0; ql = 0
(6.9)
The relationship shown in Equation 6.8 can be explained as follows: if
(1   2xqi   Ca)Wi < 0, player A would better choose pi = 0; if (1   2xqi  
Ca)Wi < (1   2xqj   Ca)Wj, then player A has incentive to decrease pi and
increase pj ; if (1  2xqi   Ca)Wi < (1  2xql   Ca)Wl, then player A will get
more payo by adding pi to p

l and setting p

i = 0. Similarly, Equation 6.9 can
also be explained in the same way.
Based on resource constraint of each player, the following cases are consid-
ered:
1.
P
i2R q

i = Q and
P
i2R p

i = P
2.
P
i2R q

i < Q and
P
i2R p

i = P
3.
P
i2R q

i < Q and
P
i2R p

i < P
In Case 1, both players use up all their resources to attack or monitor. It
happens when the security assetsWi from the set of resources are considerably
high as compared to the attacking or monitoring cost, therefore both players
are trying to attack and monitor the assets that have the biggest security
values (as pointed out in Section 6.4.1) using all of their attacking/monitoring
assets. In Case 2, player A uses all its attacking resource to the limit, while
it does not give incentive for player D to utilize all its monitoring resources,
due to high monitoring cost as compared to the gain it would achieve, i.e. the
security values of protected assets. In Case 3, both players do not use all of
their attacking/monitoring resources because by doing so it does not give so
much incentive for both of them. This is due to high attacking and monitoring
cost as compared to the security values of the assets.
From the formulation of our multi-stage Bayesian game and the Theorem
2 in [3], it can be shown that the equilibrium strategies of each player in each
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of the case mentioned earlier at stage game tk, i.e. p

i (tk) and q

i (tk), result in
the following strategies:
1) If ND  NA and NA(1  Ca) > 2xQ, then
pi (tk)
8>>>><>>>>:
= PA
Wi
PNA
j=1
1
Wj
+
yCf+Cm
(2x+yCf )D(A1j)

1  NA
Wi
PNA
j=1
1
Wj

; i 2 RS
2

0; PA
Wi
PNA
j=1
+
yCf+Cm
(2x+yCf )D(A1j)

1  NA
Wi
PNA
j=1
1
Wj

; i 2 RQ
= 0 ; i 2 R RS  RQ
qi (tk) =
8<: 12x

1  Ca   NA(1 Ca) 2xQWiPNAj=1 1Wj

; i 2 RS
0 ; i 2 R RS
2) If ND  NA
pi (tk)
8>><>>:
=
yCf+Cm
(2x+yCf )D(A1j) ;Wi > WND+1
2
h
0;
yCf+Cm
(2x+yCf )D(A1j)
i
;Wi =WND+1
= 0 ;Wi < WND+1
qi (tk) =
(
1 Ca
2x

1  WND+1
Wi

;Wi > WND+1
0 ;Wi  WND+1
3) If ND  NA and NA(1  Ca)  2xQ, then
pi (tk) =
yCf + Cm
(2x+ yCf )D(A1j) ; q

i (tk) =
1  Ca
2x
; i 2 R
in this case ND = NA = N .
where ND is the number of security assets that are worth to be monitored by
player D and is dened as ND = b(2x+ yCf )P=(yCf + Cm)c.
6.6 Numerical analysis
In this section, some numerical analysis are performed to illustrate our analyt-
ical model and the equilibrium in the described multi-stage Bayesian game.
A scenario where the attacking and monitoring costs are relatively high, i.e.
due to energy or other constraints, while security values of the assetsWi; i 2 R,
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are not as much high a compared to the attacking and monitoring costs, is
considered. In this case, the following cost parameters are set: Ca = Cm = 0:1,
and Cf = 0:3. The detection rate and false positive rate of the IDS are
x = 83:33% and y = 0:029% respectively. Ten protected assets with normalized
security values are considered: Wi = 0:1  (11  i), i 2 [1; 10]. Both attacking
and monitoring resources, P and Q, are set to 1.
Table 6.2 shows the mixed strategies equilibrium in each stage game (p;q).
Given its attack resource constraint, it can be seen that player A focuses only
to attack six most valuable assets out of ten with some probabilities. Conse-
quently, player D has incentive to monitor the same six assets as well.
For the purpose of illustrating how the posterior belief of player D upon
observing the player A's action, i.e. D(A1j), and how player A's strategies
distribution adapts the D(A1j) in the multi-stage Bayesian game, a hundred
stages game is run in which each player choose its own strategy simultaneously
based on the observation in the previous stage. At the beginning of the stage,
both D(A1j) and D(A0j) equal to 0:5. Player A decides to Attack or Not
attack randomly according to the calculated equilibrium strategy p, and the
same way applies to player D.
Figure 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate how the posterior belief of player D evolves
upon its observation to player A's action on the asset i = 1 and i = 5 re-
spectively, over the game duration. In both gures, observed action 0 means
that player D observes No attack, and 1 means Attack action was observed. It
is clear that the posterior belief quickly converges to 1 after observing Attack
due to high detection rate and low false alarm rate. Furthermore, it is very
dicult to reduce the posterior belief to a lower level in the next stage even a
Table 6.2: Mixed equilibrium strategies
i pi q

i
1 0:1183  0:0176=D(A1j) 0:2751
2 0:1314  0:0128=D(A1j) 0:2457
3 0:1478  0:0068=D(A1j) 0:2089
4 0:1689 + 0:0008=D(A1j) 0:1616
5 0:1971 + 0:0110=D(A1j) 0:0985
6 0:2365 + 0:0253=D(A1j) 0:0102
7 0 0
8 0 0
9 0 0
10 0 0
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Figure 6.3: Player D 's posterior belief update D(A1j) upon its observation
to player A's action on the asset i = 1
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Figure 6.4: Player D 's posterior belief update D(A1j) upon its observation
to player A's action on the asset i = 5
No attack action is observed once it is converged to 1. It can also be noticed
that having multiple assets to be monitored simultaneously quickly improves
the posterior belief update, as chances of observing attacks toward any of the
available asset is more than just monitoring a single asset.
Figure 6.5 illustrates how the mixed equilibrium strategy of player A, p,
over the most valuable assets evolves in the multi-stage Bayesian game. It is
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Figure 6.5: Player A's best strategy p in each stage game over the most
valuable assets
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Figure 6.6: Players A's and D 's overall payos in each stage game
can be seen that at the initial stage of the game until an Attack is observed
by player D, player A tries to increase or decrease its probability of attacking
over dierent security assets in order to maintain its optimum payo. However,
when an Attack is observed, player A pulls back its attack probability to reduce
its probability of being caught by player D, thus maintaining its optimum
overall payo. It is obvious as well that p converges to a steady state value
once the D(A1j) converges to 1.
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Figure 6.8: Players A's and D 's average utilities deviations, i.e.
U 0A   UA andU 0D   UD vs y0y , from the variation of false alarm rate, with x = 83:33% and
y = 0:29%
Figure 6.6 shows the players A's and D 's payos in each stage of the
game,i.e. UA(tk) and UD(tk) respectively. It is observed that UA(tk) remains
constant because it is not a function of D(A1j). On the other hand, UD(tk)
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varies as D(A1j) varies, and UD(tk) reaches a steady state once D(A1j)
converges to 1.
As the utility functions of both players A and D are inuenced by the IDS's
performance represented by the detection rate and false positive rate, e.g. x
and y respectively, the next question would be how these parameters inuence
the overall utilities of the players throughout the game. Figure 6.7 and 6.8 show
the variations of both player A's and D 's average payos throughout the game,
represented by
U 0A   UA and U 0D   UD respectively, due to the deviations
of IDS's performance parameters, with the default parameters x = 83:33%
and y = 0:29%. In both observations, a series of one hundred stages game is
played for 100 times, and then the average utilities in each series are taken
before averaging over 100 times of playing. In Figure 6.7, the players' utilities
deviations are observed by lowering the detection rate to as low as 0:6 of the
default detection rate parameter, i.e. x0 = 50%, while keeping the default
false alarm rate y = 0:29%. Please note that in this case, the U
0
A increases as
the x0 decreases while the U
0
D goes lower as the x
0 decreases. This behaviour
is expected because when the IDS's is lower, player A receives more payo,
while the opposite behaviour applies to player D. In Figure 6.8, the players'
utilities deviations are observed by increasing the false alarm rate to as high
as 10 times of the default false alarm rate parameter, i.e. y0 = 2:9%, while
keeping the default detection rate x = 83:33%. In this case the U
0
D slightly
decreases as false alarm rate increases while the U
0
A remains constant. From
both observations, it is obvious that the impact of varying detection rate x
towards both players' utilities UA and UD is more sensitive than the variation
of false alarm rate y.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a multi-stage Bayesian game model for IDS implementation in
access control system of a M2M distributed local cloud framework is proposed.
The feasible Nash equilibrium for each stage game is presented, which requires
the defender to continuously update its belief towards its opponent. An ana-
lytical framework for a rational attacker and defender is provided, where the
defender has a set of security assets to be protected that is also subject to the
attack from the opponent, under a certain constraint of the attack and moni-
toring resource. The proposed model and analytical framework are evaluated
numerically, and an interesting fact was found out that having to monitor a
set of security assets helps the defender to improve its posterior belief update.
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In this study, a defender's further action towards the attacker when its
posterior belief reaches a certain level, e.g. kick the attacker out from the local
cloud, has not been included in the game formulation. It is interesting to study
the game when this action and another response action from the attacker, e.g.
disassociate from the local cloud, are included, and to derive the best strategies
for each player in such circumstances. Another interesting outlook is to study
the game in which multiple attackers/defenders are involved, i.e. a coalition
game.
156
6.8. References
6.8 References
[1] Tansu Alpcan and T. Basar. A game theoretic analysis of intrusion de-
tection in access control systems. In Decision and Control, 2004. CDC.
43rd IEEE Conference on, 2004.
[2] M. Bloem, Tansu Alpcan, and T. Basar. Intrusion response as a resource
allocation problem. In Decision and Control, 2006 45th IEEE Conference
on, 2006.
[3] Lin Chen and J. Leneutre. A game theoretical framework on intrusion
detection in heterogeneous networks. Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, 4(2):165{178, 2009.
[4] Yi-Ming Chen, Dachrahn Wu, and Cheng-Kuang Wu. A game theoretic
framework for multi-agent deployment in intrusion detection systems. In
Security Informatics, volume 9 of Annals of Information Systems, pages
117{133. Springer US, 2010.
[5] Jason Crampton and Michael Huth. Towards an access-control framework
for countering insider threats. In Insider Threats in Cyber Security, vol-
ume 49 of Advances in Information Security, pages 173{195. Springer US,
2010.
[6] ETSI. Machine-to-machine communications (m2m); functional architec-
ture. Technical report, European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), 2011.
[7] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[8] IoT-A. Internet of things - architecture. http://www.iot-a.eu.
[9] George Labropoulos. D1.2.1 - user and system requirements. Technical
report, BETaaS, 2012.
[10] Feng Li and Jie Wu. Hit and run: A bayesian game between malicious and
regular nodes in manets. In Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications
and Networks, 2008. SECON '08. 5th Annual IEEE Communications So-
ciety Conference on, 2008.
[11] Yu Liu, Cristina Comaniciu, and Hong Man. A bayesian game approach
for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks. In Proceeding from
the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks,
GameNets '06. ACM, 2006.
157

7
Conclusions
This dissertation presents some challenges in the eld of access control in
IoT/M2M Cloud platform and gives solutions for them. There are three main
topics that are discussed in this dissertation: generic access control model for
IoT/M2M networks; access control and mobility management in RFID mid-
dleware; intrusion detection in access control system for M2M local cloud plat-
form. In this chapter, the dissertation has been concluded and future direction
of for the access control in IoT/M2M Cloud platform is given.
7.1 Access control and mobility management
in RFID middleware
The inter-enterprise RFID middleware sub-system generates highly dynamic
and huge amounts of RFID events data that creates a big challenge in man-
aging the access of such data. The overall RFID events data contains some
business context information, such as business step, business transaction type,
business location, disposition, etc, which may compromise the privacy of the
organization if such information is exploited by the attacker, e.g. the attacker
can analyse the production volume, sales activity, etc of a company. As far
as the access control is concerned, a ne-grained access control, i.e. disclose
only specic portions of information or elds of data, is required to tackle the
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privacy issue. In addition, an ecient access control mechanism is equally
important to deal with huge data that dynamically changes over time. The
proposed solution to such challenge is presented in Chapter 2. The access pol-
icy in the proposed mechanism is designed to take the prole of the accessing
entity and results in a suitable set of access rules of the corresponding entity to
the object(s), thus the access policy can be dynamically reuse for any user that
even had no relationship before. The access policy is dened in such a way
that it can express the dynamic context information well, e.g. time span and
EPC IDs range. A system implementation which supports inter-operability
with the RFID middleware dened by EPCglobal standard, is performed to
evaluate the proposed access control model. Finally, some qualitative compar-
ison between the proposed access control model with the existing ones, namely
X-GTRBAC and AAL, and it can be shown the proposed access control model
complements the features that are not available in each of them in terms of
ne-grained access to data, trust, and inter-operability. However, it would have
been more interesting to perform a quantitative study comparison against the
existing models, i.e. performance measurements of the existing models imple-
mentation, which would also give a more solid analysis. In any case, it has
been shown that the hypotheses 1.6.1.1.2 is justied.
Besides the challenge in privacy and access control in particular, the loca-
tion or mobility management of the RFID middleware sub-system infrastruc-
ture is not well dened by EPCglobal standard. Additionally, as IP is one
of the strongest candidate in inter-connecting billions of devices and network
technologies, including RFID, over the internet, an IP-based mobility man-
agement in RFID allows smooth integration with IP-based service. Currently,
the ECPglobal utilizes an ONS, an entity based on DNS implementation, to
resolve the network address of the EPCIS repository that stores the informa-
tion about the EPC. However, when a tag (represented with its EPC ID)
moves to another domain, e.g. company or organization, the EPCglobal left
the tag mobility management to the system implementation. In Chapter 3,
an ecient, scalable, and secure mobility management of the inter-enterprise
RFID sub-system based on EPCglobal standard is proposed. The proposed
solution comprises an integration of a SIP based mobility management in the
overall inter-enterprise RFID sub-system architecture and a secure access con-
trol based on the one proposed in Chapter 2. The test bed implementation is
done in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution. The per-
formance evaluation results show that the proposed solution greatly reduced
the delay and is easily scale to many number of tags as compared with one of
the existing system used in the study.
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7.2 Capability-based access control for IoT/M2M
networks and cloud platform
As a solution to issues particular in access control for the IoT/M2M, such
as scalability issues due to huge numbers of devices and users, and the dy-
namic nature of IoT/M2M, the Capability-based Context-Aware Access Con-
trol (CCAAC) is proposed and designed in Chapter 4. The proposed CCAAC
model solves the scalability issue in the IoT/M2M by using the capability {
sometimes referred to as token { owned by the requesting entity, as means of
authorizing an entity to access the protected resource. In order to solve the dy-
namic nature of distributed system such as IoT/M2M, the proposed CCAAC
incorporates the context into the capability that becomes part of the access
evaluation along with the capability validity check. The model also provides
an authority delegation framework which is necessary in a system to operate
in a distributed manner and to deal with the dynamic nodes connectivity in
the IoT/M2M network. The authority delegation performed through a secure
capability propagation. The privacy issue which becomes one of the primary
concern in adopting the IoT is also addressed in the proposed CCAAC by
introducing a virtual identity. The virtual identity is linked with the access
policies of an object or resource to be accessed where the object owner can
decide how it is to be seen and what information to be disclosed. However,
the formal modelling of the incorporated context in the capability, i.e. by
dening the exact types, attributes, and properties of the context, is left open,
which opens an opportunity for future extension. In addition, the trust which
plays an important role especially in the access decision as well as delegation
has not been considered in the proposed CCAAC. The privacy issue which
becomes one of the primary concern in adopting the IoT is also addressed in
the proposed CCAAC by introducing a virtual identity. The virtual identity
is linked with the access policies of an object or resource to be accessed where
the object owner can decide how it is to be seen and what information to
be disclosed. Finally, the proposed CCAAC is evaluated in order to measure
its resilience against some attacks, especially man-in-the-middle and replay at-
tacks. The evaluation results show that by introducing a nonce and lightweight
cryptographic operation, the proposed access control mechanism is resilience
against the previously mentioned types of attacks, plus the authentication can
be achieved as well. As a conclusion, the hypotheses 1.6.1.3.1 is conrmed
through these arguments and evaluation results, although some additional fea-
tures with respect to context and trust could have been done to complete the
overall CCAAC model.
161
Chapter 7
Another capability-based access control model has been designed and im-
plemented in Chapter 5 as an extension of the CCAAC model for the IoT/M2M
cloud platform. Various issues pertaining access control, especially in the
IoT/M2M cloud platform, such as the scalability and enforcing least privi-
lege access principle issues in ACL, RBAC, or ABAC, access delegation issue
in the API keys and OAuth based access control system, and the issue of con-
trolling capability propagation in the typical capability based access control,
are addressed by the proposed access control method. Several uses cases have
shown that the proposed capability based access control is suitable to the var-
ious operations of the IoT/M2M cloud platform. It should also be noted that,
in principal the proposed access control model is also suitable for any kind of
cloud computing platform.
7.3 Intrusion detection in access control sys-
tem for M2M local cloud platform
The IoT/M2M local cloud platform comprises a collection of distributed IoT/M2M
gateways cooperating to each other so as to provide a richer set of combined
M2M services from dierent gateways. One of the challenging issue is how to
protect a set of resources or security assets owned by each gateway by means of
access control mechanism, in the presence of uncertainty about the malicious-
ness of the other gateway(s) within the local cloud system. One solution of
this issue is to incorporate an intrusion detection system (IDS) with the access
control system. In addition, each gateway may be subject to some resource
constraint (e.g. power) that inuence how much it can monitor its assets using
the IDS as well as the attacking eort by the attacker, thus necessitates the
analysis of the optimum monitoring and attacking eorts (i.e. probability)
to help the optimum conguration in the platform. An analytical framework
that models the interaction between two gateways, i.e. attacker and defender,
with some resource constraint and based on a two-player multi-stage Bayesian
game is proposed in Chapter 6. The existence of the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) is proved in the proposed analytical framework and a set of PBE
strategies in each stage game is constructed. A set of numerical analysis has
been done to validate the proposed framework. Some important ndings in the
numerical analysis can be summarized as follows: the mixed strategies equi-
librium for both players in the proposed framework are consistent throughout
the whole game stages, the belief update of the defender is improved thanks
to multiple assets being monitored simultaneously, and the impact of varying
the detection rate towards both players' utilities is more sensitive than the
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variation of the false alarm rate of the IDS. These ndings show that the pro-
posed multi-stage Bayesian game can be used to optimally congure the IDS in
the access control system of an M2M local cloud platform given some system
parameters, e.g. detection and false alarm rate of the IDS, the number and
security values of the assets, and the resource constraints. In conclusion, the
hypotheses 1.6.1.1.4 is proven, although some necessary adaptation or tweak-
ing in the parameters, especially the monitoring, attacking, and false alarm
costs, will still be needed in order to apply this analytical framework in the
real system.
7.4 Future directions
The research work on the CCAAC can be extended into several directions.
The access control mechanism considered in this work does not include the
actual authentication method, although some level of authentication can be
achieved by employing a simple light-weight cryptographic method. This work
can be extended by incorporating the CCAAC model with light-weight au-
thentication supporting capability, such as an ECC based key management
and authentication, and to evaluate it with a more realistic adversaries model.
The authority delegation framework in the proposed CCAAC assumes trust
relationships that are already established among entities in dierent federation
domain. The future extension will consider the case in which no prior knowl-
edge of the trust relationship between two network domains in Federated IoT.
Unlike the approach used in this paper, an additional entity that is trusted
by both domains, for instance Identity Provider (IdP), needs to be involved
in the design. Finally, prototype implementation of all aspects in CCAAC is
something to look forward as a future step.
The access control management in the inter-enterprise RFID system relies
on the trusted third parties entity to obtain the user prole. However, the
mechanism on dealing with the trust management has not been addressed yet.
The proposed model can be extended by incorporating Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) Certicate Authority (CA), e.g. X.509 Certicate, into the access
control framework. Accordingly, the future update in the system implementa-
tion to support such extension is required.
In the research study on the intrusion detection in access control system
for M2M local cloud platform, a defender's further action towards the attacker
when its posterior belief reaches a certain level, e.g. kick the attacker out from
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the local cloud, has not been included in the game formulation. It is interest-
ing to study the game when this action and another response action from the
attacker, e.g. disassociate from the local cloud, are included, and to derive the
best strategies for each player in such circumstances. Another interesting out-
look is to study the game in which multiple attackers/defenders are involved,
i.e. a coalition game. Lastly, the future step also includes the implementation
of this analytical framework in the real M2M local cloud platform.
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